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1. WORKING WITH CASE STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: THE 
ISSUES AHEAD 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION: CASES AND CASE STUDIES 
Despite fads and fashions in the academic culture, case-based reasoning has proved to be 
a persistent form of analysis in the social sciences, in the humanities, and even in moral 
thinking. Broadly understood, case-based reasoning locates the ultimate source of our 
epistemic and moral intuitions in the concreteness and idiosyncrasy of particulars. Even 
though they can be traced back to a common root, different traditions of reasoning with 
cases and of using case studies coexist in the academic landscape. To some extent, the 
divide between traditions maps onto the distinction between practice-oriented and theory-
oriented disciplines, the former being concerned with the solution of concrete problems 
and the latter mostly aiming at the formulation of abstract conceptualizations and general 
principles.  
One can discern three main contexts of use: the case study as pedagogical tool, as method 
of treatment or intervention, and as an epistemic strategy. Even though, as a matter of 
fact, contexts of use to some extent match scientific fields, they do so loosely, in the sense 
that a given field can be hospitable to multiple uses of case studies. 
In practice-oriented fields, which to a large extent aim at producing and transmitting 
practical knowledge that is knowledge of how to practice a profession, the study of cases 
became an essential pedagogical tool. Ever since case studies were first introduced in the 
Harvard Law School in 1870 by C.C. Langdell, and soon after were adopted by the medical 
and business schools in Harvard,1 the case-based form of reasoning is being used to 
familiarize the students with the principles of the discipline and the types of problems they 
will confront eventually as professional practitioners (Forrester 1996, Creager et al. 2007). 
The case, in fact, instantiates the basic principles, illustrates both recurrent and atypical 
problems, and offers practical solutions to those problems. Knowledge of cases is 
                                                          
1 For a discussion of the use of case studies for teaching purpose in the business school see McNair 
(1954). 
  
expected to guide the future practitioner through the specificity of the situations she will 
eventually confront.   
In fields such as psychology and psychiatry the case-study is the clinical study. The 
treatment of the patient creates case-based knowledge in the first place, which is in turn 
used on subsequent occasions as raw evidence to diagnose, explain, and actually treat other 
patients. In these domains, case-based reasoning and knowledge, though used to some 
extent as a pedagogical tool, informs primarily the therapeutic practice.2 One might look 
at the art of casuistry as a similar context of use. Casuistry was directed at adjudicating 
moral issues and based its moral judgments on detailed acquaintance with a huge 
repertoire of cases, rather than on the principled knowledge of moral theories. It was the 
method of settling moral disputes and dilemmas used by the priest and the savior, regarded 
as fully legitimate until Blaise Pascal’s Provincial Letters contributed to its demise (Jonsen 
and Toulmin 1988). Pascal attacked fiercely the Jesuits of Paris for using case-based moral 
reasoning to placate wealthy Church donors while punishing poor penitents. It is still 
unclear what Pascal’s intentions were: whether “he was writing within the casuistic 
tradition, as a rigorist objecting to the laxism of his contemporaries”, or whether he was 
rejecting the whole tradition as deceptive or compromising (15). Be that as it may, as a 
matter of fact since Pascal’s attack the casuist’s method fell into disrepute for a very long 
time.  
In the social sciences, case studies are regarded primarily as an epistemic strategy.3 It 
is plausible to distinguish between weaker and stronger epistemic usage of case studies. At 
the weaker end of the spectrum, case studies occupy an ancillary role in the scientific 
investigation. That is, they are subordinate to other research strategies for illustrative 
purposes: in this context the case study is the illustration of a concept, a claim, or even a 
theory, as instantiated in a concrete case. Alternatively, case studies are the final output of 
a long and complex research procedure of inquiry, case study research (CSR), aimed at 
                                                          
2 For a distinction between clinical study and case study see Eckstein (2000 [1975]). For a criticism of the 
use of case studies in psychiatry see Grϋnbaum (1988); for a defense see Runyan (1982) and Al Rubaie 
(2002). 
3 In the present thesis, (research) strategy and method are used as synonyms.  
  
acquiring familiarity with, interpreting, characterizing, explaining, and theorizing 
phenomena of scientific interest; and, in turn, at using these descriptions, explanations, 
theorizations to predict and control social outcomes. When used as epistemic strategies in 
this stronger sense, case studies posit hypotheses about phenomena. These hypotheses are 
subject to methodological scrutiny for what concerns their credibility and their capacity to 
fulfill the research goals.   
Despite being widespread, the use of case studies to establish hypotheses in the social 
sciences has typically been regarded with suspicion, or with lenience, by some part of the 
scientific community (Gerring 2007a, Flyvbjerg 2006). Some scholars simply dismissed 
case studies as merely providing anecdotal knowledge and likened them to mere story-telling 
(Campbell 1975, Eysenck 1976)4. Other scholars adopted a more charitable view and tried 
to rehabilitate what they call the case study method in the arena of scientific methods 
(Lijphart 1971, Eckstein 2000 [1975]). They looked at it as a “special case” of the 
experimental and statistical methods. Similar to the latter in purpose and logic, it would 
mainly differ from them as to the strength of its findings. Typically, it would be understood 
as a research strategy of limited reliability, to which one resorts when the other designs, 
regarded as stronger in these respects, cannot be employed.  
More recently, scholars started looking at case studies with renewed attention and it is 
reasonable to talk of a new trend in the field. Testimony of this turn is the increasing 
number of methodologically informed publications in the social sciences and in 
philosophy.5 Several circumstances have contributed to this methodological “awakening”: 
the growing dissatisfaction with the old view that saw merely the method of case studies 
as a last resort, to be employed in the absence of a better alternative; the growing belief 
that skepticism about case studies was probably due to a lack of understanding the 
method; finally, the realization that case studies have a potential to offer that is still 
                                                          
4 Both Campbell and Eysenck have been initially fierce critics of CSR who have later softened and 
modified their original views (Flyvberg 2006). 
5 Important works in this areas are Becker and Ragin (1992), Bennett and Elman (2006), Brady and Collier 
(2004), George and Bennett (2005), Gerring (2007a), Ragin (2000). 
  
unexplored. This new perspective emphasizes the specificity of case studies and aims at 
assessing how they can best fulfill their potential.  
This new perspective informs my thesis. Its main focus is the use of case studies in the 
social sciences as an epistemic strategy to formulate, establish, and generalize causal 
hypotheses. A secondary focus is an investigation into the use of causal findings generated 
in case studies to inform policy making in the social realm. The case study, as I understand 
it, is the thick analysis of social phenomena as they occurred in circumscribed contexts. It 
is thus a situated analysis, rich in detail and directed to represent faithfully the complexity 
of the object of interest. As such, it constitutes a reservoir of local knowledge that becomes 
evidentially useful when understanding and intervening in the social world in order to fix 
it, change it, and improve it. One way in which case studies can perform this evidential 
role is by formulating causal hypotheses in a rigorous and conscientious way.  
In this chapter, I characterize what can be regarded as two alternative views of case 
studies and the understanding of science in which they are embedded.  
The first approach flourished in the 70s and looked at case studies as a special, and 
typically weaker, form of the experimental, statistical, or comparative methods. Since this 
approach tends to evaluate case studies by criteria belonging to other methodological 
traditions, it can be said to present a heteronomous paradigm. This view prevented the full 
grasp of the specificity and potential of case studies. The second, alternative view, which 
developed during the last decades, is taking shape gradually and is still far from being fully 
articulated. This approach strives for an understanding of case studies liberated from the 
narrow mindset that caricatures case studies as the method of last resort. In particular, it 
sees case studies as an autonomous epistemic genre (Morgan 2012). It thus carries the promise 
to come to terms with the idiosyncrasy that renders this research strategy so peculiar and 
challenging.  
The two approaches are rarely found in their ideal typical form and there is no neat 
dividing line between authors and historical periods. Recent contributors to the debate are 
not always fully consistent in their adherence to the new paradigm and are still often 
conditioned by the old one. It is nevertheless useful to keep the two views distinct in order 
  
to state more clearly the reasons why the former approach should be abandoned and the 
latter is where we need to move instead. 
 
1.2 THE HETERONOMOUS PARADIGM 
The traditional way to understand Case Study Research (CSR) is to look at it as a “special 
case” of the other research strategies, be it the statistical method, the comparative, or yet 
the experimental one (Morgan 2012). This view emphasizes the affinity in logic and 
purposes between CSR and the other research strategies and reduces their differences to 
matters of degree. CSR would, in fact, differ from the other methods essentially because 
it focuses on a single case rather than many (Lijphart 1971). From the homogeneity of 
purpose among the methods, it follows that CSR is characterized as stronger, or weaker, 
than the other strategies in some relevant respects, such as its capacity to discover 
phenomena, formulate new hypotheses, and suggest new concepts (heuristic power), or 
its capacity to provide rational grounds for phenomena, theories, and concepts already in 
use (testing power).  
Within the traditional view, positions differ as to the comparative strengths and 
weakness of CSR. Some scholars, for instance, see it as stronger than the other methods 
as to heuristic power while others recommend the use of statistical methods for 
formulating new theories and concepts (Eckstein 2000 [1975]). On the other hand, 
scholars disagree on whether the testing power constitutes a comparative advantage or 
disadvantage of CSR. Eckstein, for example, defends the admittedly unconventional view 
that regards CSR as comparatively powerful as a testing tool, while the majority in this 
tradition defends the superiority of the alternative methods for theory justification 
(Flyvbjerg 2006).  
Despite disagreement as to the comparative advantages or disadvantages of CSR, the 
traditional view emphasizes the homogeneity of purpose and rationale between CSR and 
  
the other research methods. In particular, adherents to this view typically maintain the 
following tenets:6     
a) Science  centers on the formulation of very broad, or universal, 
generalizations; 
b) It primarily aims to provide explanations of scientific phenomena; 
c) Scientific explanations employ general propositions (see a above) 
that relate two or more variables, or regularities.7  
d) The scientific practice is structured around: 
1. The context of discovery: the process of finding new 
scientific hypotheses. 
2. The context of justification: the process by means of 
which scientific hypotheses are judged.8   
According to this view the comparative strength of a method depends on the extent 
to which it contributes either to the context of discovery or to the context of justification. 
Scientific hypotheses are seen in this context as general propositions that describe 
empirical regularities. When assessed in this framework, the heuristic and testing power of 
CSR depends on how CSR, regarded as “the study of a phenomenon for which we report 
                                                          
6 These four tenets are by no means exhaustive of the traditional view discussed here. The adherents to 
this view of CSR also share to a large extent a similar explanatory model, hold to a sharp distinction 
between facts and theory, and so on. My purpose here is not to fully articulate the underlying conception 
of science; rather, it is presenting the underlying tenets that are more directly relevant to their assessment 
of CSR.   
7  I shall discuss below that regularities are but a form of scientific generalizations. Mechanisms are 
generalizations of a different form, at least according to some scholars (see section 1.3). 
8 Paul Hoyningen-Huene notices how the distinction between context of discovery and justification (the 
DJ distinction), as used in the 1960s and 1970s, is not just one distinction but a set of intermingled 
distinctions (2006: 119). He thus distinguishes five versions of the DJ distinction (six including the one 
he proposes): two of them concern the object-level that is discovery and justification as things in the 
world; the other four distinguish between discovery and justification at the meta-level by appealing to the 
methodological and disciplinary differences in the analysis of discovery and justification. In my 
understanding, adherents to the traditional view of CSR most probably conflate the five versions and certainly 
endorse the first version which sees discovery and justification as distinct temporal processes. This version is 
regarded as untenable by Hoyningen-Huene because it is often not possible in the history of science to 
identify processes of discovery as opposed to processes of justification (2006: 121; see also section 1.3 
below).  
  
only a single measure on any pertinent variable” (Eckstein 2000 [1975]: 124), contributes 
either to the formulation of new regularities or to their corroboration.  
This view as applied to CSR is epitomized in some influential contributions such as 
Arend Lijphart (1971), Harry Eckstein (2000 [1975]), Joseph Campbell (1975), and Stanley 
Lieberson (1991). However, it is not exhausted there. Even though certainly dominant 
among social scientists back in the 1970s, traces of it still survive nowadays in some major 
contributions to the literature on CSR (Vennesson 2008).  
 
1.2.1 DEGREES OF FREEDOM AND GENERALIZATIONS 
In Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method (1971) Lijphart articulates an approach to 
CSR that can be regarded as paradigmatic of the traditional view:9 he characterizes science 
as an explanatory endeavor to which the various research strategies contribute by 
establishing empirical regularities among variables of interest. Establishing regularities in 
a reliable way demands, however, controlling the other relevant variables, which the 
various research strategies attain to a different extent (1971: 683). Lijphart thus articulates 
a hierarchy of methods with (1) the ideal controlled experiment on top, and, in descending 
order, (2) the randomized experiment, (3) the statistical method, (4) the comparative 
method, and (5) CSR respectively. The methods in the hierarchy share the same logic but 
pursue control by different means and to a different extent. These means, in fact, are not 
all equally effective to the end of control. In particular, the lower a given strategy is in the 
hierarchy, the more imperfect is the control it achieves on the relevant variables.  
The ideal controlled experiment creates two identical situations in which perfect 
control of the relevant variables is achieved and the relationship between the variables of 
interest is therefore established with certainty. In most actual scientific practice this ideal 
situation can only be approximated and the confidence in the conclusion weakened 
accordingly. 
                                                          
9 Even though Lijphart’s view is certainly mainstream within the traditional view not everybody shares 
his hierarchical view on methods that sees the ideal experiment as the gold standard (see below). 
  
(2) When the ideal controlled experiment is not available, randomized experiments can 
(sometimes) be used that aim to create two equivalent groups in which causal factors are 
identically distributed. To this end subjects are assigned to either group by way of a 
randomizing procedure. One of the groups is exposed to a treatment, the experimental 
group, and the other is given a control, the control group. A positive experimental result 
is evidence for the causal claim that the difference in the outcome observed in the two 
groups is due to the stimulus provided. Insofar as the randomization is performed 
successfully, the assumption that the causal factors are identically distributed in the two 
groups is satisfied and the ensuing conclusion is safely established.10  
(3) At the next level below, the statistical method relies on the same logic of control 
but uses observational data that cannot be manipulated experimentally. The manipulation 
of the data is in this case conceptual and performed by way of partial correlation. The data 
sample is divided into different sub-groups within which the relevant variables are held 
fixed. Each sub-group is examined to see whether the regularity of interest holds when 
the other relevant variables are controlled for. Unlike the experimental design where all 
relevant variables are taken care of by way of a successful randomization,11 the statistical 
method attains control only for those variables that are known to be relevant. For this 
reason Lijphart regards it as an approximation to the controlled experiment. 
                                                          
10 This formulation is somewhat imprecise in two respects. First, other assumptions besides the causal 
factors being identically distributed in the two groups need to be satisfied for “the ensuing conclusion to 
be safely established”. They include assumptions about the relationship between probability and 
causation and the inference of probabilities from frequencies (see also Chapter 4). Second, more than 
just successful randomization is required for causes to be identically distributed. In fact, randomization 
when properly implemented avoids systematic differences between the treatment and control group that 
might be due to the assignment procedure (selection bias). However, it only avoids “chance differences” 
between the two groups in the long run or for high numbers that are not frequently available in the social 
sciences. To use the methodologist’s language, groups are equated “on expectations at pretest” that is, the 
means of relevant variables can differ between groups in the short run due to sampling error (Shadish, 
Cook and Campbell 2002). Furthermore, differences that are neither due to sampling error or selection 
bias might arise between the treatment and control group. They might be caused, for example, by failure 
of blinding, failure of compliance, and so on.  
11 See fn. 9 above. 
  
 (4) The comparative method is, regarded as an approximation of the ideal experiment, 
weaker than the statistical method which “it resembles in all respects except one: the 
number of cases is too small to permit systematic control by means of partial correlation 
(1971: 684)”. The number of cases is crucial for the degree of control that one can obtain: 
one, in fact, has to be able to observe whether the regularity in question persists when the 
other relevant variables are held fixed. For this, one needs to examine a large number of 
cases. One should thus resort to the comparative method only when the number of 
available cases is too small for finding reliably partial correlations. The degree of control 
one achieves by means of this method is therefore very limited.  
There are ways, however, to alleviate the problem that the comparative method 
encounters of too many variables to control for and too few cases to examine. Lijphart 
proposes a few strategies to this end. They are either directed at increasing the number of 
cases subject to analysis, for instance by using variables that are more widely applicable 
and thus comparable across a larger number of cases in such a way that the sample is 
enlarged accordingly. Alternatively, they reduce the number of variables that need to be 
controlled for, for example by a general commitment to theoretical parsimony and by 
judiciously restricting the analysis to the really key variables while omitting those of only 
marginal importance (686-690).  
(5) The lack of control becomes a much more troubling concern in CSR where the 
number of cases reduces to one. If one examines a single case, in fact, one only obtains a 
single observation for each variable of interest.12 Due to lack of variation in the putative 
cause and lack of control on the other relevant variables, it seems thus impossible to 
establish a reliable conclusion by means of case studies. Multiple explanations are in fact 
compatible with the available evidence and the observations one has are insufficient to 
rule them out. The lack of control in CSR has been famously reframed as the problem of 
degrees of freedom (Campbell 1975, George and Bennett 2005).  
                                                          
12 This is the definition of case study provided by the traditional view (see Eckstein’s definition in sec. 
1.2). 
  
This notion, widely used in statistics,13 was then carried over to the case-study context. 
In general, the number of degrees of freedom is always equal to the number of 
observations minus the number of necessary relations among those observations (Walker 
1940). If applied to a statistical sample, it is the difference between the sample size (the 
number of independent observations) and the parameters estimated on those 
observations, such as sample means and variance. In statistics it is a crucial concept 
because the sampling distribution depends from it, and if the number of degrees of 
freedom are miscalculated the level of significance of the test is also misinterpreted (1940: 
260). In general, a high number of degrees of freedom is needed in order to have a stronger 
design. Intuitively, the higher the number of observations, the better is the evidence 
against which to test alternative hypotheses. It follows that the chance that one hypothesis 
fits the whole data is lower and that alternative hypotheses are ruled out is higher. Hence, 
if a hypothesis fits the data, the confidence in it is also higher.  
Transferred to CSR, what one would observe in this case is a total lack of degrees of 
freedom; actually, negative degrees of freedom (George and Bennett 2005: 28). If one treats 
the case study as the study of a single case in the statistical sense, in fact, this would be 
understood as a situation in which a single independent observation is obtained (N=1) 
and too many necessary relations are imposed on that one observation (the relevant 
variables). One thus faces here a situation of under-determination of theory by the data 
where multiple explanations that fit the same evidence equally well are available, and one 
does not have the means to rule all but one out. We would therefore have a very weak 
design where the chance of each alternative hypothesis of fitting the data is very high, and 
the confidence in it is correspondingly lower.  
It is important to stress that this conclusion depends on treating the case study as the 
study of one case where a single observation is collected on each relevant variable. This 
view was already challenged by Campbell (1975: 179) and since then by many others 
(among which Gerring 2004, 2007a, George and Bennett 2005). Even though the type of 
                                                          
13 The notion was introduced by physician James Clerk Maxwell in the 19th century. 
  
answers provided by each author slightly differs, the general response has been that the 
number of observations (and, thus, the evidence against which the hypotheses are tested) 
dramatically increases if one considers that observations are collected not just for the 
single variables of interest, but also for the various, observable, implications generated by 
the theory. In some sense, says Campbell, the researcher has tested the theory with degrees 
of freedom coming from the multiple implications of any one theory; and she does not 
retain the one theory unless most of these are also confirmed (1975: 182).   
There is a distinct but related problem arising from the limited number of cases. As 
mentioned above, the view of CSR that is described here depends on a very specific view 
of science broadly understood. Science is regarded by these scholars, first and foremost, 
as an activity orientated to the production of general knowledge (Eckstein 2000 [1975]) 
that takes the form of empirical regularities. When the empirical material is constituted by 
a single case, the evidential basis seems too narrow to extract general knowledge that is 
valid in circumstances different than the ones actually examined. From this prima facie 
plausible observation, these scholars concluded that, if the central goal of the scientific 
practice consists in establishing generalizations, then it is hard to understand what place 
CSR can occupy in such an endeavor. If learning about the general is rendered difficult in 
the analysis of a single case, the worthiness of the whole enterprise becomes disputable. 
In this respect Lijphart comments (691): 
 
The scientific status of the case method is somewhat ambiguous because science is a 
generalizing activity. A single case can constitute neither the basis for a valid 
generalization nor the ground for disproving an established generalization. 
 
This conclusion, however, highlights a tension in the view described by Lijphart. Even 
if one agrees with Lijphart that generalizing is problematic in case studies and that science 
primarily aims at broad generalizations, he would still have to explain how experiments 
solve this problem successfully so as to deserve to be ranked first in his hierarchy of 
methods while case studies are confined to the bottom of the ranking. In fact, experiments 
  
and case studies seem to face a very similar challenge. Well renowned experimentalists say 
in this respect: 
 
Most experiments are highly localized and particularistic. They are almost always 
conducted in a restricted range of settings, often just one, with a particular version of 
one type of treatment rather than, say, a sample of all possible versions [...] A conflict 
seems to exist between the localized nature of the causal knowledge that individual 
experiments provide and the more generalized causal goals that research aspires to 
attain (Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002: 18-19). 
 
If one pays heed to what these authors say, one is led to think that also experiments 
establish very narrow causal conclusions. The tension in Lijphart’s view might be then 
explained by the (implicit) assumption that results obtained via experimental methods 
automatically generalize. This is arguably a strong assumption for which no justification is 
provided. Lijphart seems to entertain the idea that the high level of control achieved via 
experiments entails generalizability. This would be, however, an invalid argument. Control 
and generalizability are two distinct issues and, whatever their relation, certainly the former 
does not entail the latter. I will discuss these issues below under the label of internal and 
external validity. 
Given the lack of control that affects CSR and its limited capacity for producing 
general knowledge, Lijphart places the CSR at the very bottom of its hierarchy of methods. 
If the CSR deserves a place among the scientific methods at all, however, it remains to be 
specified what its positive contribution to scientific progress is. Lijphart thinks that, 
despite the serious problems that affect them, case studies can still contribute to theory 
development even though in a less direct way (1971: 691).  
 
1.2.2 CASE STUDIES: WHAT ARE THEY GOOD FOR, THEN? 
Aware of the challenges that CSR confronts due to its lack of control and generalizing 
power, Lijphart outlines a taxonomy of case studies where the possible alternative uses of 
the method are articulated. The way in which case studies can be useful depends on the 
  
distinctive relation that each type has to theoretical generalizations. Lijphart distinguishes 
the following types (1971: 691): 
1. A-theoretical case studies; 
2. Interpretive case studies; 
3. Hypothesis-generating case studies; 
4. Hypothesis-confirming case studies; 
5. Hypothesis-infirming case studies; 
6. Deviant case studies.  
Similar taxonomies are outlined by scholars such as Eckstein (2000 [1975]), Flyvbjerg 
(2006), Vennesson (2008), where the classification, and the principle behind it, remains 
essentially the same even though some change is introduced in the characterization of each 
type and the terminology in use. In what follows I will provide a brief description of the 
types in Lijphart’s taxonomy, and refine it when useful with details provided by the other 
contributors. The general purpose of this description is not to establish which taxonomy 
is the most accurate or useful, but rather to illustrate the logic they share. 
1. Atheoretical case studies 
Atheoretical case studies move in a theoretical vacuum (1971: 691). They are neither 
guided by theory nor aim at the formulation of theoretical generalizations: they are 
characterized by Lijphart as purely descriptive endeavors. 14  As such their usefulness 
resides in providing empirical material for further enquiry; in other words, they are data-
gathering tools that contribute to theory formation at best indirectly. Eckstein calls this 
type of case-studies “configurative-idiographic” (2000 [1975]: 132). They aim to present 
exhaustive depictions of the overall configuration of the individual so as to capture its 
uniqueness (the configurative element). Furthermore, they bring about the significance of 
the facts collected by largely intuitive interpretation claiming validity on the ground that 
                                                          
 
14 Lijphart is categorizing ideal-types. He clarifies that in the practice case studies seldom fit a specific 
category neatly. He specifies: “An actual instance of an atheoretical case study probably does not exist, 
because almost any analysis of a single case is guided at least by some vague theoretical notions and some 
anecdotal knowledge of some other cases, and usually results in some vague hypotheses or conclusions 
that have a wider applicability” (1971: 691). 
  
intensive study and empathetic feel for cases provide authoritative insights into them (the 
idiographic element).  
Even though Eckstein agrees with Lijphart that these studies essentially amount to the 
collection of facts without theoretical import, he also emphasizes that they are often based 
on philosophical assumptions less innocent than Lijphart seems to suggest. In the end, 
Eckstein’s position towards this type of studies is much more critical than Lijphart’s as he 
sees them as irremediably affected by theoretical poverty. Even though Eckstein does not 
deny that these studies can be persuasive and subtle in the intuitions they offer, their 
incapacity (actually, the explicit refusal) to collect facts in a systematic way renders them 
useless for theory building. 
2. Interpretive case studies 
Similar to atheoretical case studies, interpretive case studies are selected because of an 
interest in the case rather than in the formulation of a general theory (Lijphart 1971: 692). 
They have a stronger link to theory than atheoretical case studies but the link is still weak. 
In fact, they do not contribute to theory development in any meaningful way. Rather, they 
rely on previously established generalizations that are found applicable to the context of 
interest and in this way help shed light on the case at hand.  
Eckstein calls this a “discipline-configurative” type of studies (2000 [1975]: 134). The 
case is explained by subsuming it under well-established propositions: the outcome 
observed is in fact inferred by deduction from the extant theory and a set of specified 
antecedent conditions. According to Eckstein, the explanation of the case (in his words, 
the interpretation) is successful if it is logically compelled by the theory: one should be able 
to demonstrate that, given the regularity and the characteristics of the case, the outcome 
must have occurred or had a high probability of doing so (136).  
3. Hypothesis-generating case studies 
Lijphart asserts that hypotheses-generating case studies are selected for purpose of 
theory-building. They rely to a very limited extent on previously developed but vague 
generalizations. The purpose of these studies is to contribute to the formulation of new 
generalizations in areas where no theory, or very unsatisfactory theory, exists. The 
  
generalizations thus formulated ought then to be tested subsequently by further empirical 
inquiry.  
In Eckstein’s taxonomy, hypothesis-generating case studies are called “heuristic” (2000 
[1975]: 137). He remarks that there is a good track of records of case studies used for 
heuristic purposes which typically consist in discerning important general problems and 
possible theoretical solutions. One reason why this might be the case is that case studies 
consist in the intensive analysis of a subject, do not restrict the inquiry to a limited set of 
variables, and in so doing increase the probability that new variables and critical 
relationships among them be discovered (138). 
4. Theory-confirming case studies 
Theory-confirming case studies are developed within the framework provided by well-
developed theory. The general purpose of this type of studies is testing theoretical 
generalizations by providing evidence in support of the extant theory. Lijphart maintains 
that the theoretical value of these studies is limited if the theory has been confirmed 
already by a large number of cases. In other words, if the theory obtained already 
substantial evidence in its support, the confidence in the hypothesis is only marginally 
increased by one additional positive instance. The theoretical value of these studies is 
however enhanced when the studied cases turn out to be crucial (1971: 692).  
Crucial cases are characterized by “extreme values on one of the variables” and thus 
constitute a “crucial test of the propositions” (ibid.). Lijphart is not very specific in his 
definition and does not explain why crucial cases are so important for testing. In general, 
crucial cases are such that one would expect from them either a strong refutation or a 
strong confirmation of the theory. The former, what Eckstein and Flyvbjerg call “least-
likely” cases, are especially useful in theory confirmation. A least-likely case, in fact, is such 
that, given the characteristics of the case, one would expect a strong rejection of the 
theory. If the study of a least-likely case eventually confirms the theory, the confidence in 
the theory is remarkably increased, or at least it increases more than it would if the case 
was not crucial.  
5. Theory-infirming case studies 
  
Similar considerations as above extend to theory-infirming case studies, which are also 
developed within the framework of a well-developed theory. They test theoretical 
generalizations and provide negative evidence for it that is, evidence that refutes the 
theory. Also in this case, if the theoretical proposition is solidly based on a large number 
of cases, the theoretical value of one additional infirming study is limited as it decreases 
the confidence in the theory only marginally.  
Furthermore, the infirming power of the case study is higher if it uses a crucial case. A 
crucial case is useful for a theory-infirming study if one would expect from it a strong 
confirmation of the theory. This type of crucial cases is called by Eckstein and Flyvbjerg 
“most-likely”. Most-likely cases are such that, given the characteristics of the case, one 
would expect the theory to be strongly supported in the circumstances. If the study of a 
“most-likely” case eventually refutes the theory, the corresponding decline of confidence in 
the theory is particularly severe or, at least, more severe than the decline one would have 
if the case was not crucial.  
6. Deviant case studies 
Finally, deviant case studies select cases that are known to deviate from well-
established generalizations; they are known as outliers (Flyvbjerg 2006). They are used to 
develop theory further either including new variables or refining the variables in use by 
disclosing why the case at hand is deviant. They thus weaken the original proposition, but 
replace it with a modified version of it, to be tested against new cases.  
Even though the scholars mentioned above share the same organizing principle for 
their taxonomy, they see the comparative strength of the CSR in different types of case 
studies. Lijphart seems to emphasize their heuristic power while acknowledging that they 
are weak in terms of testing power when contrasted with the other research strategies in 
the hierarchy. In this position, he is not alone. It used to be conventional wisdom among 
social scientists that case studies are most valuable in the context of discovery rather than 
justification, and this view is still endorsed in more recent contributions (Gerring 2004, 
2007a).  
  
Eckstein holds instead a rather unconventional view. He defends the idea that the 
comparative strength of the CSR resides in the testing power of crucial cases. In his view 
testing a theory is an effort to falsify, and such an effort is most profitable when most-likely 
and least-likely cases are identified (Eckstein 2000 [1975]: 146).15 Despite the differences 
in emphasis, these scholars can be understood as adopting a similar view on CSR, and on 
science more in general: science is seen as a generalizing endeavor aimed at explaining 
phenomena of interest by formulating empirical regularities. In this perspective, they share 
and try to solve the same fundamental puzzle about CSR: how possibly do “N = 1” types 
of study contribute to science so understood in any meaningful way?  
 
1.3 THE NEW PROJECT: CSR AS AN AUTONOMOUS EPISTEMIC 
GENRE 
An alternative view of CSR is, however, on offer. It started taking shape recently in the 
methodological debate on qualitative research and its relationship with the quantitative 
tradition that followed the publication of Designing Social Inquiry by King, Keohane, and 
Verba in 1994 (Brady and Collier 2004, George and Bennett 2005). It is also traceable in 
isolated contributions that either preceded or lie at the margin of that debate (Creager et 
al. 2007, Flyvbjerg 2006, Forrester 1996, Geertz 1973, Morgan 2012, Vennesson 2008). 
These authors do not belong to the same philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, they 
contributed maybe unintentionally, and to different extent, to what can be seen as the 
same project, that is, liberating CSR from the statistical, comparative, and experimental 
mindset.  They tend to emphasize the distinctiveness of CSR and the difference in logic 
and purpose, rather than the similarity, with respect to the other research strategies. Thus, 
at its core this view can be regarded as different from the approach sketched above in the 
recognition of CSR as an autonomous style of reasoning which, as such, needs to be evaluated 
on its own terms.  
                                                          
15 See Flyvbjerg (2006) for a contemporary criticism of the conventional wisdom on the lack of testing 
power of case studies. 
  
The notion of “style of reasoning” is used by Ian Hacking to refer to six methods 
which historically became a permanent component of science (1992). Hacking adopts the 
definition by historian of science Alistair Crombie who explains ostensibly the notion by 
pointing to six styles. In the formulation by Hacking they are: 
 
a) The simple method of postulation exemplified by the Greek mathematical 
sciences.  
b) The deployment of experiment both to control postulation and to explore by 
observation and measurement. 
c) Hypothetical construction of analogical models.  
d) Ordering of variety by comparison and taxonomy. 
e) Statistical analysis of regularities of populations, and the calculus of probabilities. 
f) The historical derivation of genetic development (1992: 4).  
 
Hacking is not interested in the specific way in which every style came into being. 
Every style, in fact, became independent of its own history to be what we now regard as 
a “rather timeless canon of objectivity, a standard or model of what it is to be reasonable 
about this or that type of subject matter” (1992: 10). Rather, he is concerned with what 
makes of a certain method a style of reasoning. The necessary condition for being a style 
of reasoning is the introduction of novelties in the form of objects, evidence, sentences, 
modalities, and possibilities.  
Thus, in Hacking’s account each style should introduce novelties of most or all of the 
listed types, and should do so in an open-textured, ongoing and creative way. He gives the 
example of mathematicians who “do not just introduce a few sorts of abstract object, 
numbers and shapes, and then just stop. The type ‘abstract object’ is open-ended once we 
begin reasoning in a certain way” (1992: 12). In addition to the ostensive explanation and 
necessary condition, Hacking suggests that what constitutes a style of reasoning is a set of 
techniques of self-stabilization: it is by way of these techniques that each style persists in its 
peculiar and individual way (1992: 16). 
  
John Forrester proposed to extend the notion so as to include “reasoning in cases” as 
a seventh style on top of the six listed by Hacking (Forrester 1996: 2). Forrester motivates 
his proposal with the purpose of characterizing the dominant style of reasoning in 
psychoanalysis and the related sciences since the early Twentieth century. His project is, 
however, more ambitious than that. Reasoning in cases is not only typical of fields such 
as psychiatry, psychology, and criminology; rather, there is a methodological continuum 
from the psychoanalytic case, to the case used as a pedagogical tools in certain academic 
traditions, to the style of reasoning that is typical of the man of practice.  
Thus, Forrester launches a unifying philosophical project that he leaves, however, 
unfulfilled. To some extent his line of thought is followed up more recently by Mary 
Morgan. Morgan goes back to Hacking’s conception of styles of reasoning, which she re-
labels epistemic genres. She writes in defense of case studies as an epistemic genre, and 
legitimizes her project by citing Hacking’s view as follows: “It was a matter of history that 
each epistemic genre developed its own generic way of finding and validating knowledge, 
so that work within that genre came to be judged within that epistemic genre and by its 
community of practitioners, not according to the rules, or in the terms, of any other genre” 
(2012: 671). It then follows that if CSR constitutes indeed an epistemic genre similar 
considerations should be extended to it as well.    
This view of CSR sits comfortably in a conception of science rather different from the 
traditional view presented above. This alternative approach is not as coherent and uniform 
as the one to which it reacts is; it hosts in fact a range of positions which, however various, 
challenge the old paradigm in similar respects. Generally speaking, the new approach sees 
science as a much less homogeneous practice than the old view would have it. In particular, 
it challenges to varying extents the four tenets presented above (see sec. 1.2). The first 
tenet to be disputed is: 
a. The (indiscriminate) characterization of science as a generalizing 
epistemic practice. 
Objections to the first tenet come in different forms and are not all equally radical. 
Some scholars understand this statement as referring to universal generalizations and point 
  
out that some part of science is “content” with generalizations of a more limited scope. 
This is the milder objection to (a). Other scholars understand the first tenet as having 
normative import to the effect that general theoretical knowledge is the only (scientific) 
knowledge there is; or, less radically, is more valuable than concrete context-dependent 
knowledge. These scholars reject this normative stance, argue that concrete context-
dependent knowledge is as valuable, if not more, than theoretical knowledge, and that its 
value is proved by the crucial role this type of knowledge plays in human learning 
(Flyvbjerg 2006). Still other authors entertain a radically different view of science, or at 
least some fields in it. They see some part of science as a case-based epistemic activity 
where specific instances of scientific practice in the form of case studies, models, exemplars, 
occupy a central role in learning and research strategies (Creager et al. 2007). Related to 
this is the challenge to the second tenet: 
b. The primary aim of science is the explanation of scientific 
phenomena.  
The new view tends to de-emphasize the prominence of explanation as the unique, 
and/or most important, goal in science. On the one hand, it rehabilitates description as 
an important goal on its own decoupled from explanation and not just preliminary to it, 
as the old paradigm would have it. On the other hand, it introduces the idea of “thick 
description” that is providing accounts of situated phenomena which are rich in detail and 
faithful to the complexity of the studied subject. The ultimate goal is not to explain the 
specific by subsuming it under a general law; it is rather providing understanding of the 
specific case by revealing its complexity. Description so understood is pursued for its own 
sake and is not seen any longer as mere “data gathering” functional to subsequent 
explanation. Furthermore other purposes of science are more explicitly contemplated. 
Some authors see in policy making one of the main goals of scholarly research. The idea 
behind this view is that scientific inquiry should lead to the production of knowledge that 
is useful ultimately for the policy maker.   
c. The only generalizations relevant to science are empirical regularities.  
  
Several authors object to tenet (c) by pointing out that general knowledge of scientific 
interest does not only come in the form of empirical regularities but of causal processes 
and mechanisms (Coleman 1986, Stinchcombe 1991). The debate on the concept and use 
of causal mechanisms in the social sciences is too vast to do justice to it in a few lines. 
This debate has grown massively in the last years, with contributions from many social 
scientists and philosophers of science.16 The point of interest here is that these scholars 
defend the importance of mechanisms vis-à-vis regularities in the philosophical and 
methodological discourse about science. They defend this claim on the following 
grounds:17 mechanisms are distinct from regularities; the epistemic strategies conducive to 
the discovery of mechanisms and regularities are different; mechanisms play an equally, if 
not more, important role than regularities in the explanation of social phenomena.  
d. Discovery and justification are distinct temporal processes. 
Even though, as noticed above, strong objections have been raised against the version 
of the DJ distinction that sees justification and discovery as distinct temporal processes 
(see footnote 5), traces of it still survive nowadays in several contributions. The general 
idea behind the rejection is that in the practice one cannot separate the moment and 
process by means of which hypotheses are constructed from the moment and process by 
means of which they are tested. If this is indeed the case, CSR cannot be said to contribute 
either to the context of discovery or to the context of justification (Vennesson 2008).  
  
1.3.1 CASE, CASE STUDIES, AND CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
The new perspective leads to re-conceptualizing the notions of case, case study, and case 
study research. Definitions that were typical of the traditional view are dropped. In key 
contributions to the old view, case, case study, and case study research are defined as 
follows: 
                                                          
16 Prominent contributors to the debate on the role of mechanisms in the social sciences are Bunge 1997, 
2004, Elster 1989, 1998, Hedström and Swedberg 1998, Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, Little 1991, 1998, 
Mayntz 2004. 
17 This is a gross generalization. The philosophical positions in this debate are almost as numerous as the 
contributors. My purpose here is just conveying the sense of what are the issues at stake. 
  
CASE: A phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a single 
measure on any pertinent variable (Eckstein 2000 [1975]: 123-4). 
CASE STUDY: the study of a single case. 
CASE STUDY METHOD:18 is the method applied to the study of a single 
case, rather than many as in the statistical method, or just a few as in the 
comparative method (Lijphart 1971: 691).  
These definitions seem not only strongly influenced by a statistical viewpoint but also 
hardly informative, and inaccurate. Certainly, there is much more to a case study than just 
reporting and interpreting, whatever that means in this context, a single measurement on any 
pertinent variables; furthermore, it is also disputable that the case study only reports a single 
measurement on these variables, rather than many (George and Bennett 2005). Even 
though the old definitions are rejected and replaced by new ones, there is not agreement 
yet on a definition of case, case study, and case study method within the individual 
disciplines, let alone across them. The following definition by political scientist Pascal 
Vennesson are probably quite representative of the average feeling. Not all features they 
include, however, would be regarded as defining case study by the scholars in this new 
trend.19 Disagreement on basic concepts shows that the new trend has not developed yet 
into a fully-fledged view. 
CASE*: A phenomenon, or an event, chosen, conceptualized and 
analyzed empirically as a manifestation of a broader class of events. 
CASE STUDY*: is a research strategy based on the in-depth investigation 
of one, or a small number, of phenomena in order to: (i) explore the 
configuration of each case, and (ii) elucidate features of a larger class of 
(similar) phenomena, (iii) by developing and evaluating theoretical 
explanations. 
                                                          
18 Here and throughout the thesis I treat “case study research” and “case study method” as synonyms. I 
preferred to use “case study method” in this context to be faithful to the original discussion.   
19 I will discuss these features below. 
  
One can find similar definitions in George and Bennett (2005), Gerring (2004, 2007a) 
and Ragin (2000). These definitions deserve some comments, and some refinements.  
In the first place, case is a theoretical construct: it is not the specific phenomenon or 
event, but the conceptualization of it. Something such as a phenomenon or event in 
political science, an individual in psychology and psychiatry, a cultural practice in 
anthropology is turned into a case by the study of it. Forrester, citing Foucault talking about 
the development of the clinical sciences, says that the examination, surrounded by all its 
documentary techniques, makes each individual a ‘case’ (1996: 12).  
The above definition is, however, too restrictive when it defines the case as the 
manifestation of a broader class of events. The theoretical work behind the selection and 
analysis of cases is often much more fluid. The class of reference is often not established 
at the beginning of the research, can change along the process, or emerge at its conclusion. 
Sometimes it might even remain indeterminate.  
Furthermore, the purpose of the study does not need to shed light on a larger class of 
elements, but might simply be the exploration of the single case. This does not imply that 
generalizations from a case study are not possible or even undesirable. Rather, the other 
cases to which the results can be generalized are often identified once the case study has 
been accomplished. In fact, results from previous case studies may turn out to be 
applicable to new cases in an unexpected or unplanned way. In a similar vein, case studies 
do not always have such a strong and explicit theoretical motivation. Thus, the purpose 
of the study does not need to be the development and evaluation of a theoretical 
explanation. It might just be the characterization, or description, of the case at hand. In this 
sense, features (ii) and (iii) above should not be regarded as a defining feature of case 
studies but as additional epistemic benefits of this research strategy.20  
Finally, case study and case study research (or case study method) should be treated as 
distinct notions. The definition of case study given above refers in fact to the research 
                                                          
20 In particular, that feature (ii) is indeed an epistemic benefit of CSR will be argued in the next section 
and in Chapter 3. 
  
strategy, hence to case study research. The case study is the (written) output of this research 
strategy when employed to study one or a few cases.   
Morgan provides a characterization of case studies that draws on the practitioners’ 
literature but at the same time emphasizes some of the aspects that to some extent fail to 
be present in their definitions. She identifies the following as characteristic features of this 
research strategy (Morgan 2012: 668): 
 
I. Boundedness: a case study investigates a bounded whole object of analysis; 
II. Open-endedness: the boundary between subject of analysis and context is not 
clear at the start of research and may remain fluid during the study; 
III. Depth: the case study creates a considerable depth of engagement with the 
subject and dense evidential materials across a range of aspects of the topic; 
IV. Multi-method: many potential research methods may be used within the case 
study. 
V. Complexity: the outcome is a complex, often narrated, account that typically 
contains some of the raw evidence as well as its analysis. 
 
The pressing issues that CSR confronts can be understood in terms of validity and 
relevance.21 I define and discuss validity and relevance in the sections that follow. First I 
distinguish between internal and external validity. Rather than assessing CSR in terms of its 
heuristic or testing power, and try to establish whether CSR contributes to the context of 
discovery or justification, what matters here are the conditions under which CSR can 
obtain internal validity, and what criteria are adequate to assess whether a given case study 
is in fact internally valid. Furthermore, rather than assessing whether and to what extent 
case studies contribute to the formulation of empirical regularities, the broader question 
of interest here is how one generalizes from a given case study. As I shall argue below, there 
are different strategies to generalize in CSR, one such a strategy is by producing results 
that are externally valid.  Finally, once one acknowledges that the social sciences can aim at 
                                                          
21 Whereas the notion of validity has been used quite extensively in the literate on CSR (see, for instance, 
Gerring 2007a, Morgan 2012), to the best of my knowledge the notion of relevance was never explicitly 
adopted and discussed.  
  
a variety of purposes all equally worthy, the pressing issue  is under what conditions a case 
study provides results that are relevant vis-à-vis the purposes at stake.  
If CSR is to be treated as an epistemic genre, as the experimental and statistical 
methods are, then it has its own way of finding, validating, and, I would add, generalizing 
knowledge. The challenge that lies ahead for those scholars that see in it an autonomous 
style of reasoning is to understand which way this is.  
 
1.3.2 INTERNAL VALIDITY AND EXTERNAL VALIDITY 
The concept of validity refers to the correctness of scientific claims. The methodological 
literature typically draws a distinction between internal and external validity. Scientific results 
are internally valid if, and only if, the inference from the evidence to hypothesis within a 
given study is correct (Reiss 2008). The internal validity of a study, thus, is compromised 
when throughout the inferential process from evidence to hypothesis mistakes are made. 
Mistakes might be due to fallacious reasoning, to the violation of the assumptions, or to 
an incorrect measurement procedure. Internal validity is a scientific ideal since, as a matter 
of fact, it is very hard to control for all sources of error in the inferential procedure, and 
have adequate knowledge that the relevant errors have been in fact controlled. Within a 
given study, one approaches, rather than attains, internal validity. The extent to which 
internal validity can be achieved varies from method to method. Certain methods have 
higher chance to deliver conclusions that are internally valid because of the type of 
inference they rely on (deductive rather than inductive) or because they have strategies to 
ensure that the assumptions are satisfied. 
When discussing internal validity in relation to CSR one can tackle the issue from two 
points of view. On the one hand, one can ask how specifically CSR produces results that are 
internally valid. This strategy amounts to establishing what conclusions can be reached 
vis-à-vis the evidence at hand, how, and with what degree of confidence. It thus examines 
the techniques by means of which conclusions are inferred and aims at identifying under 
which conditions these techniques are correctly employed. These are conditions of internal validity 
and pertain to the inferential procedure from evidence to hypotheses. On the other hand, 
  
one can formulate an assessment of the case study based on criteria other than inferential 
correctness. Rather than examining the techniques by means of which the evidence is 
analyzed and the conclusion derived, one would focus on features of the narrative itself. 
This way typically abstains from judgments of correctness; rather, it imposes criteria, or 
standards, on the narrative as various as coherence, credibility, persuasiveness, or 
significance, and use those as indicative of the validity of the study. The two approaches 
coexist in the literature on CSR. Proponents of either approach regard their strategy as 
conducive to ascertain the internal validity of CSR. Both, however, are subject to specific 
challenges.  
In the former case, the difficulty arises from the fact that CSR relies on the use of 
several techniques that are often employed jointly. Upon examining the assumptions, 
inferential procedure, and type of evidence proper of each technique, one thus needs to 
formulate the conditions that are conducive to correct conclusions, and the degree of 
confidence one can have in conclusions thus reached. Furthermore, one needs to specify 
how the techniques are used correctly when employed jointly, and how the joint use of 
these techniques affects the confidence in the final conclusion. The techniques most 
commonly used for analyzing evidence in CSR are process-tracing and the method of 
comparison.  
The method of comparison shares the same “logic” that underlies the comparative 
method discussed in section 1.2.1.22 The method of comparison refers to a technique of data 
analysis that is employed in case study research for within-case and across-case analysis 
(CSR can in fact focus on the study of one or a few cases). In CSR the results obtained by 
the method of comparison are always integrated with other types of evidence to develop 
a complex narrative which the method of comparison could not possibly develop on its 
own. The comparative method is a research strategy that consists in the comparison of a 
(typically higher) number of cases to establish causal relations between relevant variables. 
We can thus regard CSR and the comparative method as distinct study designs which can 
                                                          
22 This logic was first articulated by J.S. Mill in his description of the method of difference and method 
of agreement (1858). 
  
both be directed to causal analysis. The former differs from the latter in that it draws on 
a variety of causal insights and techniques, among which the method of comparison, the 
results of which are eventually integrated into the narrative. 
Whereas the method of comparison is well mastered and understood, process-tracing 
is a technique whose inner workings, despite broad usage, are not fully understood yet. 
Even though its conditions of validity are not fully articulated, it is characterized as 
directed to the identification of causal processes and the circumstances in which these 
processes unfold. The literature typically refers to the former as mechanisms, and to the 
latter as the systems in which the mechanisms are embedded. When process-tracing is used 
jointly with the method of comparison, the description of the mechanism, and of the 
conditions in which it is triggered, complements, enriches, and refines the causal relation 
that the method of comparison identifies. In Chapter 2, I will try to clarify what conditions 
of validity do apply to process-tracing and how, and to what extent, the method of 
comparison and process-tracing when employed jointly increase the plausibility of the 
general conclusion.   
An alternative, and perhaps more controversial, way to assessing validity in CSR is by 
imposing criteria on the final output (Morgan 2012). Typically, the final output is a 
narrated account which has a very complex form and “contains some of the raw evidence 
as well as its analysis and ties together the many different bits of evidence” (2012: 668). 
Standards can therefore be established on how the different bits of evidence should tie 
together, or on specific features of the resulting narrative. Inspired by Neil MacCormick’s 
work on legal cases, Morgan suggests that valid case study accounts exhibit the following 
criteria: consistency with all the evidence found, coherence within the account (the bits of 
evidence fit together), and credibility of the explanation in social scientific terms (2012: 
674). This approach to internal validity does not find full consensus in the scientific 
community. While standards are acknowledged as leading to valuable case studies, they 
are also criticized for being either too loose or simply inadequate to ensure rigor (Geertz 
1973, Morse et al. 2002). Whether they are in fact conducive to internal validity is therefore 
still open to discussion.  
  
Scholars belonging to the old tradition worried about the scientific usefulness of case 
studies because of their lack of generalizing power. Since this tradition sees science 
primarily as aiming at finding regularities that explain phenomena of interest, it is hard to 
appreciate how the study of a single instance can help formulate broad generalizations of 
this sort. This is, however, a very specific way to characterize what is a much more 
complex issue: generalizability pertains to scientific findings whose scope is more 
encompassing than the subject of the study. Addressing generalizability requires one to 
specify (i) what should be generalized from a given study, (ii) to what such a result should 
be generalized, (iii) and how. Different answers can be given to these questions. I 
distinguish three approaches that differ in the answers given to each of the three questions 
above.  In the first two cases, generalizability can be understood in terms of external validity 
and what is actually generalized is an empirical finding; in the third case, the generalization 
is theoretical. 
Scientific conclusions are externally valid if they are correct in the studied context and 
in other contexts yet unstudied. Thus, whereas internal validity is obtained by way of 
correct inference from evidence to hypothesis within a given study, external validity is 
obtained by way of correct inference from the results obtained in a context studied directly 
(the original context) to a hypothesis about a new context yet unstudied (the target 
context). As such, external validity is not only achieved if one formulates general 
conclusions that are universally, or almost universally, valid. It is obtained any time 
scientific conclusions about a target context are inferred correctly from results that were 
established in the original context; that is, they are extrapolated correctly.  
Under the broader umbrella of external validity, the scholars of the old school 
provided a possible answer, very specific indeed to the three questions posed above. Any 
study should establish an empirical regularity to be generalized, if not universally, then to 
a broader class of cases of which the studied case constitutes a representative instance. 
This view on generalizability by no means belongs only to the traditional view. It is still 
  
very present in the contemporary debate on CSR, even though in a slightly revised form 
as one can easily tell from some very common definitions of case study actually in use.23 
However, that the conclusions be generalizable to a broader class of elements is not 
the only modality for CSR to achieve external validity, or any other design for that matter. 
Successful extrapolation from case to case is another modality that is, according to some 
scholars, more amenable to CSR (Forrester 1996, Creager et al. 2007). This alternative 
approach gives different answers to each of the three questions posed above. As to the 
object of the generalization, it is not the empirical regularity as such, but the causal 
mechanism responsible for the phenomenon of interest and the causal conclusion it elicits. 
The target of the generalization is another or a few other cases where similar phenomena 
are observed. Finally, the inference is made by analogical reasoning. The studied case is 
not regarded as an instance that is representative of a broader class of elements but is, 
more generally, a situated phenomenon that is similar to others in some relevant respects.24 
In the third approach, the case study is seen as the occasion for formulating conceptual 
and theoretical generalizations rather than empirical results to be directly applied to other 
cases, be they classes of elements or concrete instances. Robert Yin describes this 
alternative as a form of analytic generalization and contrasts it with the statistical 
generalization typical of other research strategies. In CSR “the mode of generalization is 
analytic generalization, in which a previously developed theory is used as a template with 
which to compare the empirical results of the case study” (Yin 2003: 33). In a similar spirit, 
Clifford Geertz talks of clinical inference, or inference within cases. Rather than beginning 
with a set of observations and attempting to subsume them under a governing law, such 
inference “begins with a set of signifiers, or symptoms, and attempt to place them within 
an intelligible frame” (1973: 165). The task is constructing an analytic system in whose 
terms what is generic to the studied case will stand out against the other determinants of 
human behavior. The generality the case study contrives to achieve, Geertz suggests, 
                                                          
23 See section 1.3.1 above for my discussion of some recent definitions of case study; see Chapter 3 for a 
thorough discussion and criticism of what I call the traditional view on external validity.  
24 It can be argued that the former approach discussed above is interpretable to some extent as a special 
case of the latter, more general, approach. 
  
“grows out of the delicacy of its distinctions, not the weep of its abstractions” (Geertz 
1973).  
In Chapter 3, I shall explore and defend the second approach to external validity. This 
line of reasoning about external validity seems in fact the most promising. On the one 
hand, it rescues CSR from the statistical viewpoint that informs the first approach and 
opens the way to a better understanding of CSR as an autonomous epistemic genre. 
Furthermore, unlike the third approach, it focuses on the causal conclusions that can be 
elicited from the case studies and carried over to other contexts. What is under scrutiny in 
this thesis is the capacity of case studies to generate valid causal knowledge under the 
assumption that this is the evidence we primarily need for policy making. In line with the 
general spirit of the present work, in the chapters that follow I only focus on the 
formulation and extrapolation of causal claims in CSR and omit analytic generalizations 
instead. 
 
1.3.3 RELEVANCE  
Case studies can be assessed in a further respect besides their internal and external validity, 
namely with respect to the relevance of their results. Valid hypotheses are those hypotheses 
that are regarded as correct by the extant background knowledge; relevant hypotheses are 
those conclusions that are adequate with respect to purposes. Validity claims thus differ 
from relevance claims first and foremost because they address distinct properties of 
scientific hypotheses: the former express judgments about the correctness of the 
inferential procedure by means of which conclusions are derived within the study, or 
outside of it; the latter express judgments on the adequacy of those conclusions to further 
purposes, fulfill tasks, or solve problems. As they target different properties of scientific 
conclusions, judgments of validity and judgments of relevance are based on different sorts 
of considerations.  
Validity claims are directed to evaluate whether a hypothesis is justified by the 
evidence: matter for this the inferential logic of the method employed and the assumptions 
on which it works. Relevance claims are directed to evaluate whether the results delivered 
  
by a given method are epistemically adequate to try to solve and achieve the problem and 
purpose in question. This type of analysis presupposes: 
1) The definition of the purpose/problem at stake;  
2) The characterization of the kind of conclusions required; 
3) The assessment of what kind of results a given method provides. 
Relevance claims are justified if 1), 2), and 3) are also justified. This implies that they 
can be contested by impugning either 1), 2), or 3). One can impugn 3) by objecting that 
the conclusion licensed by the method in question is not exactly the type of information 
that is required to fulfill the purpose of interest as specified in 2). For instance, if control 
is the goal of interest and one regards counterfactual claims as necessary to this end, one 
might object to the relevance of case study evidence because it corroborates singular causal 
hypotheses that cannot support counterfactuals. Or, one can impugn 2) by objecting that 
the specified kind of scientific result, even if actually provided by the method in question, 
is not adequate for the purpose or problem as defined in 1).  For instance, one might 
object that counterfactuals are not the type of claims one need for control purposes, after 
all, and that one needs evidence of causal processes instead.  
Alternatively, one can impugn 1) by arguing that the problems and purposes as actually 
defined in 1) are either illegitimate or incorrectly posed. Purposes and problems can be 
defined at a rather abstract level, for instance by referring to the fourfold distinction 
between description, explanation, prediction, and control, or at a higher level of detail. 
When considering control, one might define it as the formulation of policies to bring about 
intended effect in the social realm.25 And one might object to this aim as an illegitimate 
goal of science on the ground that science should stay aloof from all that concerns politics, 
policies and power. Alternatively, one might specify in greater detail the type of problem, 
policy, or yet effect of interest, for instance, by suggesting that the aim of economics is 
erasing poverty in developing countries and leveling out inequalities. The objection to 
purposes defined at this level of specification is eminently an empirical matter, and draws 
                                                          
25 See section 1.3.3.1 for a similarly general, though more precise, characterization of policy making. 
  
to a large extent on factual considerations about the context in which the purpose at hand 
is to be reached or the problem solved. 
Even though validity and relevance are distinct concerns, relevance claims do relate in 
fact to validity claims. In particular it seems reasonable to argue that when assessing the 
kind of results that a given method provides (point 3 above) one should only pay heed to 
those results that are reached by way of a valid inference. In this sense, relevance presupposes 
validity. Validity is, however, far from sufficient for relevance. In particular, relevance 
claims draw on a much broader set of considerations than the validity of those scientific 
conclusions whose relevance is ultimately at stake. This set of considerations encompasses 
among others formulating the aims which can legitimately be pursued by way of a scientific 
inquiry, and assessing which methods actually help further those aims. 
 
1.3.3.1 CASE STUDY RELEVANCE FOR POLICY MAKING 
Besides the traditional aims of scientific research, such as description and explanation, 
some contributors to the recent debate on CSR have started considering more seriously 
control. Case studies thus seem to be methodologically interesting not only for their 
descriptive and explanatory virtues, but also as evidence for policy makers. As a matter of 
fact, case studies are used for intervention purposes in several fields. In medicine, 
psychology or psychiatry the prominent goal of the clinical study is the treatment of the 
patient both directly and indirectly by building clinical knowledge to be used in future 
treatments; similarly, social and economic policies implemented by regional and 
international institutions are also largely built on case-based knowledge.  
There are specific features of case studies that seem to render them relevant to policy 
making on an intuitive ground. The case study can be in fact characterized as providing 
contextual, concrete, and processual evidence.  
In the first place, it is an investigation into phenomena that are circumscribed in time 
and space, where the boundary between context and subject of investigation remains fluid 
  
during the research (Morgan 2012). 26  The output of this procedure is thus a 
characterization of the phenomenon that is left permeable for contextual information. 
Furthermore, case studies are thick descriptions that use dense evidential material. This 
type of analysis is extremely rich in detail and, in this sense, formulated at a relatively high 
level of concreteness. By focusing in fact on localized phenomena, the case study can 
afford to retain information that ought instead to be sacrificed in the process of 
abstraction that more general analyses demand. Finally, in certain circumstances case 
studies explain by describing the causal process, or mechanism, by means of which certain 
effects are brought about.27 In particular, this form of explanation amounts to identifying 
the conditions, the factors, the events, and their configuration that were responsible for 
the phenomenon of interest.  
Thus seen, case studies are relevant to policy making understood as a practice aimed 
at producing intended effect in the social world by manipulating some feature of it.  
First, policies operate in contexts: they produce the intended effect in conjunction with 
other causal factors. Using a more technical language, policies are INUS conditions, that 
is, they are an insufficient but non-redundant part of a condition which is itself 
unnecessary but sufficient for the occurrence of the outcome of interest.28 Consider an 
example used by Nancy Cartwright and Jeremy Hardie to illustrate this point (Cartwright 
and Hardie 2012). California implemented a project to improve the academic achievement 
of its school pupils by reducing class-size in the mid90s. Class-size reduction is an INUS 
condition in Mackie’s account. On its own it does not contribute to the effect of interest, 
as shown by California’s experience, unless supported by other factors. For instance, 
availability of space and quality of teachers are other non-redundant but insufficient parts 
which, in conjunction with reduced class size, increase students’ proficiency. In this sense, 
thus, policy making is to a large extent a situated practice: when involved in actual decision 
making policy makers target contexts in their specificity. From this follows the relevance 
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27 They can do so by employing process-tracing as a technique of causal analysis (see section 1.3.2). 
28 The term ‘INUS conditions’ is due to Mackie (1988). 
  
of evidence such as case studies that is contextual and thus provides clues to what other 
factors besides the policy of interest need to be present for the outcome to occur.  
Furthermore, policy makers try to sort the intended effect by modifying certain 
features of the target contexts, by erasing existing practices, or by creating new ones. In 
other words they manipulate the context. Manipulation requires detailed information about 
what is exactly to be modified and how it can be modified: policy making needs thus to 
be informed by descriptions fine-grained enough to enable the decision maker to have an 
answer to this type of questions; this is why evidence that is concrete plays an important role 
in it. Finally, the idea of manipulating certain aspects of reality in order to produce the intended 
effect presupposes causal justification. Policy making so understood is rational only if 
supported by causal beliefs that is, by the confidence that there is some relation between 
the object to be manipulated and the outcome of interest such that the former can be 
exploited to modify the latter. Processual knowledge is causal knowledge of a specific type 
which, as such, is prima facie relevant to this end.29 
Even though the idea of case studies as relevant to policy making seems to have some 
appeal, the debate among philosophers and social scientists is still poorly developed. 
Several research avenues have, however, been opened and might be worth exploring.  As 
early as the mid-70s, leading political scientist Alexander George worried about the gap 
between policy makers’ needs and the orientation dominant in scholarly works. He is 
concerned about the conditions present in the field of international relations at that time 
and fears a bias in current research towards grand theories at the expense of research with 
higher practical relevance (George 1976, 1994, 1997).  
George takes a modest though challenging stance. He admits that the gap between 
policy making and scholarly research cannot be eliminated. Political, financial, ethical, and 
practical considerations, in fact, inform decision making besides the factual knowledge 
that science provides. Nevertheless, George urges, the gap could be bridged by scholarly 
knowledge that fulfills the standards for relevance. In sum, scholars face a choice between 
                                                          
29  Relevance as defined in section 1.3.3 presupposes validity to some extent. In Chapter 2 I will 
characterize the conditions in which case studies are likely to deliver valid causal knowledge. 
  
taking into consideration the need of policy makers and ignoring it while being driven by 
purely scholarly interest.  
The plea for more relevant research by field specialists is voiced again and articulated 
further in the later work by George and Bennett (2005). They remark that the grand theories 
of scholarly research in international relations are generalizations broad in scope and 
probabilistic in form; as such, this form of knowledge is insufficient to guide the policy 
maker in the choice of the strategy to implement in target contexts. It needs to be 
integrated by usable knowledge,30 which consists of propositions that, though narrower in 
scope, specify the conditions under which these limited generalizations hold. In this way 
usable knowledge can be guide to action because it allows the policy maker to better explain 
the opponent’ actions and make a diagnosis of whether the extant conditions are adequate 
for the adoption of a given strategy. George and Bennett see case studies as a fruitful 
instrument for the production of usable knowledge.  
The fruitfulness derives from the case study, which has to identify the causal 
mechanism by means of which explanatory variables bring about the outcome of interest. 
The focus on mechanisms, as opposed to broad generalizations, has two distinctive 
benefits.  First, the conditions under which the more modest generalization holds will be 
clarified. Secondly, focusing on mechanisms yields a description at a lower level of 
abstraction; in this way, they would identify variables that are likely to be more easily 
manipulated, and hence of utmost interest to the policy makers.  
The proposal by George and Bennett is certainly insightful and praiseworthy. They 
make an effort to spell out what the positive contribution of case studies can be to policy 
making once the policy maker’s needs and the specificity of CSR are taken into 
consideration. It leaves, however, much unspecified. Policy making is a complex practice 
organized in various stages each of which relies on a variety of evidential inputs. The role 
of case studies can be clarified further by specifying at which stages they are relevant, why, 
and how they complement the other sources of evidence.  
                                                          
30 George and Bennett borrow the term usable knowledge from the work by Lindblom and Cohen Usable 
Knowledge, Social Science and Social Problem Solving (1979). 
  
In this effort, social scientists and philosophers working on case studies would be 
assisted by more developed strands of literature on policy evaluation and evidence-based 
policy. As to the former,31 several contributors emphasized the specific and crucial role of 
case studies with respects to other forms of evaluation (Eck 2006, Scriven 2008). In the 
discussion on evidence-based policy, CSR still occupies a minor role if compared to other 
more popular strategies of research. 32  This does not come as a surprise when one 
considers the fact that case studies lie at the bottom in the hierarchies of evidence 
formulated by most institutional evaluators. The scholars who see the potential of case 
studies in policy making should thus feel the urge to engage in this debate as well. This 
would force them to clarify further why case study evidence is distinctive, how it differs 
from evidence generated otherwise, and how exactly it complements it.   
 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
Understanding CSR as an autonomous epistemic genre, rather than a (weaker) form of 
the statistical or experimental methods, adds complexity to the analysis of case studies 
while making room at the same time for new research avenues. This perspective draws 
attention to the striking features of CSR and leads to a re-conceptualization of the old 
definitions and problems. What was simply understood as a problem of control is thus re-
framed as an issue of internal validity, of which control constitutes just one specification. 
Similarly, the generalizability potential of CSR is not limited to the formulation of 
regularities that apply to the class of elements of which the case constitutes a representative 
instance. The forms of possible generalizations from, and within, case studies are various 
in content, target, and inferential modality. Finally, the discussion of the relevance of the 
CSR is also liberated from the old distinction between the heuristic and justificatory 
moment of scientific inquiry. In the old view the usefulness of the case study was in fact 
determined by the degree of support it gives to the theory at hand. Possible uses of case 
studies were either the formulation of new theories or the testing of extant hypotheses. In 
                                                          
31 Reference point in this literature is Pawson (2006), and Pawson and Tilley (1997). 
32 As an example of very recent and important contribution to the field see Cartwright and Hardie (2012). 
  
a broadened perspective other uses of case studies become apparent and their relationship 
with theory, now more broadly understood, is accordingly more complex. 
The chapters that follow are motivated by these considerations. They are informed by 
a view on CSR as an autonomous epistemic genre and address the methodological 
problems case studies confront by exploring some of the avenues outlined above.  
In Chapter 2, I address internal validity in historical narratives. Historical narratives 
are case studies that aim to formulate and substantiate causal hypotheses by articulating 
descriptions of the sequences of events leading to the outcome of interest. They typically 
make use of process-tracing to draw causal inference, and often rely on the additional use 
of the methods of comparison. Despite the important role of historical narratives in the 
social sciences, how process-tracing operates in the narratives is still poorly understood. 
The debate on process-tracing in fact, even though it is growing thanks to a number of 
recent contributions, is still muddy and under-developed. In particular, there are no shared 
criteria to assess its epistemic contribution; moreover, the conditions proposed so far tend 
to tie the validity of the findings to the use of specific kinds of evidence and are thus 
unhelpful when this specific evidence is not available.  
I argue that the proposed conditions are unduly restrictive and fail to acknowledge the 
actual contributions which process-tracing can offer to valid causal inference. I formulate 
new conditions to assess process-tracing performance in cases in which the favorable 
evidential circumstances do not occur and existing criteria fail to apply. By discussing 
process-tracing, I touch upon what is currently a hot topic in philosophy of science; that 
is the role of causal mechanisms and mechanistic knowledge in the sciences. The majority 
of scholars who are interested in process-tracing also agree that it somehow helps the 
detection of causal mechanisms. The agreement, however, stops there: scholars entertain 
many different notions of mechanisms and disagree on the role mechanisms actually play 
in explanation and causal inference. From my discussion, it will become apparent how the 
complexity of this debate contributes to render our understanding of process-tracing even 
more problematic.  
  
In Chapter 3, I address the problem of generalizability. I provide an outline of what I 
define as the traditional view on external validity. This approach is conditioned by a 
statistical viewpoint on CSR and reduces external validity to issues of mere 
representativeness.33 In so doing it leads the debate on the generalizability of case-study 
results to a dead end as it quickly dismisses external validity as the downside of CSR. At 
the same time, it suggests that CSR is comparatively stronger in providing results internally 
valid. On this ground this approach recommends the use of case studies when internal 
validity is the main research goal of interest, while turning to other methods when one 
pursues generalizations instead. This outcome is unfortunate because, as a matter of fact, 
case studies are often performed with the explicit or implicit purpose of drawing lessons 
from the studied case to be carried over to new contexts yet unstudied. 
I attempt to release this tension by examining the assumptions behind the traditional 
view on the external validity of CSR. Some of these assumptions have already been 
addressed, and actually disputed, in the current debate. In Chapter 3, I focus instead on 
those assumptions that, to the best of my knowledge, have not been addressed yet and 
seem to be responsible for the dead end in which the discussion among social scientists 
seems to be trapped now. In particular, I suggest that the debate should focus on how 
make case studies comparable rather than how select the typical case. Typicality and 
comparability are concepts closely related but distinct. The traditional view conflates the 
two and thus runs into confusion about what external validity is really about and how it 
can be addressed in a fruitful manner. I surmise that by enhancing the comparability of 
studies unnoticed room for improvement is made for formulating more reliable 
assessment of the external validity of results obtained in case studies.  
In Chapter 4, I discuss issues of relevance when policy making purposes are at stake. 
In particular, I focus on the debate on the use and usefulness of randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs) to find the key to economic and social development. The participants to this 
debate agree that RCTs are affected by limited external validity, and that this impinges on 
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their usefulness for policy making. They diverge, however, on the strategies to overcome 
this problem. I analyze three alternatives that are found in the economic literature: 
replication of RCTs, which has been proposed by the promoters of RCTs; cross-country 
regressions, which have been typically endorsed by RCT-skeptics; and the causal models 
proposed by James Heckman. I argue that these strategies succeed in their attempt to a 
different, and limited, extent.  
Proponents of the first two strategies fail to take into adequate consideration the 
distinction between external validity and relevance, and treat the latter as a spill-over of 
the former. Their strategies, in fact, aim to improve the external validity of causal effects 
on the assumption that relevance will automatically follow. I argue that this is not the case, 
because external validity and relevance are distinct concerns and should thus be addressed 
separately. The proposal by Heckman succeeds in delivering causal effects that are, as a 
matter of fact, more relevant to policy makers’ purposes. I argue, however, that his model 
cannot adequately address the type of problems policy makers are likely to face in 
developing contexts. Whereas Heckman’s model is equipped to face problems of prediction, 
in developing contexts policy makers face problems of planning. Planning is a complex 
procedure that depends on various pieces of evidence and raises several concerns. Causal 
effects are but one epistemic input in this procedure; case-study evidence is also relevant 
to the crucial phases of planning.  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
2 PROCESS TRACING AS AN EFFECTIVE EPISTEMIC 
COMPLEMENT 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION: FINDING MECHANISMS IN THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 
During the last decades, philosophers of science and social scientists have promoted the 
view that knowledge of mechanisms can help causal inference in the social sciences (Elster 
1989, Coleman 1986, Little 1991, 1998, Bennett and George 1997, George and Bennett 
2005, Steel 2004, 2008). They have regarded covariation analysis based on statistical 
methods as subject to severe limitations, and proposed the identification of mechanisms 
as a promising strategy to overcome its problems. Their views differ, however, in the 
epistemic status given to mechanisms.  
Some scholars consider them necessary for causal inference (Little 1991, 1998). Others 
regard them as insufficient on their own for this purpose, and recommend the joint use 
of mechanistic and statistical evidence (Bennett and George 1997, George and Bennett 
2005). Still others maintain that there is no general demand for mechanistic knowledge; 
whether we need it depends on contextual factors and on substantive background 
knowledge (Kincaid 1996, Steel 2008). Setting this dispute aside, mechanisms can only 
play a significant role in causal inference if social scientists have means to identify them 
correctly. Some scholars suggest that the method of process-tracing might be helpful in 
this respect (Bennett and George 1997, George and Bennett 2005, Steel 2004, 2008). 
Process-tracing is a widely used strategy of causal inquiry in the social sciences. Despite 
the ample usage, a formalized template of process-tracing is not available yet (Gerring 
2007a), and there is no shared understanding of how it works, and what its strengths and 
weaknesses are. Scholars tend to agree that it is a method of within-case causal analysis 
that helps causal inference by detecting mechanisms, and in these respects it differs 
essentially from the other empirical strategies in the social sciences. This superficial 
agreement hides deeper differences, however. Views differ in their definition of social 
  
mechanisms,34 the circumstances in which they should be studied, and what type of 
evidence is required to identify them correctly. As a consequence, there is neither a shared 
understanding of when process-tracing is a fruitful strategy to employ, nor are there 
agreed-upon criteria to tell apart successful applications of process-tracing from 
unsuccessful ones.  
Process-tracing is sometimes said to be helpful for identifying causal mechanisms 
when it also makes use of statistical and experimental evidence, or when matched by a theory 
of social phenomena fully specified beforehand35 (Steel 2008, Gerring 2007a, Bennett and 
George 1997, George and Bennett 2005). In much social scientific practice, however, these 
evidential sources are either unavailable or only offer a partial support.  
Historical narratives are often a case in point. When process-tracing is used in case 
study research as a method of causal analysis, it helps develop historical narratives, which 
are case studies that provide causal explanations of phenomena of interest in the form of 
descriptions of the sequence of events leading to the outcome. Process-tracing plays a 
central role in this type of studies because the narrative rests on the causal mechanism that 
process-tracing identifies. In this context mechanisms often are either infrequent or 
unique socio-historical patterns that cannot be studied in a controlled setting. Statistical 
or experimental data are, thus, hardly available, or only provide partial support, which is 
insufficient on its own to fully outline the mechanism. Furthermore, the mechanisms are 
typically identified upon the examination of heterogeneous piecemeal evidence and not 
derived from a theory fully specified beforehand.36  
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35 In what follows I will sometimes refer to these theories as “fully-fledged” for short. 
36 Background theories play often a role in historical narratives but, as I shall discuss below, this is not 
the role assigned to them by current accounts of process-tracing. This consideration also extends to 
analytic narratives which constitute a subset of historical narratives that make use of formal models (i.e. 
rational choice and game theoretic models) to derive hypotheses about the relevant mechanisms. Even 
in these studies the exact relation between the formal model and the mechanistic hypothesis is far from 
obvious. For an example of analytic narratives see Bates et al. (1998). For a critical discussion of the role 
of models in analytic narratives see Alexandrova (2009). 
  
In these cases it is unclear what counts as a successful application of process-tracing, 
and it is left open what the epistemic status of its findings is. For want of practicable 
criteria for assessing process-tracing contribution, it seems that it is to be acknowledged a 
“mere” heuristic role. This conclusion, however, obscures the fact that in the narrative 
process-tracing often plays an important complementary role to other techniques of causal 
analysis in achieving valid causal inference, and that whether it succeeds in doing so does 
not only depend on the kind of evidence that backs it up. It thus remains to be seen under 
what circumstances process-tracing can be an effective complement for valid causal 
inference in situations where reliable evidence of other kind such as statistical or 
experimental data is not present.  
In this chapter, I shall propose two criteria to determine whether process-tracing helps 
to achieve valid causal inference when used as an adjunct to other strategies of causal 
analysis. The fulfillment of these criteria ultimately depends on the capacity of process-
tracing to provide a complete characterization of the mechanism responsible for the causal 
relationships of interest. If process-tracing identifies complete mechanisms, it can infer 
causal sequences of events which are in turn evidence for the causal relationship in 
question.  
The criteria I propose are valuable in two respects. First, even though they do not 
constitute a condition of internal validity on their own, they can be shown to be effective 
in distinguishing successful applications of process-tracing from unsuccessful ones. And 
since their fulfillment is not tied to the use of any specific kind of evidence, they are likely 
to be applicable “across the board”, that is, also in some of the cases in which the favorable 
evidential circumstances do indeed obtain. Furthermore, upholding these criteria allows a 
more nuanced assessment of process-tracing inference beyond the sharp distinction 
between a “mere” heuristic role and full-blown validity. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I sketch some views on process-
tracing as an alternative strategy of causal inquiry, including Daniel Steel’s framework, 
which will be considered in detail. In section 2.3, I argue that the conditions of validity 
Steel proposes are tailored for specific applications of process-tracing, and fail to apply to 
  
historical narratives. In section 2.4, I propose two criteria to single out successful 
applications of process-tracing when historical narratives are not developed against the 
background of fully-fledged social theories. In section 2.5, I explain how process-tracing 
can help causal inference effectively if it meets the proposed criteria. Section 2.6 concludes 
this chapter.  
 
2.2 PROCESS TRACING AS AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY OF CAUSAL 
INQUIRY 
2.2.1 CURRENT ACCOUNTS OF PROCESS TRACING 
The debate on process-tracing hosts a variety of positions. Scholars have different views 
on what social mechanisms are, how exactly process-tracing can lead to their discovery, 
and whether it can do so reliably. Arguably, the characterization of process-tracing they 
offer is contingent on the specific definition of mechanism each of them endorses, and so 
does their ultimate view on the capacity of process-tracing to draw valid causal inferences. 
In this section and the next, I provide an overview of the most influential positions in the 
literature, focusing on their definition of social mechanism and the related understanding 
of process-tracing. Two main accounts of process-tracing will emerge. The former 
characterizes process-tracing as reconstructing sequences of events responsible for 
outcomes of interest, and as using mainly historical or qualitative evidence to this end. The 
latter characterizes process-tracing as identifying mechanisms understood as a set of 
entities and activities responsible for general causal relationships, and does not put any 
constraints on the kind of evidence it relies on. 
 
2.2.1.1 DANIEL LITTLE: PROCESS TRACING AS HISTORICAL 
INVESTIGATION 
Daniel Little (1991, 1998) conceives of causal relationships between social phenomena as 
constituted by causal mechanisms. To him asserting that C causes E is to assert that C in 
the context of typical causal fields brings about E through a specific mechanism. In 
particular, “social causal relations are constituted by the causal powers of various social 
  
events, conditions, structures, and the like, and the singular causal mechanisms that lead 
from antecedent conditions to outcomes.” (Little 1998: 161). This metaphysical thesis is 
accompanied by an epistemic requirement. Little in fact maintains that to establish credibly 
a causal relationship between C and E, one needs to identify the mechanism connecting 
the former to the latter. Only if the mechanism leading from C to E has been de 
discovered, one can assert confidently that C causes E. Knowledge of mechanisms is in 
this sense necessary for causal inference. Little sees mechanisms as a series of events (C₁, 
C₂, C₃...) that links C to E, where the transition from an antecedent to its consequent is 
governed by a causal law (Little 1991: 15). It follows that the claim that C causes E rests 
on the identification of the series of causally connected events that lead from the former 
to the latter.  
Process-tracing helps with the analysis of causal mechanisms, because it inquiries into 
the history of the event of interest and formulates causal hypotheses about its course. This 
research strategy is typically used to answer singular causal questions such as: Why did the 
Nicaraguan revolution occur? Why did European growth slow down after September 11th 
2001? Little characterizes process-tracing as collecting and analyzing historical evidence, 
broadly understood as comprising all knowledge of social, economic, and political 
circumstances, and facts that are somehow relevant to the event of interest. Process-
tracing then aims to reconstruct the chain of events that actually led to the outcome of 
interest. In Little’s account the chain so conjectured is valid evidence for the hypothesis 
in question only if it identifies a causal mechanism. That is, the events that make up the 
chain ought to be causally connected. Process-tracing can contribute successfully to causal 
inference insofar as it responds adequately to this challenge.  
 
2.2.1.2 ANDREW BENNETT AND ALEXANDER GEORGE: PROCESS 
TRACING AS COLLIGATION 
Andrew Bennett and Alexander George (1997, 2005) define mechanisms as the causal 
processes and intervening variables through which explanatory variables produce their 
effects. The notion applies to processes, including intentions, expectations, information, 
  
small group and bureaucratic decision-making dynamics, coalition dynamics, strategic 
interaction and so on (1997: 1). Bennett and George do not regard the identification of 
mechanisms as sufficient for causal inference; nevertheless they see it as a necessary 
epistemic complement to evidence of correlation. They remark that analyses only based 
on comparative methods or statistical techniques are plagued by the so-called problem of 
confounders: an observed correlation between variables can in fact be explained either by 
one variable causing the other, or by unobserved third factors causally related to both. 
Because of their inability to achieve full control of causally relevant variables, the statistical 
and comparative methods cannot draw valid causal conclusions. According to Bennett 
and George, identifying the mechanism between the variables of interest provides decisive 
evidence that the variables are indeed causally related; in so doing, it would allegedly 
provide a solution to the problem of confounders.   
In their view, process-tracing is the method that generates and analyzes data on the 
mechanisms linking the putative cause to the observed effects. They relate it to the practice 
of colligation used in historical explanation, which consists in tracing the minute chains of 
events that brought more complex phenomena about (1997: 5). Unlike purely historical 
explanation, however, process-tracing further couches the empirical observations in the 
analytical terms the research-design first identifies. In their account process-tracing is, in 
fact, a research strategy deeply loaded with theory. Its contribution to causal inquiry 
depends ultimately on how “tight” its relationship with theories of social processes is. 
George and Bennett distinguish two approaches: process verification and process 
induction (1997: 10). In the former case, the application of process-tracing is guided by a 
fully-fledged theory which already obtained some empirical support. In this case, process-
tracing collects empirical observations to be matched to the predictions entailed by the 
theory. In the latter case, when theories of the former type are inapplicable, the 
investigator sets out for “the inductive purpose of finding one or more potential causal 
paths which can then be rendered as more general hypotheses for testing against other 
cases (1997: 12)”.   
 
  
 
2.2.1.3 JOHN GERRING: PROCESS TRACING AS DETECTIVE WORK 
John Gerring presents a rather sketchy account of process-tracing, even though he fully 
acknowledges the important role it occupies in case-study research (2007a). Two strategies 
of causal inference are available to the researcher who performs case studies. She either 
employs an experimental template or uses process-tracing. In the former case, the study 
is organized in such a way that variation is observed in the phenomenon of interest and 
the putative cause only, while keeping the other relevant factors fixed. Since we are not in 
the laboratory, however, this high level of control is hardly attainable in case study 
research, and the experimental template is seldom applicable. Process-tracing reconstructs 
the causal chain relating the relata in question. How these chains are actually identified is 
not discussed by Gerring. He rather emphasizes that process-tracing uses peculiar 
evidence to this end. In particular, he says that multiple types of evidence are employed for 
the verification of a single inference (Gerring, 2007a: 173). Process-tracing, he suggests, 
collects strands of heterogeneous evidence more akin to the sparse clues in detective work 
than to the observations on homogeneous samples typical of other empirical methods.  
The aforementioned scholars regard process-tracing as a strategy of causal inquiry 
alternative to other methods of causal inference in the social sciences. The type of contrast 
they draw changes, however, from scholar to scholar. Daniel Little, Andrew Bennett and 
Alexander George regard process-tracing as an alternative to the comparative and 
statistical methods (Little 1991, Bennett and George 1997, George and Bennett 2005).  
Gerring treats it as an alternative to the experimental template in case study research 
(Gerring 2007a). All these accounts suggest that what is distinctive about process-tracing 
is the kind of evidence it uses. It fails, however, to be acknowledged that, as a matter of 
fact, process-tracing often uses a mixed evidential basis that includes both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence. More importantly, the circumstances in which process-tracing is a 
valuable strategy to use are not made clear by these authors. Since its evidence is 
characterized as non-experimental, non-statistical, or vaguely qualitative, process-tracing 
  
is portrayed (if perhaps to some extent unintendedly) as the method of “last resort”, to 
which scholars turn for want of a better alternative.  
Daniel Steel also regards process-tracing as an alternative to other strategies of causal 
inference. What is distinctive of it, though, is not whether it uses evidence of qualitative, 
historical, or quantitative nature; rather, it is the level of analysis on which process-tracing 
focuses: whereas the alternative strategies of causal inference examine evidence directly 
pertaining to the causal relationship of interest, process-tracing uses evidence that is 
indirectly related to it. It is thus mostly valuable in those epistemic circumstances where 
only indirect evidence is available. Unlike the other scholars, Steel proposes a framework 
which, while taking into account the fact that process-tracing typically relies on a mixed 
evidential basis, also clarifies when process-tracing is the most fruitful strategy to use (Steel 
2008).  
 
2.2.2 DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT CAUSAL INFERENCE 
Steel distinguishes between methods of direct and indirect causal inference (2008: 175). 
These two methods use different types of evidence for analogous inferential purposes, such 
as learning about the causal relationships among macro-features of a complex system.  
Consider the set of variables V, the causal relationships among which one intends to 
investigate. They might be the macro-features of a system S, such as inflation and 
unemployment if the system is an economy; or, to take Steel’s example, exposure to 
Aflatoxin B1 and development of liver cancer if the system is an organism (2008: 187-8). 
The researcher faces a choice between two approaches: she can proceed to draw causal 
conclusions among variables in V using evidence about those same variables. She would 
thus employ direct causal inference (ibid.). Alternatively, she might try to draw the same 
conclusions by using evidence about a distinct and yet related set of variables M and thus 
employ indirect causal inference instead. M contains the properties of the components of 
system S, which she is ultimately investigating. If S is an economy and the relationship of 
interest is between inflation and unemployment, M might include the households and their 
consumption behavior, the firms and their employment policy. Thus, rather than focusing 
  
on the systemic features directly, the researcher would study them indirectly by first 
examining the structure responsible for them.  
The system components and their relationships when associated in such a way as to 
give rise to macro-level regularities constitute what Steel defines as a causal mechanism.37 In 
the social realm the mechanism’s components are agents grouped into categories 
associated with characteristic modes of behavior. Thus, social mechanisms involve 
reference to some categorization of agents into relevantly similar groups defined by a 
salient position their members occupy vis-à-vis others in the society. In the description of 
the mechanism, the relevant behavior of the agent is often assumed to be a function of 
the group to which he or she belongs (2008: 48). The characteristic behavior of agents 
constitutes what one calls a practice, or custom. When applied successfully, process-
tracing identifies the set of practices that link together to form a social mechanism (2008: 
190). As an illustration of the type of mechanisms process-tracing detects, we consider 
one of the cases Steel uses to describe its operation.  
This case concerns the Trobriand society, studied by leading anthropologist Bronislaw 
Malinowski (1935). Malinowski uses indirect evidence to support his claim of the existence 
of a causal relationship between (C) the possession of many wives and (E) wealth and 
influence among Trobriand chiefs. In absence of statistical evidence about the relationship 
between C and E, this causal claim is supported by evidence about the relevant social 
processes in Trobriand society. The social practices for which Malinowski collects 
evidence are the following: (1) the custom whereby brothers are required to contribute 
substantial gifts of yams to the households of their married sisters – gifts that are larger 
than usual when the sister is married to a chief. Furthermore, (2) yams are the primary 
means used by chiefs to finance their political endeavors and public projects (Steel 2004: 
67). In virtue of (1), the possession of more wives causes the possession of more yams; in 
                                                          
37 The definition of mechanism I endorse is rather close to Steel’s but generalizes it in important ways: 
components in social mechanisms are not necessarily associated with characteristic modes of behavior; 
more generally, they engage in activities/actions in virtues of their properties and their organization 
within a given system. Furthermore, mechanisms do not give rise necessarily to regularities but also to 
singular causal relations. I’ll come back to these points in section 2.4 below. 
  
virtue of (2), the possession of more yams leads to greater influence among Trobriand 
chiefs. Insofar as (1) and (2) hold, we can conclude that C causes E. Process-tracing serves 
to convince us of the existence of (1) and (2). 
In what follows I shall discuss how Steel presents his proposal as a solution to the 
problem of underdetermination that typically plagues forms of direct causal inference in 
the social sciences (2008:  174).  
Most forms of direct causal inference are in fact based on the use of comparative and 
statistical methods. Steel remarks that conditional probabilities and statistical associations 
are often insufficient evidence to identify causal relationships. Common causes (i.e. 
confounders) might be responsible for the observed correlation between variables and 
remain undetected by the scientist. Furthermore, it can still be the case that the causal 
structure cannot be identified by means of probabilities only and more sophisticated 
strategies such as the use of instrumental variables, 38  even though they might help 
circumvent the problem, are often inapplicable. Process-tracing might offer a solution to 
the problem of underdetermination faced by the strategies of direct causal inference as it 
confronts a distinct underdetermination problem. This consists in the identification of underlying 
mechanisms by using evidence about the system components rather than focusing directly 
on the systemic causal relation itself. Since the two problems are distinct it seems plausible 
to Steel that there can be cases in the social sciences in which one can be solved 
successfully while the other cannot.  
Steel illustrates the point in relation to the case of Trobriand society. Imagine that V 
= {W, S, N}, where W, S, and N are variables indicating Wealth, Social status, and 
Number of wives, respectively (2008: 193). It is plausible, says Steel, that there is a causal 
connection between each pair of these variables that is unmediated by the third: status is 
likely causally linked to wealth as cause or effect independently of number of wives; it is 
likely that status and number of wives are linked by a path that is not mediated by wealth; 
                                                          
38 Instrumental variables are used for causal inference in econometric regressions when the relationship 
of interest is likely to be confounded. For a more extensive discussion of instrumental variables along 
Reiss’ lines see section 4.2.2.  
  
and it is also likely that wealth and number of wives are linked by a path unmediated by 
status.  It follows that alternative causal structures are equally plausible and compatible 
with the same statistical evidence. Consider the following diagrams each representing 
plausible alternative causal structures (193):
 
 
 
Under standard assumptions about the relationship between probability and 
causality,39 neither the case in which S causes N and W, and N causes W (fig. 2.1) nor the 
case in which W causes S and N, and S causes N (fig. 2.2) generate probabilistic 
independencies among the variables: each pair of variables is probabilistically dependent 
both marginally and conditional on the third variable. Given to the absence of probabilistic 
independencies between W, S, and N the two graphs are indistinguishable and the 
statistical evidence cannot help establish whether N in fact causes W. If adequate 
instrumental variables are not available, strategies of direct inference cannot solve the 
underdetermination problem they face. 
Process-tracing uses evidence about a distinct but related set of variables. In this case 
it investigates the practices that together sustain the causal connection between N and W. 
The epistemic problem it confronts is the correct interpretation of these practices. How 
can one establish whether yams are used as means to finance public project and political 
                                                          
39 Steel assumes the faithfulness condition (FC), which asserts that the only probabilistic 
independencies in acyclic causal structures are those entailed by the Causal Markov Condition (CMC). 
The CMC asserts that, conditional on its direct causes, a variable is probabilistically independent of any 
set of other variables that does not include its effects. FC and CMC are discussed and defended by 
Judea Pearl, Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour, and Richard Scheines, among others. See Hitchcock (2010) 
for a discussion of these points. 
  
endeavors rather than as savings which the wife’s family offers for the upbringing of 
offspring? And that this transaction strengthens the reputation of the man who receives 
rather than contributes yams? Even in this case, as in the case of direct inference above, 
multiple explanations are plausible. The problem of underdetermination at stake is, 
however, distinct from the one above as it regards other variables: flows of yams, kinship 
relations, public projects, and the practices of which they are part. Furthermore, these 
practices are typically identified by different means, such as interviews, prolonged 
observation, and active engagement with the community. Steel’s point is that there are 
cases in the social sciences in which the epistemic circumstances are more favorable to the 
identification of the underlying social practices rather than the systemic causal relation 
itself.       
If, as Steel suggests, process-tracing is a strategy to exploit epistemic circumstances 
distinct from the ones on which methods of direct inference rely, it might then be helpful 
in two ways: 
1. as a surrogate of the alternative methods;  
2. as a complement of the alternative methods.  
1. As a surrogate it would be used in place of the alternative methods in cases in which 
the latter are not applicable in a fruitful manner. In this case the direct benefit of employing 
process-tracing would consist in extending the range of cases where causal inference is 
possible in the social sciences.  
2. Alternatively, as a complement it might be used in tandem with the other methods in 
circumstances that are somehow favorable to both, and still have the benefit of increasing 
the overall confidence in the causal conclusion. The two ways of process-tracing (1, 2) are 
not mutually exclusive. Process-tracing might be employed as a surrogate in certain cases 
and as a complement in others. It is, however, plausible that the strength of the causal 
inference varies in the two cases. For in way 1 the burden of drawing valid causal inference 
lies entirely on process-tracing, whereas in way 2 it is shared by two or more strategies 
employed in a mutually supportive way. 
  
If process-tracing is employed as a surrogate method (1), it establishes at best 
qualitative causal claims. As Steel points out in relation to Malinowski’s study of Trobriand 
society, all one can conclude from successful identification of the mechanism is that there 
is at least one path through which the number of wives exerts a positive influence upon 
wealth among Trobriand chiefs (2008: 192). That some mechanism is identified correctly, 
does not exclude that other mechanisms might be present which the social scientist fails 
to notice. And if the other mechanisms happen to exert causal influence in the opposite 
direction, the overall effect of their joint operation is nil.  
If, by contrast, one uses process-tracing as an adjunct method to the strategies of direct 
inference this problem can be more successfully circumvented. Let us assume that 
statistical dependence had been established between the relevant macro-variables in the 
Trobriand case. This evidence  supports the hypothesis that the number of wives exerts 
positive causal influence on wealth, helps assess the strength of this influence, and  
indirectly rules out (to some extent) the hypothesis that undetected mechanisms might be 
exerting a neutralizing effect. Be it employed as a surrogate method or in a complementary 
fashion, it remains to be established whether and how process-tracing can solve the 
underdetermination problem it faces. 
 
2.3 VALIDITY CONDITIONS OF PROCESS TRACING 
If process-tracing is to be a strategy for formulating causal hypotheses and providing 
evidence for them, as Steel indeed suggests, it ought to solve its underdetermination 
problem, which amounts to identifying the relevant mechanism. According to Steel, this 
is facilitated considerably in specific evidential circumstances.  
If available, statistical and experimental evidence is particularly helpful to establish 
generalizations about the system components (2008: 188-9). As an example Steel refers to 
the study by Donohue and Levitt (2001), who propose a novel explanation of the sharp 
decrease in the crime rate in the United States since the Nineties onwards. Donohue and 
Levitt hypothesize that “the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade legalizing 
abortion nationwide potentially fits the criteria for explaining a large, abrupt, and 
  
continuing decrease in crime” (2001: 380). This hypothesis is partly supported by direct 
evidence about the correlation between the legalization of abortion and drop in the crime 
rate. Furthermore, a mechanism consisting of the following links is said to be operating: 
(1) unwanted children are more likely to be born in adverse socio-economic conditions; 
(2) children born in adverse socio-economic conditions are more likely to engage in 
criminal behavior. Links (1) and (2) are supported by evidence from experimental and 
statistical studies. If this evidence is regarded as valid, it follows from links (1) and (2) that 
the abortion has a disproportionate effect on the births of those who are most at risk of 
engaging in criminal behavior; thus, were abortion legalized, the crime rate would 
eventually go down.  
The problem process-tracing faces, however, more often consists in interpreting social 
practices in the absence of statistical and experimental evidential support. In this case, 
Steel suggests, in line with Todd Jones (1999), that cognitive psychology might be of help 
by offering evidence about general tendencies at the psychological and cognitive level 
(2008: 194). In this field controlled experiments are more a practical possibility than in the 
rest of the social sciences. What cognitive psychology can provide, more precisely, is the 
background knowledge required for the interpretation of the practice. This is however 
insufficient to identify fully the various norms, customs, and social practices in place in 
the various contexts of interest. Steel thus suggests that process-tracing is likely to solve 
its specific underdetermination problem if the relevant practices present the following 
characteristics: 
 
1. The practice in question is exhibited in publicly accessible settings. 
2. There is no prohibition, taboo, or other obstacle to open discussion of the 
practice. 
3. The practice is transparent to participants, in the sense that participants have a 
reasonably clear understanding of its functioning (2008: 195). 
 
Steel specifies that conditions (2) and (3) facilitate learning what participants regard as 
the rules and practices, while (1) allows for comparison with actual behavior (ibid.) 
  
These conditions seem to be tailored for specific applications and settings in which 
process-tracing can rely on the use of ethnographic techniques such as the method of 
participant-observation (DeWalt & DeWalt 2002). Participant-observation is a data-
collection method that aims to gain intimate and close familiarity with a given group of 
individuals (religious, occupational, and sub-cultural groups, or a particular community) 
and their practices through an intensive involvement with people in their cultural 
environment, usually over an extended period of time. To compare what the agents say 
with their actual behavior, and thus satisfy the criteria above the researcher ought to be 
granted access to the social setting where the practice enacts and be able to interact with 
the agents involved in the practice. More in general, the criteria above presuppose that the 
practices in question are directly observable.  
This is hardly ever the case in social science. This might be due to a variety of factors: 
trivially, the researcher might be denied direct access to the setting; more interestingly, the 
setting in which the practice is displayed might be too broad or the practice too complex 
for it to be observable in any obvious way; or, the evidence might be available only from 
indirect and historical sources. Many fields in the social sciences, such as political science, 
social history, comparative sociology, and some subfields in economics, hence cannot rely 
on the use of ethnographic techniques; yet they draw on a form of analysis that is largely 
based on process-tracing. In particular, process-tracing is used in these cases to develop 
causal accounts in the form of historical narratives. Since probabilistic and experimental 
evidence plays here a marginal role and ethnographic techniques are often inapplicable, 
the use of process-tracing in these cases cannot be assessed by the criteria listed above.  
Scholars such as Little, George, and Bennett pay closer attention to the use of process-
tracing in historical narratives and have shown awareness of the difficulty this use entails. 
Historical narratives are case studies 40  aimed to articulate and substantiate a causal 
hypothesis. Typically, they do so by reconstructing and describing the sequence of events 
that lead from the alleged cause to the purported effect. The sequence of events is valid 
                                                          
40 See section 1.3.1 for a definition of case study. 
  
evidence for the hypothesis at hand only if the events that make up the chain41 are causally 
connected. Daniel Little believes that process-tracing confers just temporal order to the 
events considered and only formulates hypotheses about the causal connections between 
them. In a similar vein, George and Bennett claim that process-tracing on its own only 
tracks temporally ordered chains of micro-events. In other words, in both accounts 
process-tracing cannot distinguish between accidental and causal sequences of events. 
Evidence that testifies that the sequence identified is causal needs to come from elsewhere, 
and in particular, from well specified theories of social phenomena. In absence of a theory, 
process-tracing is regarded merely as a helpful heuristic strategy. 
This conclusion can be explained by the causal assumptions these authors hold. 
Whereas George and Bennett do not render explicit their view, Little asserts that 
mechanisms are fundamental to causation: there is a causal relation between variables if 
and only if there is a causal mechanism connecting them (1991: 25). However, if one 
considers the definition of mechanism Little endorses, one concludes that he holds 
ultimately a Humean theory of causation: causation is a temporally asymmetric, stable 
association between events. Little, in fact, defines mechanisms as series of events leading 
from cause to effect where the transition from an event to the other is governed by lawlike 
regularities. Social mechanisms, in particular, derive from lawlike regularities that govern the 
behavior of individuals (1991: 18). It thus seems that Little ultimately sees regularities as 
prior to mechanisms: 42  to identify mechanisms one needs knowledge of regularities; 
knowledge which cannot be offered by process-tracing as it typically deals with unique 
series of events.  
Claims of causal connectedness between events in the chain thus require support from 
theoretical evidence in the form of deductions from established theory. Little cites the 
example of the Communist revolution in China in the late 1930s and asserts that it is 
                                                          
41 In what follows I use “sequence” and “chain” as synonyms.  
42 Little’s view can be summarized by the slogan “no regularities, no mechanisms”.  He further specifies 
that “regularities stem from the properties or powers of a range of entities” (1991: 18). He does not tell 
us, however, what kind of things in the world powers are, nor does he specify how one would proceed to 
identify them. Even though he tries to give more substance to his theory of powers in later contributions 
(1995), his theory remains underspecified from an epistemic point of view.  
  
plausible to regard the worldwide Great Depression as causally responsible for the Chinese 
revolution that followed, because the former significantly affected the Chinese rural 
economy. This claim ought to be supported by an account of the particular causal 
sequence of events that led from the putative cause to the effect. To identify this sequence, 
however, one should substantiate the claim that the events in the chain are causally 
connected by appealing to theory. Little clarifies: 
 
We note that singular event a is followed by event b, and we argue that this was to be 
expected on theoretical grounds. Suppose for example that it is held that falling prices 
for cotton in the international market in the 1930s caused Chinese peasant activism. 
This causal judgment may be supported by a theoretical analysis of peasant political 
motivation focusing on the connection between peasant economic security and 
political behavior. (1991: 30) 
 
One needs a theory of political behavior that specifies what effect is to be expected 
when certain regularities about human behavior hold. In the example above, it might assert 
(among other things) that in worsening economic circumstances peasant communities join 
or promote radical political movements, or both. Process-tracing provides historical 
evidence that in the 1930s the economic conditions in the countryside were indeed severe 
and that peasants actually joined in radical movements. The causal claim about the actual 
mechanisms is validated if, and only if, it is entailed by the established theory and 
confirmed by the series of occurring events. The events in the series are causally related 
on behalf of the regularity posited by the theory, which we need to ground the claim that 
they constitute a mechanism. Process-tracing amounts to matching the empirical evidence 
about token events with the predictions entailed by the theories in this case. If there were 
no theory to guide its application, process-tracing would not have the capacity to 
distinguish causal from accidental sequences, and its contribution would be heuristic.  
By distinguishing sharply the justificatory and heuristic role of process-tracing, 
however, this view neglects that further meaningful distinctions can be drawn to assess 
more precisely the epistemic contribution of process-tracing. In what follows I shall argue 
  
for a distinction between those applications of process-tracing that fail and those that 
succeed in providing evidence for causal inference in the absence of a well specified  theory 
from which hypotheses about the relevant mechanism can be derived. Even in cases in 
which process-tracing is not fully backed-up by a social theory it can still succeed as an 
effective complement for causal inference. Its success does not depend strictly speaking on the 
kind of evidence it uses, and is not jeopardized by the absence of an established theory. 
Rather, it depends on how well supported by the evidence the narrative that it articulates 
is. Only if this evidence is sufficient to outline a mechanism that is complete vis-à-vis the 
historical hypothesis in question, process-tracing can help causal inference effectively.  
Before moving to this discussion, a further point needs to be made about the 
distinction between the justificatory and the heuristic power of process-tracing. Internal 
validity should be regarded as a scientific ideal, which the various methods of causal 
inquiry approach to varying degrees. Julian Reiss sees validity as having to do with the 
correctness of the inference from evidence to hypothesis (Reiss 2008); he remarks that the 
inference can be regarded as correct once known sources of errors are controlled for. 
Trivially, we cannot expect to be able to control sources of errors that are unknown at the 
time of the inquiry.43 Furthermore, even if we have principled knowledge of which errors 
we can make, we might still be unable to control for them, or to have full certainty that 
control has been effectively achieved.  
For these reasons, it might be helpful to regard Reissian validity as the end of a 
spectrum. At the other end, validity is at its minimum, and the method can be regarded as 
having only heuristic capacity.44 That is, it can formulate new hypotheses but cannot 
provide evidence for them. The point I will try to make with the discussion that follows 
is that there might be room for further fruitful distinctions along this continuum. 
 
 
                                                          
43 Unless we control for them accidentally that is, without being aware that we have. 
44 This presupposes that one rejects the sharp distinction between context of discovery and context of 
justification as in Steel (2008). 
  
2.4 PROCESS TRACING AS AN EFFECTIVE EPISTEMIC COMPLEMENT 
In historical narratives process-tracing is often employed in tandem with other strategies 
of direct causal inference, such as the method of comparison. In these cases, the narrative 
typically offers: 
(GH) General Hypothesis, which encompasses the cases compared; 
(HH) several Historical Hypotheses, one for each case considered. 
We can regard GH and HH as type and token causal claims respectively. Type causal 
claims describe causal relations in which relata are generic (e.g. expansive educational 
policies improve economic development), whereas token causal claims describe causal 
relations between singulars (e.g. UK government decision to rescue the Royal Bank of 
Scotland in September 2010 jeopardized the support of British taxpayers).  
Thus, GH characterizes the causal relationships among variables at the more general 
level: its scope typically covers all cases under consideration; HH describes the causal 
connections among events occurring in each particular case. The historical narrative 
develops at the interplay of the two (sets) of hypotheses. It is typically structured around 
the description of several causal chains each connecting the variables in GH as instantiated 
in the specific cases. The claim was made that HH provides evidence for GH, and that it does 
so only if the causal chains it describes are uninterrupted (George and Bennett 1997). In 
George and Bennett’s account, the causal chain is uninterrupted if, and only if, each link 
conforms to the expectations previously formulated on the basis of the background 
theory. Whereas absence of disruption is a plausible requirement, it is possible to provide 
an account of it that is more accurate, and at the same time, less restrictive than the one 
proposed by George and Bennett.  
In what follows I shall argue that when employed jointly with the comparative method, 
process-tracing contributes effectively to causal inference if, and only if, it identifies causal 
chains that are continuous. My argument develops in two steps. I first provide a criterion 
for the continuity of causal chains as posited by HH, and illustrate by way of an example 
how process-tracing can fail to satisfy it. The usefulness of this criterion will become 
apparent once I introduce and discuss a second criterion, related to the former, which 
  
establishes when process-tracing succeeds as an effective complement for causal inference. By 
reconstructing continuous causal chains process-tracing partakes in a broader framework 
for causal inference where valid conclusions are derived by gradually eliminating rival 
hypotheses. I shall discuss in detail how and why this is the case in section 2.5. 
Here is a criterion for continuous causal chains: 
Continuity Criterion (CC): The causal chain in (HH) is continuous if, 
and only if, process-tracing articulates a complete causal mechanism vis-à-vis 
the historical hypothesis in question. 
Consider first the distinction between causal chains and causal mechanisms. Causal chains 
are sequences of events that are causally connected. Causal mechanisms are sets of 
components, and the related properties, organized in a system in such a way as to give rise 
to causal chains. In drawing this distinction, my view differs from Little’s who identifies 
the mechanism with the chain of events itself. It also differs from Steel’s who defines social 
mechanisms as only giving rise to macro-level regularities. I do not regard the production 
of regularities as a defining feature of causal mechanisms.45 Social mechanisms can also 
bring about unique series of events.  If the mechanism is triggered repeatedly and is 
embedded in a stable system then it also gives rise to regularities. In historical narratives, 
the mechanism, or mechanisms, in question is responsible for the chains of events as it 
unfolded in each case and, if instantiated in more the one case, for the general causal 
relationship as well.     
Completeness is achieved if, and only if, every link in the chain is backed up by the 
mechanism at work, that is, the mechanism is structured in such a way that the interactions 
among its components are responsible for the entire sequence of events in the causal 
chain. The description of the mechanism typically includes the characterization of the 
relevant components, of the system in which they are embedded, and the type of 
relationships among them. Relationships among components are typically, though not 
necessarily, governed by social practices, norms, customs, laws, and so on. The sequence 
                                                          
45 For a similar view see Reiss (2008: 108-110). 
  
of events is produced by interactions among the mechanism components that, once 
triggered, unfold in virtue of, and are shaped by, the components structured relationships. 
The causal chain has a gap whenever one of the links fails to be explained by reference to 
the set of underlying structured relationships, or some subset in it. In this case the 
requirement of completeness is not fulfilled and the causal chain is discontinuous.  
Consider the following example. In Regional Advantage, regional planner Anna Lee 
Saxenian (1994) explains the diverging economic performance of Route 128 and Silicon 
Valley, economic regions located in the Boston area and Northern California, respectively. 
Silicon Valley and Route 128 had a period of explosive economic growth during the 1970s. 
The astounding success of the two regions was driven by highly-sophisticated technology 
production: while Silicon Valley was an international leader in the market for 
semiconductors, Route 128 had a major role in the production of mini-computers. Their 
position was severely threatened in the mid-80s by a global turmoil. Japan became a heavy 
competitor in the market of semiconductors, while Route 128 minicomputers lost market 
shares to start-ups (from inside and outside the United States), producing personal 
computers and mainframes. This unexpected change in the global context dramatically hit 
the two regions. They reacted to the downturn, however, in opposite ways. Silicon Valley 
swiftly recovered taking control again of the more sophisticated and highly customized 
segment within the market for semiconductors. Route 128 remained stuck in the 
minicomputer market, which became increasingly thinner due to the impressive demand 
expansion for mainframes and personal computers. What we observe at the end of the 
80s is thus a thriving Silicon Valley and a steady decline of Route 128.  
Comparing the two cases, Saxenian formulates the following general hypothesis: 
(GH) Industrial system  Economic adaptation46 
The industrial system is the structure in which relationships are organized in the 
economic region. The relations comprise: 
 ties among socio-cultural institutions, political powers and firms;  
                                                          
46 Here and below arrows stand for causal relations, unless specified otherwise. 
  
 relations between firms and suppliers; 
 power and work relations within the firm.  
Saxenian claims industrial systems to be responsible for the degree of adaptation of 
the regional economy to the relevant environment. This relationship depends on the 
specific chain of events that unfolded in each case from the emergence of a given industrial 
system to the economic performance at the end of the 80s. Silicon Valley, says Saxenian, 
first developed, then partly abandoned but ultimately enforced a network-based industrial 
system (NBS); Route 128 created and remained stuck in what she defines as an 
independent-firm based system (IFS). Saxenian formulates two historical hypotheses that 
posit that the emergence, abandonment, and enforcement of a given system were 
responsible for the specific path of alternative growth and decline that was observed in 
each case. Fig 2.3 represents the causal chain that unfolded in Silicon Valley (HHSV). 
Two types of mechanisms are posited to back-up the causal chain. They are 
characterized by similar systems and components but differ in the way in which 
components are arranged therein. Both mechanisms are embedded in a system – the global 
market for technology - characterized by fast and sudden changes, and comprise agents in 
the productive, social, and political sectors. In the first mechanism (NBS),47 firms and 
suppliers are tied by horizontal links, companies are characterized by a decentralized 
power structure and dense relations exist between firms and the political and social agents 
in the region. The interactions among the components are informed by practices such as 
a balanced mixture of competition and cooperation, information disclosure, flexibility in 
the job market, social informality, and so on. The second mechanism (IFS)48 is arranged 
in the following way: firms are organized in a vertically integrated manner keeping 
exchanges with suppliers to the minimum, ties to local institutions are almost non-extant, 
and power inside the firm is strongly centralized. In this case the interactions among the 
                                                          
 HHsv refers to the historical hypothesis about Silicon Valley. Saxenian also formulated HHR128, a 
historical hypothesis about Route 128. I do not consider the latter to avoid rendering the discussion 
unnecessarily complicated. 
47 NBS stands for Network Based System. 
48 IFS stands for Independent-Firm based System. 
  
agents are governed by practices of fierce competition, information secrecy, job market 
rigidity, and social ties informed by strong formality.   
Continuity is granted to the causal chain if each link is supported by (one of) the 
posited mechanisms. This seems, however, not to be the case. Whereas some links in the 
sequence are indeed backed-up by the mechanisms (continuous arrows, fig. 2.3), others 
are not (dotted arrows, fig. 2.3). Mechanism NBS explains how agents adapt to sudden 
changes in the relevant environment by relying on practices of information exchange, 
mixed cooperation and competition, and flexibility (thick arrows, fig. 2.3). On the other 
hand, mechanism IFS explains how practices that endorse rigidity, information secrecy, 
and fierce competition prevent adaptation when similar unexpected changes occur, and in 
this way lead to economic downturn (thin arrows, fig. 2.3).  
Consider instead the dotted arrows. Saxenian claims that because of the astounding 
growth of the 70s entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley “abandoned the network”; and, as a 
consequence of the severe downturn in the early 80s, they went back to the network (1994: 
88). She further claims that the decision of quitting the network system and adopting it 
again depends on the agents’ capacity (or lack thereof) to correctly understand the reasons 
of their failure and success. No account is given of why this would be the case and the 
mechanisms above do not offer such an explanation. The suggested causal link needs to 
be supported by reference to the (cognitive) mechanisms and social practices in virtue of 
which the agents formulate perceptions (and misperceptions) of the surrounding 
environment and restructure their relationships accordingly.  
 
That a causal chain is continuous in the sense described above does not entail that the 
mechanisms that back it up are correctly identified. The criterion of completeness is not 
  
tailored to assess whether process-tracing succeeds or fails in solving its 
underdetermination problem, to use Steel’s terminology. Nevertheless, it can be useful to 
assess whether process-tracing can help to reach a valid causal inference when used jointly 
with strategies of direct inference. If the causal chain is not backed up by a complete 
mechanism, it is discontinuous and fails to connect the causal variables of interest. Hence, 
it cannot be used effectively to support the general hypothesis GH:  
Effective Complement (EC). Process-tracing is an effective 
complement for (GH) if, and only if, it posits continuous causal chains in 
(HH). 
I shall argue in section 2.5 that if process-tracing satisfies criterion EC it helps reach 
valid causal inference by way of the gradual elimination of alternative hypotheses. It is, 
however, important to notice that discontinuity in the causal chain does not render the 
evidence in its support strictly speaking invalid. Consider the case illustrated above. It might 
well be the case that the described mechanisms are correctly identified; still, they do not 
back up each link in the causal chain. Hence, process-tracing here provides only partial 
evidence for the historical hypothesis in question. Nothing excludes that if this evidence 
were further developed into the description of complete mechanisms, process-tracing 
would also be an effective complement for causal inference.  
The criterion of completeness, thus, cuts across the sharp distinction between heuristic 
and valid evidence I pointed out above.49 In particular, that the posited mechanism is 
incomplete does not imply that the evidence is invalid; vice versa, that it eventually 
develops in a complete mechanism is not guarantee to full validity. Nonetheless, I shall 
argue below it can still help causal inference effectively. 
     
2.5  PROCESS TRACING IN THE GENERAL ELIMINATION 
METHODOLOGY 
                                                          
49 See last paragraph in section 2.3. 
  
I claimed above that process-tracing is an effective complement for causal inference if, 
and only if, it posits continuous causal chains in the historical hypotheses HH (effective 
complement criterion, EC); I further claimed that it posits continuous causal chains if, and 
only if, it articulates mechanisms that are complete vis-à-vis HH (continuity criterion, CC). 
If process-tracing meets these criteria when used jointly with the method of comparison, 
it furthers valid causal inference by helping the elimination of alternative hypotheses. It 
partakes, in fact, in a more general procedure of eliminative induction that consists in the 
identification of possible causes of the outcome in question and gradually narrowing down 
the alternative hypotheses. In what follows I shall first characterize this eliminative 
procedure within a more general framework of eliminative induction, and then, by way of 
a case study, explain why continuity is a crucial condition for achieving eventually valid 
causal inference.  
Process-tracing contributes to causal inference within the framework of the General 
Elimination Methodology (GEM) described by Michael Scriven (2008). Scriven illustrates 
GEM in its simplest instantiation as follows:  
 
Every child acquires a repertoire of possible causes for a large number of effects before 
reaching school age; for example, they know that the vase on the table by the window 
can be knocked over by the wind, the shades, the cat, a sibling, a playmate, or a grown-
up. When they encounter the effect, they begin to sift the list and check for indicators, 
either immediately observable or quickly accessible, that will eliminate one or more 
candidates and eventually may identify the responsible cause. This is the basic case of 
hypothesis creation and verification and it is the essential element, even if subliminally 
and non-inferentially, in all careful causal explanations (Scriven 2007: 9). 
 
According to Scriven, GEM is the basis for all causal claims:50 it is used in scientific 
practice and in everyday situations; it is employed whether one uses background 
                                                          
50 In my view, Scriven does not really provide sufficient evidence for the claim that GEM underlies all 
causal claims, nor that it underwrites all strategies listed below. However, I think that process-tracing 
when used jointly with the method of comparison is underpinned by GEM, as I shall argue in what 
follows. 
  
knowledge of theoretical and empirical kind, practical knowledge, or formal strategies of 
causal inquiry. It operates by gradually narrowing down the range of possible causes of 
the phenomenon in question until a valid explanation is eventually obtained. In ordinary 
circumstances practical knowledge of a tacit and implicit kind is often sufficient, as in the 
case of the competent mechanic who is dealing with a break failure (2008: 21). When new 
and complex phenomena are examined, as typically happens in the social sciences, one 
relies on the application of research designs proper.  
Scriven suggests the following ways to establish causation relying on GEM:  
(i) Direct critical observation, such as visual, and tactile observation. 
Scriven claims that in certain instances causation can be directly and 
reliably observed, or more generally, experienced. One sees causation by 
looking at the pen falling when Jack releases his right hand. Similarly, one 
experiences causation by pushing the speed pedal when driving the car.51 
(ii) Reported and validated observation, e.g. case studies. Scriven refers 
here to those case studies that consist in reporting previous observations of 
causal relationships of the sort described in (i).  
(iii) Direct or simple inductive inference from (i) or (ii). Upon having 
seen the pen falling when Jack released his right hand, one can explain the 
pencil on the floor by Jack’s releasing his left hand. Scriven mentions as 
an instance of this strategy, the inference to the effects of meteorites on 
the far side of the moon’s surface, prior to satellite launching.  
(iv) Simple GEM inference, e.g., autopsy, engineering breakdown, and so 
on; that is, the elimination of alternative explanations which is based on 
                                                          
51 Scriven defends his claim that causation is directly and reliably observable by referring to experimental 
findings about concepts development in early childhood and by appealing to the fact that causal claims 
based on eyewitness testimony (when they meet certain standards such as normal vision, propinquity, 
absence of motive to lie, etc.) are used for establishing a case in the court of law. For example, eyewitness 
testimony of a shooting is used to establish whether the victim was actually assaulted by the suspect. 
Scriven acknowledges that his position is controversial and highly disputed (2007: 5). This fact, however, 
does not impinge on the relevance of the methodological framework he proposes which accounts both 
for the cases in which causation is directly experienced and for the cases in which it is actually inferred.    
  
background knowledge of possible causes and direct observation. If the 
car does not start, I’ll first check the tank because I know that one possible 
cause is that I run out of fuel; if the tank is full, I conjecture that the battery 
must be out of charge. The same strategy underwrites the inference made 
by the coroner when performing an autopsy. 
(v) Theoretical inference, based on the use of analogy or theory. This 
strategy concerns especially fields in which direct observation is not 
available, such as cosmogony, or geology. Examples are the theory of 
continental drift to explain mountain ranges, or the dust cloud produced 
by the meteorite fall to explain the extinction of dinosaurs (Waldner 2003). 
(vi) Direct manipulation e.g. in the kitchen and lab. By way of tinkering 
and making things happen one learns about causation, for instance by 
lowering the flame one learns to prevent water from spilling; similarly, by 
raising the flame one learns to make fried egg.  
(vii) Randomized Controlled Trials, (RCTs): experimental designs 
involving at least two groups of subjects, the control group and the 
experimental group, between which the subjects are distributed by way of 
a randomizing procedure. 
(viii) Quasi-RCT. Experimental situations in which, unlike RCTs, 
treatment is not assigned to the units by way of a randomizing procedure, 
e.g. pharmacology.  
(ix) Quasi-experimentation. Experimental situations that lack some of 
the features of the randomized controlled experiment. For instance, post-
test only designs are quasi-experiment where the outcome in the two 
groups is measured and compared only after the treatment. Scriven refers 
here to fields such as pedagogy, addiction studies, and international aid.  
(x) Natural experiments: observational studies where experimental 
conditions “naturally” occur that is, they are neither brought about by the 
  
experimenter’s intervention nor are they subject to her control. In these 
situations the treatment is assigned “as if random.”  
I suggest that GEM also underpins the joint use of several research strategies together. 
In particular, when process tracing is employed as an adjunct method to strategies of direct 
causal inference, they together rely on GEM. In this case, where theory (v) often plays a 
substantive role, GEM finds application through a sort of division of labor among the 
strategies employed. Process-tracing thus partakes in this general inferential procedure 
with its own specific contribution. Before describing its role more precisely, let’s consider 
the logical steps underlying GEM. GEM works under the following conditions: 
 
1. The general premise is the deterministic principle: all macro events have a cause. 
2. The first “premise from practice” is the list of possible causes (LOPC) of events 
of the type in which we are interested, e.g. learning gains, reduction of poverty, 
extension of life for AIDS patients…An LOPC usually refers to causes at a certain 
temporal or spatial remove from the effect, and at a certain level of conceptualization; 
the context of investigation determines the appropriate distance parameters. 
3. The second practical premise is the list of modus operandi for each of the 
possible causes (MOL)52. Each cause has a set of footprints, a short one if it is a 
proximate cause, a long one if it is a remote cause, but in general the MO is a sequence 
of intermediate or concurrent events or a set of conditions, or a chain of events, that 
has to be present when the cause is effective.  
4. The fourth premise comprises “the facts of the case”, and these are now 
assembled selectively by looking for the presence or absence of factors listed in the 
MO of each of the possible causes. Only those causes are (eventually) left standing 
whose MO is completely present. Ideally, there will be just one of these, but sometimes 
more than one, which are then co-causes (Scriven 2008: 21). 
 
The causal inference proceeds through (a) the listing of possible causes of the effect 
in question, (b) the listing of their modus operandi, and (c) the collection of empirical data 
to establish the relevant cause by means of the evidence about which MO is actually at 
                                                          
52 MOL stands for list of modus operandi. MO stands for modus operandi. 
  
work. When process-tracing is employed in conjunction with other research strategies it 
typically serves at steps (b) and (c). Consider the study by Donohue and Levitt discussed 
above. 53  Background knowledge supplies the list of possible causes, that is, the 
explanations so far provided in the literature for the sharp decrease in the crime rate in 
the United States since 1991. They include the increased use of incarceration, improved 
policing strategies, the decline in the crack and cocaine trade, and so on (Donohue and 
Levitt 2001: 380). Unlike the case of the mechanic dealing with a break failure, or the 
detective searching the motive behind a murder, scientific studies as this one generally aim 
at proposing novel explanations of the effect of interest. They aim at enlarging the list of 
possible causes currently available in the academic literature. Strategies of direct inference 
are primarily orientated to identify the novel cause and provide some evidence that this is 
a prime suspect.  
The list of MOs is either retrieved from background knowledge or the outcome of 
theoretical work. Whether empirical facts are required to prove the absence of the 
alternative MOs depends on specifics of the case. In the case above, empirical information 
not pertaining to the MOs is considered sufficient to exclude the competing causes. For 
example, the fact that “Many cities that have not improved their police forces have 
nonetheless seen enormous crime declines (2001: 380)” is sufficient to exclude the 
improvement in policing strategies as the main causal factor.54 In other cases, further 
empirical information is required to exclude the competing causes. Process-tracing enters 
at this stage and, in particular, searches for clues that the MO of the proposed cause was 
actually in place. In this case process-tracing consists in recollecting the experimental and 
statistical evidence for the theoretical links constituting the mechanism between the 
legalization of abortion and the drop in the crime rate that followed twenty years later. As 
argued in the sections above, however, evidence of experimental and statistical character 
is not always central to process-tracing. Nevertheless, one observes a similar division of 
labor among research strategies in historical narratives. In this case the application of 
                                                          
53 Cfr. Section 2.3. 
54 The authors do not exclude that it maybe had a role, but that it was a major one.  
  
GEM is slightly more complicated, as the following case study, very popular among 
sociologists and political scientists, shows. 
 
2.5.1 THE CASE STUDY: STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS 
Theda Skocpol (1979) studies social revolutions in France (1788-9), China (1911-1916), 
and Russia (1917). States and Social Revolutions is a historical narrative that draws extensively 
on the method of comparison:55 positive and negative outcomes of social revolutions are 
contrasted and, in accordance with the logic of Mill’s method of agreement and difference, 
similarities and differences among the cases examined. The outcome of the investigation 
is rather complex. A set of circumstances proves in fact consistently present in the three 
positive cases (France, China, and Russia), and only partly so in the negative ones (Japan, 
Prussia, England, and Germany).56 The method of comparison does not lead to a pattern 
of causal interaction, but only individuates the factors that have causal relevance in the 
cases at hand. Causal order needs in fact to be conferred on the set of relevant 
circumstances to establish causal priority and interactions among them.  
By identifying underlying mechanisms, process-tracing reconstructs the causal chains 
that unfolded in each case and connects the relevant factors. The following pattern thus 
emerges upon the joint use of process-tracing and the method of comparison. Skocpol 
identifies two proximate causes of social revolutions: (1) state breakdown and (2) peasant 
revolt; and five ultimate causes: (a) international pressure, (b) agrarian economy, and (c) 
non autonomous state as causes of state breakdown; (d) peasant autonomy and solidarity 
and (e) landlord vulnerability as causes of peasant revolt. 
                                                          
55 See Mahoney (1999) for a methodological discussion of this study.   
56 Prussia and Germany refer to Prussian Reform Movement (1807-1814) and German (failed) revolution 
(1848-50) respectively. 
  
 
 
Let’s consider the mechanism pertinent to the rectangular section in the causal diagram 
in fig 2.4. It is represented below in a simplified form (see fig 2.5). The absolutist monarchy 
is its central component and it is part of two relevant systems. It is a component in the 
European system of states where it competes with more economically developed powers 
abroad. In the case of France, the Bourbon monarchy bids for supremacy over continental 
Europe and on seas (double edged arrows).The absolutist monarchy also is a proto-
bureaucratic imperial state embedded in agrarian economies, where it is tied to a dominant 
class by ties of mutual dependence and conflicting interests. In France, the monarchy relies 
on the dominant class for collecting dues and taxes among peasants. In return, the latter 
is granted military protection, fiscal exemption and feudal offices. In virtue of these offices 
the dominant class has strong political leverage and can oppose monarchy decisions. This 
set of ties is represented by the thick arrows in the diagram in fig. 2.5.  
This complex mechanism explains how events unfolded in France and led to the state 
breakdown, which eventually caused the social revolution in 1789. Insofar as it is complete 
vis-à-vis the (segment of) the relevant chain, it succeeds in connecting conditions (a), (b) 
and (c) to (1) in the diagram 2.4. In so doing, it confers the causal order that these 
conditions would lack otherwise and that cannot be given by the method of comparison 
which, only detects relevant similarities and differences and cannot tell causes and effects 
  
apart. The chain of events this mechanism backs up shows instead how (a), (b), and (c) 
interact and jointly lead to outcome (1).  
Causal order among the relevant factors is not fully achieved whenever the mechanism 
is incomplete and the causal chain discontinuous. Complete mechanisms are required for 
filling the diagram with all the links that would be missing otherwise and connect the full 
set of relevant causal variables. I shall argue in what follows that it is exactly on this ground 
that process-tracing helps to rule out effectively alternative hypotheses.  
 
Skocpol considers four families of theories of social revolutions as alternatives to her 
own:  
 Marxist theories. This family of theories understands revolutions as 
class-based movements growing out of objective structural contradictions 
within historically developing and inherently conflict-ridden societies. Key 
to any society is its mode of production, or specific combination of socio-
  
economic forces of production (technology and division of labor), and 
class relations of property ownership and surplus appropriation. The basic 
source of a revolutionary contradiction in society is the emergence of a 
disjuncture within a mode of production between the social forces and social 
relations of production. In turn, this disjuncture expresses itself in 
intensifying class conflicts. Revolution itself is accomplished through class 
action led by the self-conscious, rising revolutionary class (1979: 7-8).  
 Aggregate psychological theories subsume revolutions under the 
more general concept of political violence. People typically engage in 
political violence when they live in conditions of relative deprivation that 
is, when they perceive a discrepancy between the opportunities to which 
they feel entitled and the ones they actually have (1979: 9). The widespread 
feeling of frustration generated by this condition of relative deprivation 
constitutes the fundamental factor that triggers the organization and 
participation in revolutionary action. 
 Systems/value consensus theories understand revolutions as violent 
responses of ideological movements to severe disequilibria in the social 
systems. A social system experiences a crisis when values and environment 
become “dis-synchronized” due to the intrusion of new values or other 
disruptive factors such as new technologies (1979: 12). If existing 
authorities fail to respond in a flexible manner to the current crisis and 
resist change with an intransigent attitude, then revolutionary movements 
develop in order to re-synchronize societal values and environment. 
Revolutions thus consist in the purposeful implementation of strategies of 
violence to implement the necessary change.    
 Political-conflict theories understand revolutions as a special case of 
collective action in which groups fight the government for ultimate 
political sovereignty over the population and to some extent succeed in 
displacing existing power-holders (1979: 11). Revolutions develop when 
  
discontent becomes widespread in the population and leads to the 
emergence of multiple sovereignties. They are only successful, however, if 
the contenders, that is, the revolutionary coalition, have control of 
substantial force (ibid.)   
Skocpol rules out rival explanations of social revolutions by means of two strategies: 
I. Explanations are ruled out if their modus operandi fails to be present.  
This strategy thus strictly obeys to the logic of GEM.  
Both Marxist and systems/value consensus theories above posit the presence of a 
purposeful movement directed to overthrow the extant social and political order as an 
essential component of the revolutionary process. But this factor is found not to be 
operative in the cases analyzed.  
II. Explanations are ruled out if their modus operandi, though present, 
fails to identify fully the relevant causal chains and thus fail to establish 
full causal order among the relevant causal factors.   
This strategy deviates from GEM as traditionally conceived. 
Consider political-conflict theories, which Skocpol regards as relevant to some extent 
to explain the revolutionary outcomes (1979: 14). Central to their modus operandi are 
class relations and interests and the availability of resources for class struggle. Even though 
these mechanisms are both present in the cases at hand – say the class-mechanism and the 
resource-mechanism – they only explain some segments of the chain of events that 
unfolded in the three cases (continuous arrows). They fail to account for the sequence of 
events leading from conditions (a), (b) and (c) to outcome (1). Causal order among these 
conditions is thus not achieved by the modus operandi posited by political-conflict 
theories. As a consequence they only establish some links in the causal diagram and fail to 
fill the remaining links in (dotted links).   
  
 
 
2.5.2 PROCESS TRACING CONTRIBUTION TO VALID CAUSAL 
INFERENCE 
When process-tracing and the method of comparison are used in historical narratives, they 
contribute jointly to causal inference by means of a procedure that consists in the gradual 
elimination of causal hypotheses. Their joint operation conforms to the logic of causal 
investigation as described in GEM. The method of comparison identifies the relevant 
causal factors and process-tracing reconstructs the causal chains that in each case connect 
causally the factors identified by the method of comparison. The eliminative procedure 
employed consists of two distinct strategies. The first strategy, which is described in GEM, 
rules out alternative explanations whose modus operandi fails to be present in the cases at 
hand. GEM does not require the identification of the actual modus operandi, but only 
evidence of the absence of the modus operandi that is posited by the competing 
explanations. This strategy may not be sufficient to eliminate all alternative hypotheses. 
As Skocpol’s study shows, it might be the case that the modus operandi posited by other 
rival theories is operating. 
The second eliminative strategy narrows further the range of competing explanations 
in these thorny, but not necessarily uncommon, cases. It helps to rule out those 
explanations whose modus operandi, even though present, fails to disclose the whole pattern of 
causal relations among the relevant variables. If process-tracing succeeds in identifying causal 
  
chains that in each case considered connect all relevant variables, it discloses the whole 
pattern of causal interaction and rules out those hypotheses that fail to do so. Two 
epistemic considerations justify this eliminative strategy. First, causal order is fully 
established if all the relevant variables are connected by causal chains. Knowledge of the 
temporal order in which events occurred is insufficient to establish causal order when the 
causal structure is complex as in Skocpol’s case. Certain circumstances are long-standing 
causes, such as the agrarian economy, whereas others are triggering factors, such as the 
increasing international pressure. If one only considers temporal order, it may be plausible 
to infer that agrarian economy caused the increase in international pressure. Causal chains 
thus help with telling causes and effects apart.  
 Secondly, the identification of causal chains connecting the relevant variables provides 
evidence that corroborates further the general causal hypothesis. In other words, it 
supports the conclusion that the variables identified by the method of comparison are not 
spuriously correlated. The method of comparison, does not guarantee that full control of 
the relevant variables is achieved.57 Confounding factors may lurk in the background and 
escape cognizance by the social scientists; and this is indeed one of the most powerful 
argument in favor of process-tracing as an adjunct method of causal analysis. However, 
the skeptic may object that this is still insufficient to rule out those rival hypotheses that 
fail to identify all causal chains among the relevant variables and regard the one hypothesis 
that is left as valid. After all, it may be the case that the method of comparison identifies 
variables that are spuriously correlated, and process-tracing posits sequences of events that 
are spurious as well.  
In particular, the skeptic may ask for additional evidence that jointly corroborates the 
historical and general hypotheses. The identification of complete mechanisms provides the 
evidence required. A mechanism is complete vis-à-vis a given historical hypothesis if, and 
only if, it backs up each link in the chain, which connects in turn the relevant variables in 
                                                          
57 See section 1.2.1 for a brief discussion of the comparative method and the problem it encounters in 
providing valid conclusions; see section 1.3.2 for a distinction between the comparative method and the 
method of comparison. 
  
the general hypothesis. The mechanism thus supports both the causal chain and the 
general relationship. By describing complete mechanisms process-tracing helps causal 
inference effectively. Valid causal hypotheses are the ones that are left once rival 
explanations are gradually eliminated, either because the mechanisms they posit fail to be 
present, or because it fails to back up fully the relevant causal chains. The criterion of 
continuity thus discerns the successful causal hypothesis within a narrower range of 
alternative explanations.  
   
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Process-tracing is employed in much practices in the social sciences but there is no shared 
view yet on when it is a valuable strategy to use, and which criteria it ought to satisfy to be 
fruitfully applied. Scholars tend to tie its conditions of validity to the use of specific kinds 
of evidence. Process-tracing is thus regarded as (more likely) to provide valid results if it 
relies on statistical and experimental evidence, or when its application is governed by fully-
fledged theories of social phenomena. However plausible, these conditions are not 
adequate to assess process-tracing performance in contexts where these favorable 
epistemic circumstances fail to occur. In these cases, for want of criteria, process-tracing 
would be in fact acknowledged a “mere” heuristic role. I argued in this chapter that further 
fruitful distinctions along the continuum between merely heuristic and fully valid evidence 
can be drawn so as to assess more precisely process-tracing performance. 
The criterion I propose, that process-tracing ought to outline complete mechanisms vis-
à-vis the hypothesis at hand, aims to single out successful applications of process-tracing 
in historical narratives where the alleged favorable epistemic circumstances tend not to 
obtain. I argued that when used in tandem with the methods of direct inference process-
tracing can help effectively causal inference whenever it fulfills the aforementioned 
condition. By drawing causal links among the variables that direct inference first identifies, 
it assists the latter in ruling out the alternative hypotheses. The eliminative strategies on 
which process-tracing and methods of direct inference jointly rely ideally discard all the 
rival hypotheses until the point in which a single hypothesis is eventually left. This final 
  
theory should be regarded as valid as long as there is no evidence that either disproves the 
posited mechanisms or identifies new relevant variables so far undetected and thus 
unaccounted.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
3 DRAWING LESSONS FROM CASE STUDIES BY ENHANCING 
COMPARABILITY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In an influential book on the principles and practice of the case study method, John 
Gerring defines the case study as “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose 
of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)” 
(Gerring 2007a: 20).58  And, in fact, case studies are often performed with the purpose of 
“drawing lessons” in the form of conclusions that apply beyond the single case and explain 
other outcomes in addition to the one studied directly. Obtaining general results from a 
studied context is a legitimate epistemic purpose; furthermore, it is also instrumental to 
plan interventions in contexts yet unfamiliar. Case studies, in fact, are also used in fields 
such as economics, political science or educational research to suggest hypotheses that 
help informing policy decisions in altogether new situations. The former purpose raises 
issues of mere generalizability, which regard the range of conditions under which the 
conclusions of the case study are expected to hold. When policy making is the goal, the 
concern of generalizability is further complicated by the need to formulate guidelines on 
how to intervene in unstudied contexts.   
In the philosophical literature, issues of generalizability are usually discussed under the 
name of external validity (Campbell and Stanley 1963, Cook and Campbell 1979, Guala 
2005, 2010, Steel 2008, 2010).59 The concepts of internal and external validity were first 
introduced by Campbell and Stanley in their work on experimental designs (1963). And 
indeed, the relevance of the distinction is apparent when thinking of laboratory sciences. 
In the social sciences, experiments are most often set up with the purpose of teaching 
lessons about the non-experimental world. Knowing the conditions under which these 
results are applicable outside the laboratory becomes therefore a prominent concern. 
                                                          
58 In Chapter 1 I argued that the purpose of generalizing results, though certainly desirable, should not 
be regarded as a defining feature of case study research as Gerring among others suggests.   
59 See section 1.3.2 for my definition and discussion of internal and external validity. 
  
Though a less pressing concern, generalizing remains a goal of case study researchers. 
External validity is thus an issue for Case Study Research (CSR) as well.  
Philosophers, however, have so far worried little about the generalizability of CSR. 
Social scientists making use of case studies proved rather timid in addressing this issue. 
This tendency is changing nowadays. The interest in case studies and their methodological 
riddles experienced an upsurge in the last decades so that it is appropriate to speak of a 
new trend. This recent turn has the merit of bringing the problem of generalizability to 
the forefront.60 However, even if scholars in the new trend strive for a more autonomous 
understanding of CSR liberated by the statistical and experimental viewpoint, their 
attempts are not always coherent and successful. In fact, the contemporary debate on 
external validity is largely influenced by the heteronomous paradigm of CSR. The currently 
dominant approach is a hybrid that retains major features of the old heteronomous 
paradigm in a revised form. To stress the continuity with the old paradigm, I term the 
currently dominant approach the traditional view on external validity. 61 
The adherents to the traditional view emphasize the specificity of CSR by describing 
its advantages and disadvantages with respect to other methods of inquiry. In particular, 
they usually assume the existence of a trade-off between internal and external validity, and 
find a downside of the case-study design in the lack of external validity. Treated as a 
comparative weakness of CSR, external validity is, however, only shortly discussed and 
quickly dismissed.62 This situation generates an interesting tension and calls for attention: 
there is, in fact, a gap to bridge between purposes and means. Generalizing is set forth by 
                                                          
60 I n Chapter 1 I introduce and discuss the new trend which sees case study research as an autonomous 
epistemic genre.  
61 In section 1.3.2 I distinguish three approaches to generalizability: two of them discuss generalizability 
in terms of external validity; the first is the “traditional view” and the other is the approach I introduce 
and defend in this chapter. Whereas the first approach gathers consensus among a rather compact group 
of scholars in political science, only scattered contributions were made to the second approach. For this 
reason I regard the “traditional view” as dominant in the debate on the external validity of CSR. The 
third approach is concerned with the generalizability of theoretical and conceptual results. For the reasons 
given in section 1.3.2 this approach is not further explored in this thesis. 
62 Gerring (2007a) is an interesting case in point. His book on the principles and practice of CSR devotes 
two chapters to investigate techniques to strengthen the internal validity of case studies; external validity, 
after being briefly mentioned in the introductory chapter, is only discussed indirectly in the chapter on 
case selection. 
  
case study researchers as a prominent goal, but methodological discussions related to it 
conclude with a gloomy perspective. 
In this chapter, I first examine the reasons that led most of the scholars to the 
conclusion that CSR is a weak methodology with regard to establishing external validity. 
As we shall see, this conclusion is based on assumptions that are, to say the least, 
disputable. In section 3.2, I revisit the line of reasoning that underwrites the traditional 
view on external validity and outline some of the objections raised against it. I shall focus 
in particular on the role that the concept of typicality plays within this view, and argue that 
the centrality given to it diverts the debate from the real issue of external validity.  
One unfortunate result of this has been to lead the debate to a dead end where it stands 
now. I propose to refocus the debate on external validity in CSR by bringing the concept 
of comparability of case studies to the fore. Whereas typicality characterizes the case and its 
relationship to a set of other cases, comparability is a property of the actual study. In what 
follows, I shall suggest that by making case studies more comparable in the sense to be 
specified, one has more reliable grounds to judge the external validity of the results. This 
refocusing has two major beneficial effects. First, my analysis demonstrates why it would 
be best to situate external validity as a problem of inference rather than mere 
representativeness, as the traditional view maintains. Second, the approach that I develop 
suggests strategies for strengthening the generalizability potential of case studies. The goal, 
in short, is not so much a critique of the traditional view’s account of the pitfalls of CSR 
with respect to external validity, but a shifting of perspective that reveals room for 
improvement.  
 
3.2 THE TRADITIONAL VIEW ON THE EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF CSR  
The use of case studies is common in the social sciences, and apparently increases (Gerring 
2007a). Interestingly, CSR starts to be used as an autonomous tool of investigation even 
in fields that typically relegated it to an at best ancillary position, such as economics 
(Rodrik 2003, Bates et al. 1998). John Gerring (2004, 2007a) quite surprisingly notices that, 
even though widely employed across the sciences, CSR is still regarded as a weak 
  
methodology, and attributes the low appreciation in which it is held to the general lack of 
its understanding.  
Several scholars have recently tried to rehabilitate this methodology by providing a 
thorough analysis of its specificity. Becker and Ragin (1992), Brady and Collier (2004), 
George and Bennett (2005), Gerring (2004, 2007a), Mahoney and Goertz (2006b), and 
Ragin (2000) all contribute to the methodological reflections on CSR by emphasizing its 
distinctiveness with respect to the other methods of inquiry. These works find some 
convergence in their understanding of what CSR is good for. Nonetheless, they tend to 
agree on the fact that external validity counts as a weakness of the method. This conclusion 
is supported by a set of assumptions on what external validity is and how it should be 
evaluated. I term this the traditional view on external validity.  
Some of these beliefs are widely shared in the literature on external validity, and are 
thus not confined within the debate among case study researchers. At the same time, not 
all scholars above would probably endorse each of these assumptions with the same degree 
of confidence. Even if it is not fully expressed by any of these authors, I take George and 
Bennett (2005), Mahoney and Goertz (2006b), and Gerring (2004, 2007a) as holding this 
view. The assumptions on which it rests are, in fact, traceable in the following excerpts:   
 
Recurrent trade-offs [in case study methods] include […] the related tension between 
achieving high internal validity and good historical explanations of particular cases 
versus making generalizations that apply to broad populations. The inherent 
limitations include a relative inability to render judgments on the frequency or 
representativeness of particular cases (George and Bennett 2005: 22). 
 
Questions of validity are often distinguished according to those that are internal to the 
sample under study and those that are external (i.e. applying to a broader -unstudied- 
population). The latter may be conceptualized as a problem of representativeness 
between sample and population. Cross-case research is always more representative of 
the population of interest than case study research […] Case study research suffers 
problems of representativeness because it includes, by definition, only a small number 
of cases of some more general phenomenon. Are the men chosen by Robert Lane 
  
typical of white, immigrant, working-class American males? Is Middletown 
representative of other cities in America? These sorts of questions forever haunt case 
study research. This means that case study research is generally weaker with respect to 
external validity than its cross case cousin. The corresponding virtue of case study 
research is its internal validity (Gerring 2007a: 43).  
 
In qualitative research, it is common for investigators to define the scope of their 
theories narrowly such that inferences are generalizable to only a limited range of cases. 
Indeed, in some qualitative works, the cases analyzed in the study represent the full 
scope of the theory. By contrast, in quantitative research, scholars usually define their 
scope more broadly and seek to make generalizations about large numbers of cases. 
Quantitative scholars often view the cases they analyze simply as a sample of a 
potentially much larger universe (Mahoney and Goertz 2006b: 237). 
 
Even though not fully developed and thoroughly discussed, the adherents to the 
traditional view share a set of underlying assumptions that enables the conclusion that the 
lack of external validity is a comparative weakness of CSR. This conclusion, in turn, fits 
comfortably an account of CSR that essentially consists in fleshing out the comparative 
advantages and disadvantages of this method with respect to the other research designs. 
Specific normative implications are then derived regarding situations where the case study 
design is the appropriate method to use and how to make it stronger.  
The set of beliefs that constitutes the traditional view is the following:   
1. External validity is a property of the scientific results and of the 
research designs that delivers them.  
2. Internal and external validity stand in a trade-off relation. 
3. External validity is a matter of representativeness. 
4. External validity is a quantifiable property. Whether it is high or low 
depends on the scope (breadth) of the population to which the 
results of the study apply. 
Besides sharing the four assumptions on external validity, these scholars agree that 
CSR encounters major problems in selecting cases that are representative of a large 
  
population. This fact together with the assumptions that external validity is a matter of 
representativeness (3), and the degree of external validity depends on the scope of the 
population to which the results from a study apply (4) entail the conclusion that case 
studies provide results with very limited external validity. Furthermore, since external 
validity is regarded as a property of the results of a given study and the method by means 
of which the results were obtained (1), it follows that CSR is low in external validity. Finally, 
since a trade-off is assumed between internal and external validity (2), CSR turns out to 
be weaker in external validity and stronger in internal validity than methods that are more 
successful in selecting cases that are representative of broader populations.63 
I will discuss the four assumptions and their normative implications below. The 
traditional view on the external validity of CSR borrowed assumptions 1 and 2 from the 
debate on the external validity of the experimental designs. In this context, the 
aforementioned assumptions have been independently discussed and challenged. I will 
examine assumptions 1 and 2 only shortly by referring to this discussion and the related 
criticisms, and by giving some additional reasons why they are further unjustified when 
carried over to CSR. I will then turn to assumptions 3 and 4, which have been smuggled 
into CSR from the statistical discourse. These assumptions seem to be more challenging, 
and their normative implications, to the best of my knowledge, have not been examined 
yet. I will then focus on those at length. 
  
3.2.1 THE ASSUMPTIONS CARRIED OVER FROM THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONTEXT  
Assumption 1 treats external validity as depending on intrinsic features of the research 
design: a given method is thus characterized as good or bad at providing generalizable 
results. This is at odds with the original formulation of Cook and Campbell (1979), where 
external validity is used to qualify solely the result of an experiment. In this formulation, an 
                                                          
63 In regarding CSR as low in external validity and high in internal validity the traditional view differs from 
the heteronomous paradigm of CSR. The old paradigm, in fact, maintained that CSR also faces serious 
problems of internal validity. 
  
experiment is externally valid if, and only if, its results can be generalized to a broader 
population. More generally, the recent literature commonly treats external validity as a 
property of a whole design rather than of a particular application of it (Lucas 2003).  
Assumption 2 asserts a trade-off between internal and external validity. It has been 
discussed by Jimenez-Buedo and Miller in relation to the use of experiments in the social 
sciences (2010). They explain the asserted trade-off with the underlying intuition that in 
the experimental context “the more we ensure that the treatment is isolated from potential 
confounds in order to make certain that the observed effect is attributable to the 
treatment, the more unlikely it is that the experimental results can be representative of 
phenomena of the outside world, since typically, in the outside world, many factors 
interact in the production of events that we are interested in” (2010: 302).  
Assumptions 1and 2 have been carried over to the case study context without clear 
arguments in their support. In particular, the use of the notion of external validity as an 
undistinguishable property of the scientific results and of the design where those results 
are obtained has slipped silently into common parlance as if it had no important normative 
implications. The normative implications are, however, remarkable. It follows from 
assumption 2 that a design described as having a comparative advantage in one respect is, 
in virtue of the trade-off, comparatively weaker in the other. Assumptions 1 and 2 together 
have thus given the scholars above license to qualify CSR as high in internal validity and 
low in external validity.64 These assumptions rationalize the methodological prescription 
that recommends the use of CSR when the main goal is achieving internal validity and of 
other designs, such as the statistical methods, when the goal is deriving broad 
generalizations instead.   
The soundness of this methodological principle is certainly disputable once 
assumptions 1 and 2 are also disputed. Assumption 1 has it that external validity is a 
property of scientific results and of the research method by means of which they have 
been produced. Remember from section 1.3.2 that scientific findings are externally valid 
                                                          
64 They are not, by themselves, sufficient for this conclusion. 
  
if, and only if, they are correctly extrapolated from the studied context to a context yet 
unstudied. Given this definition, it seems illegitimate to use the concept of external validity 
to refer to the research method as well. One establishes whether results are externally valid 
by empirical testing on a case-by-case basis; however, it is absurd to regard a research 
design as externally valid on a case-by-case basis.   
Alternatively, on a more charitable reading, scholars speaking of a research design as 
being low in external validity can be interpreted as meaning that the design in question tends 
to provide results that lack external validity. This requires, however, an additional 
methodological argument for why this would be the case. The argument which case study 
researchers typically provide appeals ultimately to assumption 3: they assume that external 
validity is a problem of representativeness, and argue that CSR faces problems at selecting 
representative samples. Hence, it tends to provide results that are poor in terms of external 
validity. This argument will be discussed in detail when I address assumption 3.  
  Assumption 1 has been challenged by Jeffrey Lucas (2003) in relation to the 
experimental design. Although the experimental method is criticized by several scholars 
for being poor in external validity, Lucas rejects this criticism as essentially misdirected. 
Specifically, he responds that “critiques of investigative techniques as being low in external 
validity because findings cannot be generalized quite often should be directed at the theory 
under test, rather than at the methodology employed to test it” (2003: 238). If findings fail 
to hold in naturally occurring situations while the theory is supported in well-designed 
experiments, this suggests that the theoretical framework should be submitted to scrutiny 
rather than the design itself. The theory might in fact be in need of revision so as to include 
those variables impacting the phenomenon that it might have overlooked.  
Assumption 2 has been addressed by Jimenez-Buedo and Miller (2010). They notice a 
tension between the widely held beliefs that internal and external validity stand in a trade-
off relation and, at the same time, that the former is a prerequisite for the latter. As said 
above, the general idea behind the trade-off is that creating the conditions to reach higher 
internal validity in the studied context necessarily leads to results that are less likely to be 
valid outside of it. This is generally explained by referring to the artificiality of the 
  
experimental situation. Upon analysis of the methodological literature and the 
experimental practice, Jimenez-Buedo and Miller conclude that “the notion of artificiality 
is a rather more elusive concept than we normally acknowledge” (2010: 307); and that the 
alleged trade-off relation is far less cogent than the common understanding would have 
one believe.   
This argument has a strong, though indirect, bearing on the discussion on CSR. The 
reasons given for the emergence of a trade-off, in fact, speak against its existence in the 
context of case studies. If one pays heed to Jimenez-Buedo and Miller, the trade-off 
between internal and external validity is borne out of the fact that in the experimental 
context internal validity is obtained by increasing the isolation of the experimental system from 
outer influences. It is then hard to see why such a trade-off should arise in CSR in the first 
place, where the researcher has very poor control, or no control whatsoever, over the 
system under study. In general in CSR, and in particular in historical narratives, internal 
validity cannot be achieved, in fact, by increasing the isolation of the factors of interest.65 If 
it is true that artificiality trade-offs against external validity, this should be all in favor of 
CSR.  
These criticisms suggest that the methodological norm based on assumptions 1 and 2 
does not have the self-evident status that the traditional view presumes.  
 
3.2.2 THE ASSUMPTIONS CARRIED OVER FROM THE STATISTICAL 
CONTEXT 
Whereas assumptions 1 and 2 have been addressed in the literature, the remaining 
assumptions have not yet been addressed. The discussion that follows therefore focuses 
on assumptions 3 and 4 which are carried over to the case-study context in the following 
form:  
3* A case study is externally valid if, and only if, the case is representative 
of a broader population. 
                                                          
65 See Chapter 2 for a discussion on the internal validity of historical narratives. 
  
4* The broader the population, the higher the external validity of the 
case study. 
Assumption 3* is a condition for the generalizability of scientific results in CSR. 
Results that are obtained within a study apply outside of it if, and only if, the studied case 
represents the population66 in some sense to be specified. The traditional view borrows its 
idea of representativeness from statistical discourse. The external validity inference is here 
conceived as an inference from sample to population, legitimized by the former being a 
statistical representative of the latter.  
Translated into a qualitative framework, a case is said to stand in a sample-to-
population relation with a universe of cases when it is a typical case within that universe. 
Typicality is therefore understood as the key requirement for ensuring external validity to 
the case study within the traditional view. Methodological precepts oriented to strengthen 
the external validity of case studies would all go in the direction of giving rules for the 
selection of the cases. The following excerpt is an example: 
 
The typical case study focuses on a case that exemplifies a stable, cross-case relationship. 
By construction, the typical case may also be considered a representative case, according 
to the terms of whatever cross-case model is employed […] One may identify a typical 
case from a larger population of potential cases by looking for the smallest possible 
residuals […] for all cases in a multivariate analysis. In a large sample, there will often 
be many cases with almost identical near-zero residuals […] Thus researchers may 
randomly select from the set of cases with very high typicality (Seawright and Gerring 
2008: 299). 67   
                                                          
66 The terms population and/or universe (of cases) are borrowed from the statistical discourse to refer to 
the set of cases to which the results from a given study apply. I prefer the term target case/s (target for 
short) because it does not smuggle in the assumption that the hypothesis of external validity necessarily 
concerns a broader set of cases that relates to the studied case through a sort of sample-to-population 
relationship. I will switch to the term target below when I introduce my own conditions and criteria for 
external validity. 
67 See also Mahoney and Goertz (2006b). 
  
Reduced to a matter of representativeness, the problem of external validity thus 
amounts to adopting the selection procedure that maximizes the probability of choosing 
the case most typical of the target of interest.  
In the traditional view two major problems threaten the external validity of CSR. The 
first lies in the difficulty of establishing the typicality of the selected case, the solution of 
which consists in further refining the selection procedure of the case to study. The second 
is the intrinsic limitation to the degree of external validity CSR can reach. According to 
assumptions 4 and 4*, the degree of external validity depends on the size of the population 
to which the results are generalizable. In virtue of assumptions 3* and 4*, CSR is low in 
external validity because its capacity for selecting representative samples of a sizable 
population of cases is very limited indeed. Even if one succeeds in identifying typical cases, 
so the argument goes, their typicality is always confined to a small population. CSR, in 
fact, studies intensively either one case or a small set whose degree of representativeness 
is not only hard to establish but also limited. Representativeness, it is said, increases with 
the size of the sample, and so in turn does external validity.  
 
3.3 EXTERNAL VALIDITY IN CSR: FROM TYPICALITY TO 
COMPARABILITY 
The traditional view treats the problem of external validity as a problem of mere 
representativeness. This has two major normative implications. First, its methodological 
precepts as regard to external validity are mainly oriented towards guiding the selection of 
the “right” case, understood as a typical case. Secondly, the traditional view describes the 
difficulty that CSR has in putting together a representative sample as the source of the 
method’s incapacity, or the extreme weakness, in achieving external validity.  
This reasoning errs already at the first step, and this makes its negative conclusion 
problematic. External validity is not, as I shall argue, essentially a problem of 
representativeness but rather one of inference, and so a problem of which the 
representativeness of the case may offer one possible solution. The challenge of external 
validity actually consists in identifying the circumstances under which the results of a study 
  
can be generalized to other cases. The inference from the studied case to some new 
contexts needs to be justified by some factors that give us reason to believe that what was 
found true of the former is most probably true of the latter as well. Typicality might be 
one of these factors. The claim that the case at hand is typical backs up the inference to 
conclude that what is true of the case is also true of entire the population.  
Finding the typical case is therefore a practical solution to what is truly an epistemic 
problem. Typicality is a solution to the problem of generalizability; typicality per se is not 
the ultimate problem to solve. The traditional view conflates these two concepts—the 
typicality of a case and its generalizability, and in so doing, not only fails to capture the 
essential distinction, but also confuses one solution with the entire problem. As a 
consequence, the methodological norms it imparts to guide the selection of the case 
cannot respond to the epistemic challenge of external validity.   
The traditional view confines the methodological discourse on external validity to the 
stage of the selection of the cases and in so doing implicitly suggests that the problem of 
external validity is fully solved by singling out the representative case from a population 
of cases. Representativeness, however, only offers a solution if the strategy used to 
establish it properly responds to the epistemic challenges posed by external validity. That 
is, the typical case cannot be identified by presupposing knowledge that its identification 
is expected to deliver in the first place. The problem with the strategy described by Gerring 
in the excerpt above is exactly this one. What he suggests for the selection of the typical 
case presupposes knowledge of the cases that we are not supposed to possess when the 
problem at hand is correctly described as one of external validity. If we already know the 
causal relationship we are interested in generalizing, there is nothing left to generalize in 
the first place. Gerring’s strategy probably solves successfully issues of representativeness, 
but cannot double up as a solution to an inferential problem.  
The scholars subscribing to the traditional view fail to respond to this challenge, 
because they fail to distinguish conditions for the external validity of the results and 
epistemic criteria that help establish whether these conditions hold. The conditions for 
  
external validity are the circumstances that justify the generalization; typicality is the one 
explicitly acknowledged by these scholars:68  
Condition for External Validity (CEV): If the case is typical of a broader 
universe of cases, then the case-study result is generalizable to the universe 
of cases.  
Typicality, however, cannot double up as an epistemic criterion for the assessment of 
external validity. Once the conditions for the generalizability of the results have been 
defined, independent strategies should be devised that help establish whether those 
conditions hold. These are epistemic criteria that inform us about the representativeness 
of the case and, at the same time, do not presuppose the knowledge of the universe of 
cases that we are expected to extract from the case study itself. This criterion is 
comparability. 
Epistemic Criterion (EC): 69  Comparability of the study is required to 
establish whether the case is typical of the universe of cases and the result 
hence generalizable.  
If the case study is comparable in the appropriate respects, it enables us to elicit both the 
information that is to be generalized and the information that is required to decide about 
the generalizability of the same results from the case.  
The notion of comparability has been introduced by LeCompte and Goetz (1982) in 
a work on the validity of the ethnographic methods. LeCompte and Goetz understand 
external validity in terms of typicality and comparability.  
 
The fieldworker’s problem is to demonstrate what Wolcott conceptualizes as the 
typicality of a phenomenon, or the extent to which it compares and contrasts along 
relevant dimensions with other phenomena. Consequently, external validity depends 
on the identification and description of those characteristics of phenomena salient for 
                                                          
68 Typicality might be taken as a restrictive condition. In the literature on external validity, several scholars 
endorse similarity instead, which is a broader concept. I discuss the relation between typicality and 
similarity below.  
69 The epistemic criterion serves to assess whether the conditions of external validity indeed hold. 
  
comparison with other, similar types. Once the typicality of a phenomenon is 
established, bases for comparison may be assumed (1982: 51). 
 
LeCompte and Goetz have the merit of hinting to the epistemic problem at the core 
of external validity but still fail to disentangle fully conditions for validity and criteria of 
assessment. Typicality refers to the condition the case has to satisfy for having results from 
the study that are generalizable. Typicality, however, cannot be established a priori, nor it 
can be inferred from knowledge of the universe of cases the generalization itself is 
expected to provide. The typicality of the case and the generalizability of the results are 
established upon comparison with other/new cases. 
The hypothesis of external validity is truly empirical and has to be settled on a case-
by-case basis (Guala 2005, 2010, Steel 2008, 2010). Whether the results of the original 
study apply outside of it, in fact, depends on matters of fact about the target which, as 
such, have to be inquired empirically. The idea that external validity is a fixed feature of a 
given design or can be established a priori, that is without engaging with the empirical 
investigation of the target, is misled. Claims of external validity always presuppose 
empirical assumptions about the target contexts even if they are sometimes left implicit or 
not subjected to scrutiny. Comparability is therefore the epistemic requirement to be 
imposed on the design of the study in such a way that, by contrasting its results with what 
we observe in other situations, we are capable to adjudicate the typicality of the case at 
hand and the generalizability of its results. 
By rendering the case study comparable in the appropriate respects, the problem of its 
external validity becomes decidable. This does not mean that external validity is in this 
way guaranteed; only that it can be established reliably. The discourse on external validity 
so far developed among case study researchers is misdirected and therefore not helpful to 
this end. Required in addition are strategies that are epistemically viable for assessing the 
typicality of the case and the generalizability of the findings. Disentangling the two issues 
by distinguishing between typicality and comparability is a first step in this direction.  
  
A second step involves making the notion of comparability more precise. I return to 
this point below. Before turning to this aspect, however, I want to emphasize a final point 
in relation to the traditional view. Its focus on representativeness as if it was the ultimate 
challenge to establishing external validity has biased the debate and led to its current dead 
end. That is, the consensus view is that the lack of external validity constitutes an 
irremediable weakness of CSR, attributed to the fact that it studies a very limited number 
of cases. This conclusion, however, links high external validity to a capacity for offering 
broad generalizations. This assumption about the requisite breadth of the generalization, 
however, is disputed in the literature.  
 
3.3.1 RADICAL LOCALISM AND EXTERNAL VALIDITY 
Influential scholars in the debate on experimental design hold the view that the 
generalizations that science allows are always very limited in scope. In a discussion on the 
external validity of experiments, Francesco Guala (2002) mentions Bruno Latour, David 
Gooding, and Andrew Pickering as promoting a form of radical localism, and Ian Hacking 
and Nancy Cartwright as defending milder positions in a similar spirit. In its extreme 
version, radical localism denies any external validity to scientific hypotheses except when 
the outside world can be carefully engineered and made alike the laboratory such that the 
experimental results can be exported directly (2002: 1196). Guala defends a less skeptical 
position that admits of several ways to solve the problem of external validity.  
According to Guala,70 the problem amounts to minimizing the error in the inference 
from the laboratory to the outside world; this is achieved by making the two contexts as 
similar as possible. One way to this end is what he calls “engineering the world.” Another 
strategy is adapting the experimental setting to the outside conditions. For instance, the 
former can be modified as to reproduce more accurately non-experimental settings. Even 
though various strategies exist to generalize reliably from experiments to the outer world, 
external validity is bound to remain a “local” matter. That is, the generalizations that 
                                                          
70 Guala mentions Deborah Mayo to be a defender of this view.  
  
science allows never travel too far and never apply too broadly. Case studies would then 
pose no special problem, as all type of studies possesses only limited generalizability.  
Moreover, from the perspective of this alternative approach to external validity, 
similarity between the two contexts is the condition that grants generalizability to the 
results. CEV can be thus relaxed as follows: 
(CEV)*. If the case is similar to the target case/cases, then the results 
obtained in the former are generalizable to the latter. 
Similarity is a broader concept than typicality. Typicality presupposes similarity 
between the case and its target but further requires a sample-to-population kind of relation 
between the two. This idea, originating as it does in a statistical context, badly fits CSR, 
where random sampling is often not a feasible strategy. Furthermore, it is restrictive in 
that it asks that the relevant population be clearly defined before engaging in the study of 
the case that is supposedly representative of it. This led to the type of discourse on external 
validity I discussed above.  
Similarity instead does not require any a priori definition of the relevant target and 
leaves the issue of generalizability open to the empirical analysis that follows the case 
study. Unlike experiments, in CSR, the case studied and its target cannot be “made” similar 
as an experiment and the non-experimental setting are. The case, in fact, cannot be adapted 
in any meaningful sense to the target, whereas, as Guala suggests, the experimental settings 
can be slightly modified to fit some features of the outside world. And, in general, given 
the complexity of the phenomena that case studies examine, the idea of engineering the 
outside world as to reproduce the study conditions is simply not practicable. The way that 
is open to CSR is finding similarity between the studied system and the target in vivo. 
I argued above that the hypothesis of external validity is empirical and to be settled on 
a case-by-case basis, and it is justified by the similarity between the studied case and the 
target, which in CSR can only be found in vivo. General conclusions about the external 
validity of case studies are thus hard to come by: whether the studied case and the target 
are similar enough is a contextual issue that depends on the epistemic purpose of interest. 
That is, it depends on the kind of results we are interested in extrapolating from the former 
  
to the latter. In this perspective, methodological prescriptions should be directed to inform 
contextual decisions about the external validity of the hypothesis of interest. In particular, 
they should help to decide whether upon empirical investigation the studied case and the 
target are similar enough so that what was true of the former can be reasonably 
extrapolated to the latter. I shall argue in the rest of the paper that by making case studies 
comparable, one facilitates this type of assessment. 
 
3.4 IMPROVING THE EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF CSR BY ENHANCING 
COMPARABILITY 
On the basis of what is said above, we can thus relax EC as to encompass the broader 
condition of similarity: 
(EC)*: Comparability of the study is required to establish whether the case 
is similar to the target case/cases, and therefore whether the result is 
generalizable. 
Even though intuitively appealing, comparability as described by (EC)* is too vague 
to be useful. We need to refine the criterion further to distinguish what qualifies as a 
comparable case study and what does not. Furthermore, one needs to specify what makes 
a case study comparable and what detracts from it. In this way we would propose some 
principles that might help strengthen the external validity of CSR by making its assessment 
more reliable.  
To judge comparability, it is worth keeping in mind that when assessing the 
generalizability of a result, one faces severe epistemic constraints. The external validity 
hypothesis is, in fact, empirically settled by the comparison between the case studied and 
the target case, of which we know very little. If we knew of the target what we already 
know of the case, there would be no worries for external validity in the first place. Certainly 
we do not know whether the result or hypothesis that is true of the case is also true of the 
target, since this is what one aims to establish. But, in general, any inference of external 
validity is bounded by the limited knowledge of the target case (Steel 2008). Hence, 
provided that it is correct, the inferential strategy that requires a minimum amount of 
  
information about the target case to establish whether the scientific results at hand are 
externally valid is to be preferred.    
With this proviso in mind, I suggest that comparability requires that the study renders 
available the information necessary to establish whether, upon comparison, the case is 
sufficiently similar to the target so as to justify the generalization of the results obtained. 
Take, for instance, the most common scenario in which the result to be generalized is a 
causal relationship. The case and the target have to be similar in the respects that are 
causally relevant to the hypothesis for this to be valid in the latter as well (Guala 2010, 
Steel 2010). The study then needs to inform us about the respects that matter to the causal 
relation in the studied case such that we can proceed to the comparison with the target 
and eventually to the inference.  
In CSR, where neither engineering the world is an option nor is adapting the case to 
the target, knowledge of the relevant causal factors is what enables the inference. 71  
Without it, even a tentative assessment of external validity would not be possible. 
Complete knowledge of the relevant causal factors is, however, an epistemic ideal. Setting 
the ideal aside, one supposes that the more complete this knowledge is, the more reliable 
the inference will be.  
Provided that comparability is satisfied in the sense described above, we can then 
distinguish between high and low comparability depending on whether the inference from 
the study is more or less epistemically efficient: when one can economize on the 
information needed about the target case to make the inference reliable. However, as I shall 
argue below, this presupposes that the studied case be examined more thoroughly in the 
relevant causal respects. The extent to which causal relationships are investigated 
thoroughly in the studied case determines in turn the degree of comparability of the study 
itself. Hence, the more information about the target case is required in order to establish 
the external validity of the hypothesis, the lower the comparability of the case study will 
be. If the case study only describes the causal factors that are relevant for the outcome of 
                                                          
71 Guala says that in experimental economics this causal knowledge can be sometimes black boxed 
without implications for the external validity inference (Guala 2010: 1080). 
  
interest, then the comparison between the studied case and the target needs to be fully 
articulated – that is, contrasted along all relevant respects before the hypothesis can be 
generalized to the new case. Since epistemic efficiency is a virtue when external validity is 
at stake, a case study that requires full comparison is low in comparability.  
If the study describes the complete causal mechanism instead, then comparison with 
the target can be partial: it needs only to involve a limited number of features to support 
the hypothesis of external validity. Recall from Chapter 2 that a causal mechanism consists 
of the system components and their relationships when associated in such a way as to give 
rise either to macro-level regularities or to unique series of events that are causally 
connected72. If the mechanism is complete, it specifies the causal links among the relevant 
factors and identifies the set of conditions that are jointly sufficient to produce the 
outcome in question: the difference in a subset of these factors can thus disrupt the 
mechanism. If the study describes the complete causal mechanism, its comparability is 
higher because partial comparison between the case and the target in a subset of causal 
factors is sufficient to draw conclusions about the behavior of the whole mechanism. If 
instead the studied mechanism is underspecified, it becomes much harder to economize 
on information of the target that is needed in order to settle the hypothesis of external 
validity. 
The examples that follow illustrate the distinction between high and low comparability 
of case studies.  
The first case study on Botswana is an instance of the high type. It provides a 
characterization of the causal mechanisms in the studied case besides the relevant causal 
factors. As such, this study would enable us to draw conclusions about the generalizability 
of the results upon partial comparison between the studied case and the targets. And 
indeed, the evidence seems to be in favor of this hypothesis. As we shall see, the authors 
of the study attempt to draw conclusions about target cases on the basis of a limited 
comparison between the latter and Botswana.  
                                                          
72 See sections 2.2.2 and 2.4 above. 
  
The second example is meant to illustrate how a case study low in comparability would 
look like instead. Despite the effort to single out the factors causally relevant to the 
outcome of interest, there is no description of the related mechanisms. If used to draw 
conclusions about cases yet unstudied, this work would thus demand a much more 
comprehensive comparison between the studied cases and possible targets. In particular, 
such comparison would have to be comprehensive of the full array of causal factors that 
matter to the outcome of interest before confirming any hypotheses of external validity. 
 
3.5 HIGH AND LOW COMPARABILITY OF CASE STUDIES 
 
3.5.1 THE STRANGE CASE OF BOTSWANA 
In a case study of Botswana, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson 
(2003) explain the unusually good economic performance observed in the country in the 
last decades. If compared with the average in sub-Saharan Africa, in fact, Botswana 
performed outstandingly in terms of per capita income growth rate in the last 35 years. 
The authors start with the assumption based on previous studies that proximate 
determinants of its economic success are the institutions and the related policies that the 
country developed over time. Institutions are conducive to growth when they correspond 
to a social organization that ensures effective property rights to a broad cross-section of 
the society. The authors refer to this cluster as property right institutions.  
What the authors aim to explain is, however, why Botswana was able to develop the 
institutions it now possesses and thus search for what can be defined as the deep 
determinants of growth (Rodrik 2003: 3). To this end, they adopt a case-oriented 
methodology. They eventually offer a country narrative in which they reconstruct the 
processes through which Botswana developed its institutions.   
The examination of the country’s history suggests five (structural) features as plausibly 
responsible for its property right institutions and good economic policies:  
1. Botswana is very rich in natural-resource wealth. 
  
2. It had unusual precolonial political institutions that enabled an 
unusual degree of participation in the political process and placed 
restrictions on the political power of elites (Kgotla).73 
3. British colonial rule in Botswana was limited. This allowed the 
precolonial institutions to survive to the independence era. 
4. Exploiting the comparative advantage of the nation after 1966 
directly increased the incomes of the members of the elite. 
5. The political leadership of Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), 74 
particularly that of Seretse Khama,75  inherited the legitimacy of these 
institutions, which gave it a broad political base. 
The causal influence of each of these features on Botswana’s modern institutions is 
established by describing the mechanisms through which this influence is conveyed. These 
mechanisms, theorized in the background literature on development economics to which 
the authors refer, are used to explain why these factors are causally relevant to the 
emergence of property rights institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000). Consider, for 
instance, the mechanism of political losers: 
 
An institutional setup encouraging investment and adoption of new technologies may 
be blocked by elites when they fear that this process of growth and social change will 
make it more likely that they will be replaced by other interests - that they will be 
political losers. Similarly, a stable political system where the elites are not threatened is 
less likely to encourage inefficient methods of redistribution as a way of maintaining 
power (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2003: 103). 
 
According to the mechanism of political losers, political elites do not oppose the 
adoption of institutions and policies favorable to growth if they feel that their power is 
not threatened by the change; that is, they fear not being political losers. In Botswana 
                                                          
73 Kgotla is an assembly of adult males in which issues of public interest are discussed (Acemoglu et al. 
2003: 93). 
74 BDP is the dominant party in the country. 
75 Seretse Khama was BDP political leader and president of Botswana from 1965 until 1980. 
  
(feature 2) precolonial institutions ensured some degree of political stability and went 
almost unaffected by the imposition of British colonial rule (feature 3). In addition, the 
legitimacy of Seretse Khama and the broad coalition he formed further strengthened it 
(feature 5). The authors conclude that features 2, 3, and 5 influenced the building of 
property right institutions by setting the mechanism of political losers at work and thus 
ensuring a high degree of political security to the existing elites. A similar use is made of 
the other two theoretical mechanisms: they trace the causal relations among the factors 
that jointly determine the emergence of property rights institutions and the ensuing 
economic growth. 
In the final section of the work, Botswana is compared with four African countries - 
namely, Somalia, Lesotho, Cote d’Ivoire, and Ghana. The authors apply the lessons drawn 
from Botswana to these countries by way of a partial comparison with each target case. 
They reason along the following lines: the difference in one feature is regarded as sufficient 
to infer the disruption of the related mechanism and explain the failure to develop 
property right institutions (and eventually experience long term growth) in the target. On 
this assumption, each country is compared to Botswana with respect to one or two of the 
features above, and never along all five dimensions before drawing a conclusion about 
why property right institutions failed to develop in the circumstances. As an illustration of 
this form of reasoning, consider the mechanism of constraints that Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2003) describe as follows.  
 
When (precolonial) institutions limit the powers of rulers and the range of distortionary 
policies that they can pursue, good policies are more likely to arise (see Acemoglu and 
Robinson 1999). Constraints on political elites are also useful through two indirect 
channels. First, they reduce the political stakes and contribute to political stability 
(mechanism of political losers), since, with such constraints in place, it becomes less 
attractive to fight to take control of the state apparatus. Second, these constraints also 
imply that other groups have less reason to fear expropriation by the elites and are 
more willing to delegate power to the state (ibid.: 104). 
 
  
The mechanism of constraints is set into operation by feature 2 that is, by the type of 
precolonial institutions. If these institutions have the right properties, such as kgotla had 
in Botswana, then they are effective in placing constraints on rulers. These, in turn, affect 
the emergence of property right institutions both directly and indirectly. At the same time, 
feature 3 can have the opposite effect of inhibiting the mechanism of constraints. In fact, 
strong British colonial rule alters precolonial institutions and disrupt the mechanism of 
constraints if it was in place before. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson thus compare Botswana and Somalia with respect 
to features 2 and 3 and find them similar in feature 3 but different in feature 2. Similarly 
to Botswana, British government had in fact only marginal interest in Somalia and imposed 
very soft colonial rule. Somalia had, however, precolonial institutions that induced intense 
factional conflict and were therefore incapable of placing constraints on political elites. 
From this partial difference in the type of precolonial institutions between the two 
countries (feature 2), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson infer that the mechanism of 
constraints was not operating properly in the country and it thus impeded also the proper 
working of the mechanism of political losers. As a consequence, property right institutions 
did not emerge and in turn its economic performance faltered.  
A similar line of reasoning is then used in the comparison with the other countries. 
The comparison is limited to one or two structural features whose difference is taken as 
evidence that the corresponding mechanism is not operating properly in the target and 
thus explains the absence of property right institutions and the ensuing bad economic 
performance. Features 1 to 5 are thus treated as INUS conditions: non-redundant 
components that together produce the outcome.76 If one of the conditions is missing, the 
mechanism is disrupted and the outcome will not obtain. The reverse is also true. If one 
factor has to be absent for the outcome to obtain and is instead present, the mechanism 
is equally disrupted. If the case study successfully identifies INUS conditions, a minimal 
comparison is sufficient to draw causal conclusions about the target.  
                                                          
76 See section 1.3.3 for a discussion of INUS conditions as relevant evidence for policy-making. 
  
It seems that Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson reason in a similar way to what Daniel 
Steel (2008) calls comparative process tracing. Whereas process-tracing is a within-case 
strategy of causal inference,77 comparative process tracing serves the purpose of generalizing 
findings from a studied context to a context the knowledge of which is indeed very limited. 
In particular, comparative process tracing consists in comparing the mechanisms in the 
study and the target at the “critical junctures”. From this limited comparison, one can 
establish the presence (or absence) of the mechanism in the target and, thus, the presence 
(or absence) of the causal relationship that ensues. In this case study, Botswana is 
compared to each target case in only a limited number of features involved in the working 
of the mechanisms that are conducive to growth through the emergence of property right 
institutions.  
Partial comparison in the relevant features between Botswana and the target cases is 
used by the authors to explain that bad institutions and poor growth are caused in the 
latter by the incorrect operation of the related mechanism. Whether this inference is 
ultimately justified, however, depends on whether the following assumption is also 
vindicated. The extrapolation of the mechanism in fact presupposes causal homogeneity 
across the contexts: causal factors that are alike would operate together in similar manners 
in the studied case and in the target. Is this assumption justified? Even though the authors 
do not explicitly discuss it, they hint to some facts they seem to regard as evidence for it. 
They seem to suggest, in fact, that cultural, geographical, and social affinities among the 
countries considered are such that had similar factors been in place in the studied and the 
target cases, they would operate together in similar ways.  
Whether this assumption justified or not, this study can be said to attain a higher degree 
of comparability than the one I will discuss below where equally reliable conclusions could 
only be achieved at a higher epistemic cost. Provided that the assumption of causal 
homogeneity is satisfied, in the study above the comparison across cases can be performed 
in a limited number of respects, because the mechanisms identify the causal links among 
                                                          
77 Cf. Chapter 2 for a discussion of process-tracing as a method of within-case causal inference. 
  
relevant variables and thus isolate those that if absent would be sufficient to disrupt the 
mechanism.   
  
3.5.2 COMMUNITY BASED PROGRAMS TO DEFEAT MALNUTRITION 
The second study formulates a policy hypothesis about the effectiveness of 
community-based programs to defeat malnutrition. It is a report by the World Bank in the 
early Nineties on successful nutritional programs in Africa (Kennedy 1991). The study 
aims to identify the factors that make programs against malnutrition work. To this end, it 
combines the use of two qualitative methodologies --namely, large sample survey and case-
oriented studies. Eileen Kennedy (1991) motivates the study by appealing to the fact that 
the literature on malnutrition in the 1970s and 1980s focused only on the types of 
interventions implemented. The 1989 meeting of the International Nutritional Planners in 
Seoul, however, concluded that “how” a program is implemented is as important as, or 
maybe more important than, the type of intervention for successful programming (1991: 
1). In line with the recommendations of nutritional planners in Seoul, Kennedy uses survey 
and case studies jointly to identify what factors matter for the effective implementation of 
programs against malnutrition. The ultimate goal is to learn lessons that can be generalized 
to other African contexts (1991: 2). The evidence is combined in the following way. 
The survey offers prima facie evidence78 of what factors are required for successful 
implementation. It combines the findings from 110 answers received from policy makers 
and program implementers. The respondents answered two types of questions: whether 
the program was successful and what factors they thought were key to its success. 79 
Furthermore, six programs among the 66 found to be successful were selected for an in-
depth analysis: the Macina Child Health Project, in Segou Region, Mali; the Infant Feeding 
Project, in Togo; the Imo State Child Survival Project, in Nigeria; the Applied Nutrition 
                                                          
78 Following Reiss, prima facie evidence is relevant to the hypothesis at hand but still defeasible, and hence 
not decisive for it (Reiss 2008). 
79  110 were the individuals/institutions who responded to the mail survey out of the 330 initially 
contacted. In addition to this first pool, 78 individuals involved in various ways in the implementation of 
programs against malnutrition were interviewed.  
  
Program, in Ghana; the Mali Institutional Development Enterprise and Nutrition 
Program, in Mali; and the Nutrition Project, in Kinshasa, (formerly) Zaire. These projects 
were selected out of the 66 because they represent different types of community-based 
programs that can succeed in combating malnutrition. The survey and additional 
interviews singled out seven factors as important for successful implementation: 
community participation, program flexibility, institutional structure, recurrent cost 
recovery, multifaceted program activities, training and staff qualifications, and 
infrastructure (Kennedy 1991: 7). The same factors were found to be present in almost all 
six cases. The case studies then focus on how the seven factors were actually implemented 
in the specific context. 
The main conclusion drawn from the report is that different types of programs can 
succeed in defeating malnutrition. Whether they succeed depends on a set of conditions 
regarding how the programs are in fact implemented. The study, however, cannot be 
considered in itself sufficient to establish which of the factors identified are necessary for 
the effectiveness of the program: it offers at best prima facie evidence that these factors are 
causally relevant to the outcome in question. It thus gives some support to the idea that 
there is not such a thing as one-size-fit-all intervention, but, rather, different ways can be 
pursued.  
Has the ultimate goal of this study been achieved? That is, are we learning lessons that 
are generalizable to the other African contexts (1991: 2)? This is an empirical question: 
whether these causal hypotheses are justified in other situations not yet explored is a 
question to be settled on a case-by-case basis, upon comparison between the studied 
context and the target cases. Such comparison is not attempted by the author; however 
some observations can be made as regards the comparability of this study. 
The strength of this study derives from the effort it makes to single out factors that 
matter to the successful implementation of the programs against malnutrition. We can 
consider the study comparable in the sense described above. By listing the set of causal 
respects that matter to the phenomenon of interest, it enables the comparison with new 
cases along the relevant dimensions. In this way it would help formulate conclusions about 
  
what outcome would occur in the target case. Whether these conclusions are justified 
depends on assumptions about causal homogeneity between contexts similar to those 
discussed in the case study above. Even if these assumptions were justified, however, this 
study does not enable the type of efficient comparison that the case of Botswana allows. 
There is no evidence, in fact, that the factors identified are INUS conditions for the 
outcome. The complete description of the relevant mechanisms would facilitate the 
identification of the set of non-redundant factors that are jointly sufficient for the 
phenomenon of interest.  
Kennedy’s case studies, however, fail to characterize the mechanisms that explain why 
the factors identified matter to the success of the program and how. Their contribution is 
limited to a more or less exhaustive list in which the relevant factors are described in detail, 
and so are the modifications in the specifics of implementation that occurred over time. 
An analysis of the causal mechanisms at work is however lacking, despite the fact that this 
was set as a research goal at the very beginning of the paper (Kennedy 1991). Different 
from the case of Botswana discussed above, the causal relationships among the factors of 
implementation are not specified and the underlying causal mechanisms are not even 
hinted at. As a consequence, even though we can consider these studies to some extent 
comparable to new target contexts, they have low epistemic efficiency.  
In order to decide about the generalizability of the causal findings obtained in this 
study, one should then perform a fully-fledged comparison of the relevant causal factors 
between the studied contexts and the target cases. There would be no other way, in fact, 
to establish whether the causal result is likely to obtain also in the new situations. 
Knowledge of the mechanisms responsible for the causal relationships of interest would 
avoid this cumbersome epistemic strategy and render the comparison more efficient in 
this respect. One could in fact examine the mechanisms at the critical junctures in the 
target cases and infer on this ground whether the causal relationship of interest is likely to 
obtain. The study by Kennedy does not allow this more efficient comparison, even if it 
reveals information that is ultimately crucial to formulate judgment of external validity, 
namely knowledge of the relevant causal factors.   
  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
The debate on the external validity of CSR is stunted, and, so far, developed under the 
influence of the statistical perspective. The resulting approach was biased in an unfruitful 
direction that ultimately led the debate to the dead end, where it seems to stand now. 
Reaching external validity in CSR was, in fact, essentially regarded as a hopeless endeavor 
and the downside of CSR. This conclusion stands in a stark contrast with the struggle for 
generalizations in which case study researchers engage at the same time. In this chapter, I 
argued that this conclusion is unjustified once we examine more carefully the assumptions 
on which it is based. The bottom line of this discussion is not that CSR has high rather 
than low external validity as the traditional view maintains. Rather, in the perspective I 
defend here this type of judgment is not very appropriate in the first place.  
First, external validity is not a property of a research design. Furthermore, if one 
accepts some form of localism, the generalizations that science allows never travel too far 
and never apply too broadly. Moreover, whether certain results have external validity in 
fact is an empirical matter that can only be settled on a case-by-case basis. The problem to 
solve then is not how to increase the external validity of CSR; rather, it is making external 
validity a decidable issue. This can be done once we abandon the old paradigm, the 
traditional view, and its focus on representativeness as the problem of external validity. 
External validity becomes decidable only if the study first renders available the evidence 
that is necessary to circumvent the epistemic impasse in which any inference of this kind 
finds itself. Making case studies stronger in external validity therefore means strengthening 
the design in such a way that it helps researchers reach judgments of external validity with 
a higher confidence and epistemic efficiency. One way to this end is by enhancing its 
comparability. 
External validity should be right on the agenda of philosophers and methodologists 
who worry about making of case study research a design better understood and better 
used. Generalizing is not only a valuable goal in itself for scientific practice but also the 
middle step on the way to sound policy making. Drawing the right lessons from the 
contexts we know already is to some extent presupposed by planning effective 
  
interventions in contexts with which we are not acquainted yet. One way to learn how to 
use the knowledge obtained from studied contexts in unknown situations is by discussing 
issues of external validity. The inferential problem that it underpins is in fact the first the 
scholar encounters when transferring the knowledge gained from epistemically privileged 
systems to less privileged ones. Experimentalists were the first to worry about it, and they 
still reflect upon it extensively. Case study researchers should do the same.  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
4. ON THE EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF CAUSAL EFFECTS AND THEIR 
RELEVANCE FOR POLICY MAKING 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
According to many commentators development economics is in a dismal state (e.g. Cohen 
and Easterly 2009; Deaton 2010). The recent upsurge in the use of randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs) across the social sciences raised the hope for an improvement of the allegedly 
infelicitous state of this field. RCTs, its defenders believe, are likely to deliver the recipes 
for growth that eluded research on development so far (Banerjee 2007). RCTs would 
provide the hard evidence required for sound policy making because by measuring 
accurately causal effects, RCTs supply valuable information on the effectiveness of 
development policies. More cautious scholars, however, object to what they regard as a 
burst of unjustified optimism. They contend that RCTs’ capacity to cure the ills of 
development economics and promote effective policy making is in fact very limited, one 
of the main reasons being the lack of external validity of their results.80  
Several strategies have been proposed to overcome this problem. They aim at 
improving the external validity of causal effects so as to render them relevant for purpose 
of policy making. In this chapter, I examine and assess these strategies. Whereas it can be 
conceded that they succeed to some extent in addressing the issue of external validity, they 
fail to fulfill the demand for relevance. The proposal made by Nobel Laureate James 
Heckman stands out as an exception in this regard. By defining a broader range of causal 
effects, the model Heckman outlines can address some of the questions that policy makers 
actually face. As I shall argue, however, it is still inadequate for the most pressing problems 
policy makers face in the context of development. In these cases, in fact, problems of 
planning trump the problems of prediction that Heckman’s model is designed to address.   
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, I discuss the problem of relevance 
that RCTs face in relation to their lack of external validity. In section 4.3, two strategies to 
                                                          
80 RCTs are also criticized in other respects, e.g. the fact that they are gold standard in most evidence 
hierarchies. 
  
increase the external validity of causal effects are examined, and found lacking in terms of 
relevance. In section 4.4, I present Heckman’s model for causal effects as a response to 
the Rubin-Holland model which is the template for the analysis of every RCT. In section 
4.5, I argue that Heckman’s model constitutes a more promising alternative to the other 
strategies on offer, even though its relevance is still too limited to respond adequately to 
policy makers’ needs. In section 4.6, I draw a distinction between problems of prediction 
and problems of planning, argue that in developing contexts policy makers confront first 
and foremost problems of planning, and Heckman’s model cannot be of help in 
addressing those. In section 4.7, I present a sketch of the planning process and the type 
of evidence it draws upon, and argue that case studies provide relevant evidence in its 
earlier phases. Section 4.8 concludes. 
 
4.2 ON THE EXTERNAL VALIDITY AND RELEVANCE OF RCTs 
The widespread and increasing popularity of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in 
the scientific fields where practical concerns are most prominent is to a large extent driven 
by the expectation that RCTs can improve policy making remarkably. Development 
economics is an interesting case in point. It is in fact a field directed to a large extent to 
further the solution of practical problems which according to many commentators have 
so far suffered from a long series of failures (Cohen and Easterly 2009).  
RCTs recently spread in this area thanks to a team of young scholars which founded 
in 2003 the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab at the Massachusetts Institute for 
Technology. Research at the Poverty Lab and in its regional centers consists in planning 
and performing RCTs to evaluate the impact of programs and policies in areas relevant to 
the economic development such as agriculture, microfinance, health, education, the labor 
market, governance, and so on.81 Abhijit Banerjee, one of the directors of the Poverty Lab, 
expresses the goals and motivations of their enterprise as follows. He argues that the aid 
that flowed into developing countries in the past decades failed to meet its goals because 
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policy makers were clueless as to which projects are effective in promoting growth and 
erasing poverty. He further adds that, by evaluating policies and programs rigorously, 
RCTs finally provide the hard evidence that is needed for, and which was lacking so far, 
“making aid work” (Banerjee 2007).   
Banerjee’s appeal to the relevance of RCTs for effective policy making rests on two 
related claims. First, RCTs are taken to provide the type of information policy makers need 
in their practice. Secondly, (only) the information RCTs provide is regarded as sufficiently 
reliable for the goals at hand. RCTs aim at establishing whether a given program is 
effective and would thus supply the policy maker with evidence of which program works. 
They do so by evaluating the impact of a given policy on the outcome of interest.  
 
4.2.1 MEASUREMENT OF CAUSAL EFFECTS IN RCTs 
The quantity RCTs aim at measuring is typically known as causal effect. The notion of causal 
effect was first defined formally in the Rubin-Neyman statistical model and was 
subsequently popularized by Paul Holland (Holland 1986). The Rubin-Holland model 
(RH) posits that, in a population of units Ω, two causes82  denoted by t (treatment) and c 
(control) are potentially administered on each unit ω in Ω. The model defines: 
 S is the variable that indicates the cause to which each unit in Ω is 
exposed. Hence, S = t indicates that the unit is exposed to t and S = c 
indicates that the unit is exposed to c. 
 Y is response variable that measures the effect of causes. 
 Since the value of the response variable is potentially affected by the 
particular cause, t or c, to which the unit is exposed, Yt and Yc are 
introduced as the potential outcome variables to measure each effect.83 
Yt(ω) is the value of the response that would be observed if unit ω were 
exposed to t; Yc(ω) is the value that would be observed were ω exposed to 
c. 
                                                          
82 Holland uses the terms cause and treatment interchangeably (Holland 1986: 946). 
83 Holland calls Yt and Yc response variables. 
  
RH defines the individual causal effect of t (relative to c) on ω (as measured by Y) as 
follows: 
Yt(ω) – Yc(ω)      (1) 
 
The causal effect (1) is the difference in the values that the response variable Y would 
take upon administration of treatments t and c on unit ω. Thus, (1) measures an individual 
causal effect. The causal effect so defined faces a crucial problem of measurability. The 
“fundamental problem of causal inference” (1986: 947) is that the individual causal effect 
cannot be measured due to the impossibility of observing the effect of two distinct 
treatments on the same unit ω. A strategy has to be devised to evaluate an acceptable 
approximation to (1).  
Holland suggests two solutions to this empirical problem. The “scientific” solution 
consists in formulating assumptions that allow treating different units as if they were the 
same. Typical assumptions are: 
 Temporal stability; 
 Causal transience; 
 Unit homogeneity. 
Temporal stability asserts that the value Yc(ω) does not depend on the moment in 
which c is administered on unit ω and Y measured. Causal transience asserts that the value 
Yt(ω) is not affected by ω being previously exposed to c and Yc measured on ω. If these 
two assumptions hold, it is possible to estimate the individual causal effect of t (relative to 
c) on ω (as measured by Y) by exposing ω sequentially to c and t and measuring Y after 
each exposure (648). Alternatively, assuming unit homogeneity amounts to asserting that 
Yt(ωi) = Yt(ωj) and Yc(ωi) = Yc(ωj) for each i and j in Ω. The causal effect of t is then Yt(ωi) 
- Yc(ωj). By assuming temporal stability and causal transience or, alternatively, unit 
homogeneity the individual causal effect can thus be estimated.  
  
The “statistical” solution, adopted in RH and the ensuing statistical literature, 84 
consists in redefining the causal effect at the population level and evaluating its expected 
value.85 RH thus defines the average causal effect T of t over Ω as the expected value of the 
difference Yt(ω) – Yc(ω) over the ωs in Ω (1986: 947): 
 
T = E(Yt - Yc)     (2) 
 
(2) can also be expressed as follows by applying the usual rules of probability: 
 
T = E(Yt) - E(Yc)     (3) 
 
The observed data (S, Ys)86, however, can only give us information about: 
      E(Ys/S = t) = E(Yt/S = t)    (4) 
and  
E(Ys/S = c) = E(Yc/S = c)    (5) 
(3) is correctly estimated only if E(Yt) is equal to E(Yt/S=t) and E(Yc) is equal to 
E(Yc/S=c). It is possible, however, that E(Yt) differs from E(Yt/S = t) and E(Yc) differs 
from E(Yc/S = c) since some sub-population in Ω is exposed to t, and the same is true of 
c. The evaluation of (3) requires the assumption of independence, which asserts that S is 
independent from any other variables over Ω. In particular, this means that the value S(ω) 
                                                          
84 RCTs belong to this tradition. 
85 In the second section of the article Holland introduces probabilistic concepts: “A probability will 
mean nothing more nor less than a proportion of units in Ω. The expected value of a variable is merely 
its average value over all of Ω. Conditional  expected values are averages over subsets of units where 
the subsets are defined by conditioning in the values of variables” (1986: 945). 
86 The causal indicator variable S determines which value, Yt or Yc, is observed for a give unit. If S(u) = 
t, then Yt is observed, and if S(u) = c, then , then Yc is observed. Thus the observed response on unit ω 
is Ys(u)(u). The observed response variable is therefore Ys. Even though the model contains three variables, 
S, Yt , and Yc, the process of observation involves only two, S and Ys. 
  
does not depend on Yt and Yc. If an adequate implementation strategy to assign the units 
to t and c such as a hypothetical randomization is carried out correctly, independence is 
satisfied and the average causal effect (3) can be estimated. 
Causal effects can be measured via a variety of methods (Morgan and Winship 2007), 
for instance causal graphs, regressions, matching estimators, and RCTs. RCTs are 
experiments in which subjects are typically divided into two groups, one of which is 
administered a treatment and the other a control. In particular, RCTs measure average 
causal effects. Arguably, they do so quite reliably and on this further ground Banerjee, 
among others, defends their relevance.  
Indeed, it is often claimed that the attractiveness of RCTs largely resides in the rigor 
of the method (Cartwright 2007a, 2007b). RCTs are experiments of a special sort where 
subjects are assigned to the treatment and control groups by way of a randomizing 
procedure. Hence, if the probability of the outcome is higher in the treatment than in the 
control group, under certain conditions one can safely attribute causal efficacy87 to the 
policy implemented. These conditions comprise: 
a) A metaphysical premise asserting that probabilistic dependence calls 
for causal explanation; 
b) The assumption that all factors causally relevant to the outcome 
(other than the treatment) are distributed identically between the 
treatment and control groups. 
c) The probability of the outcome in the treatment and control groups 
is inferred correctly from observed frequencies. 
According to Nancy Cartwright ideal RCTs, RCTs that are carried out in ideal 
conditions where assumptions a) to c) are met, are clinchers: the positive results in the 
experiment deductively imply the causal conclusion (2007a, 2011). Whether the 
assumptions are met in practice, and a real RCT clinches its conclusion, depends on the 
                                                          
87 I follow Cartwright in the use of the terms efficacy and effectiveness. Efficacy refers to whether a 
treatment, or policy, causes a given outcome in the studied population under the selected circumstances; 
effectiveness refers to whether the treatment, or policy, causes a given outcome in the target population 
(2009a, 2009b). 
  
success of the implementation procedure. The additional feature that according to 
Cartwright renders RCTs more attractive than other clinchers is that RCTs are self-
validating. A clincher is self-validating if, and only if, the justification for its assumption is 
provided within the design itself rather than outside of it. 88  Most clinchers, such as 
econometric modeling, are not self-validating in this sense since the causal assumptions 
on which they are based are justified by knowledge obtained outside the study design. The 
RCTs design envisages procedures that, if properly carried out, maximize the probability 
that the assumptions are met in the practice: support for the assumptions is thus “built 
in” the study design (2011: 1400).89 
 
4.2.2 EXTERNAL VALIDITY AND RELEVANCE OF CAUSAL EFFECTS 
IN RCTs 
Critics challenge the usefulness of RCTs from various angles. A first set of criticisms 
points to the fact that using RCTs, even if desirable, is not always a viable methodological 
strategy. One objection is thus directed at their limited applicability: RCTs cannot be used 
to assess the impact of certain kinds of programs such as monetary policies, trade policies, 
a different political system, and so on. RCT design mandates that the treatment, or 
program, be administered randomly to the experimental subjects so as to render the 
treatment and control groups causally homogeneous. The random administration of 
national or regional programs such as monetary policies, trade policies, political reforms 
is nearly always unfeasible either because of practical constraints, or because it might 
undermine the program efficacy in the first place. Furthermore, RCTs can be impeded by 
ethical concerns related to the withdrawal of the treatment/policy from part of the 
population involved in the experiment (Banerjee 2007).  
                                                          
88 The metaphysical assumption is not subject to self-validation. It depends on the theory of causality one 
endorses.  
89 The procedures comprise the use of statistics to retrieve probabilities from frequencies, the use of 
randomizing devices to allocate subjects in the two groups, quadruple blinding, and so on (Cartwright 
2011: 16-17). 
  
A second set of criticisms reacts to the claim which is often made that only RCTs 
provide the hard evidence needed for effective policy making. Critics suggest that other 
methodological options equally reliable are at hand. Methods that provide hard evidence 
of the kind RCTs supply would include the econometric methods, derivation from 
established theory, Galilean experiments, and so on (Cartwright 2007 a, b). 90  As an 
example consider the reconstruction of instrumental variables by Reiss (Reiss 2008, 2013). 
Instrumental variables are used for causal inference in econometric regressions when the 
relationship between two variables of interest is potentially confounded by other variables 
(2013: 129). Reiss proves that if a set of rather demanding assumptions is satisfied, the 
correlation between the variables of interest entails causation. Imagine that we are 
interested in whether X causes Y, and choose variable Z as an instrument for (X, Y). The 
instrumental variable approach delivers valid causal inference if the following assumptions 
are satisfied:  
a) Z causes X  
b) Z causes Y if at all only through X (that is, not directly or via some 
other variable)  
c) Z is not itself caused by Y or by a factor that also affects Y (Reiss 
2013: 169).91 
Instrumental variables so defined are clinchers in Cartwright’s sense: if the assumptions 
are met, a correlation between Z and Y deductively implies the causal conclusion. 
A third set of criticisms holds that, even if applicable, RCTs do not constitute an 
effective strategy for improving policy making, the (main) argument being that RCTs are 
lacking in external validity. This charge deserves attention for two main reasons. First, not 
only the opponents but also the promoters of RCTs agree that their external validity is 
severely constrained (Banerjee and Duflo 2009). Moreover, it hits at the heart of the 
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critique of the alleged superiority of RCTs over the other methods of causal inference see Scriven (2008). 
91 In addition to a) to c) above, three general assumptions need also to be satisfied. They comprise the 
“Reichenbach principle”, which concerns the relationship between probabilities and causality, the 
assumption of transitivity, and functional correctness (for a discussion, see Reiss 2008: 132-3). 
  
arguments of Banerjee and others who defend the prominence of RCTs on account of 
their alleged usefulness for combating poverty in developing countries.  
The notion of external validity was introduced and discussed in Chapter 1 (see 1.3.2). 
Recall that the general idea behind this notion is that a scientific hypothesis has external 
validity if, and only if, it is correct in asserting that the results that hold in the sample where 
they were first established also hold outside of it. To illustrate the notion in the present 
context, imagine that the RCT measures the impact of using bed nets on the probability 
of contracting malaria among hospitalized women in Northern Kenya. Imagine further 
that the RCT delivers a positive result (that is, there is a positive difference in outcome 
between the treatment and the control group) and that we trust the procedure. The RCT 
thus establishes that bed nets are a preventer of malaria; it does so, however, in a 
circumscribed and very specific context. The hypothesis of external validity has it that bed 
nets are a preventer of malaria in the experimental population, the hospitalized women in 
North Kenya, and in other populations as well (for instance shepherds in Swaziland and 
tribes of hunters in New Guinea).  
It might, however, be the case that the result obtained depends on features of the 
experimental setting and the specific way in which the program was implemented in the 
experimental context that might fail to hold elsewhere. Bed nets might work among 
Kenyan women because they were instructed on how to use them and their compliance 
monitored in the hospital; once freely distributed among fishermen in Kerala, they might, 
however, turn ineffective because they are used as fish nets instead. If settings and 
strategies of implementation are dissimilar as they indeed often are, the causal result might 
be bounded to the experimental context and fail to travel outside of it.  
External validity and relevance are issues tightly connected. Relevance was defined in 
Chapter 1 as the adequacy of scientific results to further a given purpose, solve a specific 
problem, or fulfill a goal of interest. While discussing the relation between relevance and 
validity, I suggested that it is reasonable to argue that the former presupposes the latter.92 If 
                                                          
92 See section 1.3.3 above. 
  
this is true, relevance would also presuppose the external validity of scientific results that, 
established in a context different than the context of interest, would be adequate if valid 
for the task at hand.  
If the results obtained by means of RCTs lack external validity, and thus fail to hold 
outside the experimental context, it is hard to see how they can be of any use to the policy 
maker, at least in an obvious and straightforward manner. If the goal is fighting malaria in 
Kerala, it is not enough to know that bed nets proved to be a preventer in Kenya: this fact 
per se has no bearing on the task in question, unless some kind of connection is established 
between what was observed in Kenya and what will happen in Kerala. The objection often 
raised to RCTs is that they offer poor help in this regard. According to many the evidence 
they provide is insufficient to justify the hypothesis of external validity that is, the claim 
that the result obtained therein would also hold elsewhere. It is thus understandable that, 
when RCTs are waved by their promoters as the most effective means to combat poverty 
world widely, the RCT-skeptic feels somehow uneasy.  
  
4.3 IS EXTERNAL VALIDITY A PROXY FOR RELEVANCE? 
The argument above should give an intuitive feeling of why external validity might well be 
a concern if one worries about the relevance of RCTs for policy making. And, indeed, 
both the RCT-enthusiasts and the skeptics regard external validity as an inescapable issue, 
try to confront it and possibly improve the use of RCTs with respect to their external 
validity. It will emerge from the discussion that follows that common assumption in both 
camps is that relevance is a sort of “spill-over” effect of external validity. In both camps, 
in fact, strategies are proposed to strengthen the external validity of causal effects under 
the presupposition that relevance will automatically ensue. In other words, the shared view 
has it that causal effects that are externally valid are ipso facto relevant to policy makers.  
External validity and relevance remain, however, distinct concerns. It is not external 
validity as such that confers relevance onto given results, even though it might be a helpful, 
and maybe even necessary, ingredient for effective policy making. The issue of what 
evidence is relevant for a given task should be tackled independently, and prior to, the 
  
question of external validity of the same evidence.93 Failure to discern this fact led to the 
belief that, by improving the external validity of scientific results, one also provides what 
policy makers need. As I shall argue throughout this chapter, this is a gross mistake.  
In the RCT-enthusiasts camp, the proposal was made that replication is the strategy that 
solves the problem of external validity that plagues RCTs (Banerjee 2005, 2007, Banerjee 
and Duflo 2009). The general idea is that repeating a given experiment across different 
settings is liable to increase the external validity of the causal conclusion. More precisely, 
if positive results about the efficacy of the treatment are repeatedly obtained when the 
same experiment is run in settings that differ in some (relevant) respects, the hypothesis 
that the causal effect thereby measured has external validity is (eventually) corroborated.  
The proposal remains vague in several respects. One would assume that the settings 
are to be different in “meaningful” ways and the experiment run a “sufficient” number of 
times before the external validity hypothesis is regarded as corroborated. On intuitive 
ground, it is plausible that one might be interested in running the experiments in new 
settings that approximate the context of intervention; or in settings where changes are 
made in features that are likely to be causally relevant. Replications, however large, that do 
not encompass this sort of changes seems not to be very helpful, in the end, to corroborate 
the hypothesis of external validity. No clarification is, however, provided in these regards 
by the promoters of this strategy (Cohen and Easterly 2009).  
Furthermore, these scholars do not clarify what hypothesis of external validity they 
specifically have in mind. It is legitimate, in fact, to try to export from RCTs qualitative 
causal conclusions about the causal effectiveness of a given program. These conclusions 
state that the program causes the outcome in the target population as it does in the 
experimental population. 94  It is also legitimate to try to export quantitative causal 
conclusions about some measure of improvement in the average effect that is expected to 
hold in the target population as it was in the experiment. Each type of conclusion is 
                                                          
93 See section 1.3.3 for the difference between validity claims and relevance claims and the type of 
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94 It is more accurate to say that the causal conclusion one elicits from an RCT is that the program causes 
the outcome at least in some member of the experimental population  (Cartwright 2007a: 15). 
  
justified by different, and quite demanding, assumptions about the causal features in the 
target population, information that RCTs on their own do not deliver. To be clear on what 
causal conclusions one wants to export from an RCT is therefore important because 
different hypotheses of external validity require different types of justification.95  
More to the point, this strategy is haphazard if seen from the viewpoint of the policy 
maker. It certainly cannot be denied that results that happen to be persistent across 
contexts increase somehow the confidence in the generality of the phenomenon. The 
generality of a given phenomenon offers, however, evidential ground for the expectation 
that it will also hold in the context of interest, if justified by further assumptions about the 
similarity between the (set of) contexts where the phenomenon was first established and 
the target.96Moreover, the results this strategy delivers are not perspicuously relevant. 
Replications of the RCTs are typically implemented by changing the location and/or 
modifying some feature of the experimental setting. The kind and degree of modifications 
are however steered and constrained by the experimental setting itself, rather than the 
policy maker’s purpose and interest. Feasible modifications are only the ones that fall 
under the experimental control. Even if general results are thus obtained,97 they are likely 
to satisfy more the experimenter’s curiosity than the policy maker’s needs.98 Even if the 
experimenter gives priority to the policy maker’s needs, she might be interested in 
modifications of the environment that cannot be implemented in the experimental design.  
On the other hand, if the causal result fails to be replicated, this framework simply 
treats the failed occurrence as evidence against the hypothesis of external validity. A failed 
replication, however, might be clue to the fact that one “stumbled” into a salient variation 
of some contextual features. As such, the evidence of a failed occurrence is perfectly 
compatible with the treatment being efficacious but counteracted by other circumstances; 
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Cartwright (2007a). 
96 See my discussion of the notions of similarity and comparability in Chapter 3. 
97 How often the replication of an RCT is liable to deliver the same result is disputable, and indeed very 
much disputed (see Deaton at 2012 Annual Conference, NYU Development Research Institute). This 
point is, however, not directly relevant to my argument. 
98 The risk is thus that of searching for the key where the lamp sheds its light. 
  
or with it being efficacious were other circumstances in place.99 It is plausible that the 
policy maker would like to distinguish the case in which the treatment efficacy is an 
ephemeral and idiosyncratic phenomenon from the case where the phenomenon is robust 
and eclipsed in the circumstances. The replication of RCTs as such, however, is opaque to 
this sort of considerations. A different strategy is required if one wants to tell the two cases 
apart.   
In the opponents’ camp the suggestion was made that, to obtain causal effects with 
high external validity, one should turn to an altogether different strategy of identification 
and estimate. Cross-country regressions have been proposed as such an alternative (Rodrik 
2009). According to this view cross-country regressions would outperform RCTs in terms 
of external validity because they identify and estimate causal effects with a broader 
geographical and temporal coverage.  
The charge from this camp against RCTs is that they license conclusions that, even 
though highly reliable, are only valid for the experimental population and, thus, typically 
very narrow in scope. The solution proposed then amounts to broadening the scope of 
the causal claim by broadening the population on which it is tested. Cross-country 
regressions would do just that. They in fact measure average causal effects that “cover” a 
long list of countries (all countries included in the sample) over a long temporal frame (the 
temporal interval covered by the regression).  
Unlike RCTs, cross-country regressions face notorious problems of internal validity, 
however.100 It is thus a legitimate question whether they can indeed constitute a “real” 
solution to the problem of external validity that RCTs face. It has been argued that internal 
validity is a prerequisite to external validity, rather than standing in a trade-off relationship 
with it. 101  It seems reasonable in fact that results that are incorrect in the studied 
population cannot apply to populations not yet studied. It, thus, seems that if the study 
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corresponding capacity claim being true (see section 4.5 for a brief discussion of the notion of capacity).  
100 Problem of internal validity in correlation analysis were introduced in section 1.2.1 and discussed more 
extensively in Chapter 2. 
101 See section 3.2. 
  
fails to identify correctly the causal effects in the sample, it hardly can do so for out-of-
sample populations. There are certainly cases, though, where one has reasons to trust the 
validity of a cross-country regression. Furthermore, if the regression measure causal 
effects correctly, it does so for a large pool of countries. What then about relevance?  
This seems to be the case of a trade-off. In at least one respect cross-country 
regressions ensure broader coverage at the expense of relevance. Measuring the causal 
effects of a given policy in a pool of countries requires that the policy be treated as a 
homogeneous variable across the whole set. For this to be possible some process of 
abstraction is typically required. That is, the concrete properties of the program are 
stripped away for constructing a variable that abstracting away from the particulars of the 
case becomes broadly applicable. This operation gives rise to two types of problems.  
First is the problem of construct validity, which has to do with whether the so-called 
homogeneity assumption is justified. Generally speaking, constructs and variables are valid 
if they succeed in measuring what they actually purport to be measuring. In cross-country 
regressions, this requirement is complicated by the fact that the variables ought to measure 
the same phenomenon across contexts. This means that one needs warrant for the 
operation of measuring particulars in different countries by using one and the same 
variable; in other words, one need to be justified for regarding different particulars as 
instances of the same phenomenon. In the context of interest, one would have to make sure 
that the programs implemented in the various countries are sufficiently alike to justify the 
conceptual operation of treating them as instantiations of one and the same policy variable. 
If this operation is unjustified the measurement is invalid.  
The second problem has to do with the level of abstraction being adequate to the policy 
maker’s interest. It is plausible that policy makers aim at fine-grained control on the 
outcome of interest; and fine-grained control depends on the nitty-gritty of the program 
at hand. As one climbs the ladder of abstraction in concept construction, one achieves 
greater generality at the expense of details concerning the phenomenon of interest. 102  In 
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the case of medical protocols the details might regard the treatment dosage, duration, the 
strategy of administration, and so on.  In the case of nutritional policies like the ones 
discussed in Chapter 3, the program is a package of activities stretching from growth 
monitoring and nutrition surveillance, nutritional first aid, distribution of food, nutritional 
training of volunteers, food supplementation demonstration, and so on. Each activity can 
be defined in turn at a more concrete level: nutritional first aid can in fact comprise vitamin 
A distribution for children every 6 months, iron supplementation, oral rehydration, and 
so on. 
Details such as the ones described above need often to be sacrificed in climbing the 
ladder of abstraction. A given program or policy variable can apply justifiably at the large 
scale typical of cross-country regressions only if very few details of its specific instantiation 
in each country are retained. If it is plausible to assume that nutritional programs are to a 
large extent standardized across countries, this is hardly true of more complex policy 
packages, such as institutional reforms concerning political, social and economic systems. 
However, these are the details in which the policy maker might be ultimately interested. 
Knowing that institutions have a positive impact on growth rate might not be very helpful 
for policy making, even if causal effects are correctly measured in a large pool of countries. 
The policy maker might in fact want to know the effect of tinkering with the “how” and 
“what” of specific institutional set-ups.     
These proposals are both driven by the quest for generality. The strategies they suggest, 
whether the replication of RCTs or the use of cross-countries regressions, rest on the 
assumption that external validity is a synonym for generality, and causal effects are relevant 
if they are general enough. Relevance is not, however, a matter of scope. Policy makers 
worry only incidentally about the generality of the causal claims they use because they 
typically deal with specific contexts. Causal effects are of interest to them only if they 
respond to questions about the impact that given programs or policies would have were 
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they implemented in a specific way in a specific context; and insofar as this is the type of 
problem the policy maker faces. The higher the generality of the causal effect, the higher 
the chance that it will also travel to the specific context of use. From the point of view of 
the policy maker this is, however, hardly sufficient.  
The mere replication of RCTs is blind to the modifications of interest to the policy 
makers, either because they are likely to fail to fall under the experimenter’s control, or 
because they modify the effect in such a way as to render it opaque to detection. On their 
side, cross-country regressions privilege concerns about the external validity of the causal 
effects over their relevance. To allow identification, causal effects are defined for variables 
that have been stripped away of all concrete details of the particular program, details that 
arguably are of major interest to policy makers.  
An alternative approach to the problem of external validity that plagues RCTs is hinted 
at by Angus Deaton (Deaton 2009, 2010). Deaton argues that the best strategy for 
justifying any hypothesis of external validity consists in establishing why the hypothesis 
holds in the experimental setting in the first place. In this spirit, he suggests that theory 
development and mechanistic theorizing are the type of evidence that eventually grant the 
inferential ticket one needs.  
While Deaton’s proposal remains suggestive, the same intuition is further developed 
and formalized by James Heckman. Heckman outlines a model for causal/counterfactual 
effects as a framework where policy makers address and solve the policy questions of 
interest. His contribution foreruns and encompasses the more recent debate on RCTs in 
development economics: it directly confronts the statistical model for causal effects on 
which RCTs are in fact based. In what follows, I shall consider how Heckman’s proposal 
refines and outperforms the HR model for causal effects. 
 
4.4 A NEW MODEL FOR CAUSAL EFFECTS: MARSHALLIAN CAUSAL 
FUNCTIONS 
Heckman’s proposal can be regarded as a refinement, rather than a replacement, of the RCT 
program (Heckman 2010). It questions the relevance of the Rubin-Holland model for 
  
causal effects, which informs the RCT template, and offers a more sophisticated version 
of it that promises to take adequate care of policy problems (Heckman 2001, 2008). 
Heckman maintains that policy makers typically face and try to solve the following 
problems:  
 
(P1) Evaluating the impact of historical interventions on outcomes including their 
impact in terms of the well-being of the treated and of society at large.  
(P2) Forecasting the impacts of interventions implemented in one environment in 
other environments, including their impacts in terms of well-being. 
(P3) Forecasting the impacts of interventions never historically experienced to various 
environments, including their impacts in terms of well-being (Heckman 2008: 7-9). 
 
Heckman regards P1 as a problem of internal validity and P2 and P3 as problems of 
external validity (2008: 8). He maintains that RH can only answer questions of the first 
type and fails to address problems of the second and third type: RH can only define causal 
effects for the impact that policies already implemented had on outcomes. It does not 
allow the construction of counterfactual states in which the causal effect of old and new 
policies in new contexts can be evaluated. This shortcoming derives from RH's inadequacy 
for understanding and modeling the causes of effects (2001: 29).  
Consider that RH posits two causes (t and c) potentially acting on each unit ω in 
population Ω. 103  Notice further that t, c and ω are not defined as variables but as 
parameters within the model. As such they are single-valued; that is, no variation is 
definable over them. The only variables in this model are Y, which is the outcome to be 
measured, and S, which indicates the relevant state of the world. The variation we observe 
in Y is therefore solely determined by the units being exposed either to cause t or c. No 
variation in Y can obtain as a consequence of variation in t, c or ω. This setting constrains 
dramatically the range of causal effects definable within the model, and thus measurable 
eventually outside of it.  
                                                          
103 See section 4.2.1 above. 
  
Heckman points out that, having been collapsed into a parameter, the intervention is 
essentially treated as a black box (2008: 6). As it stands, the model therefore delivers no 
information on the interventions performed and the difference between them except for 
the fact that they do, indeed, differ. The causally relevant aspects of each intervention are, 
in fact, neither characterized, nor are the respects in which the interventions actually differ. 
Nor is any information available on the characteristics of the population that undergoes 
the interventions. In sum, the model cannot evaluate the outcomes of new policies and of 
old policies on a new population simply because there is no way to define a new policy or 
a new population therein. If the corresponding causal effects are not definable, problems 
(P2) and (P3) cannot be addressed.104 
Heckman concludes that RH is not helpful for solving the problems of major concern 
to policy makers. He proposes a deep structural model in which he defines what he calls 
Marshallian causal functions (2008: 29-30): 
 
Y(s) = g(Qs, X, Us) 
 
The function g maps the vectors of generating characteristics Qs, X, Us into outcomes. 
These vectors represent the whole range of causes that contribute to bring about outcome 
Y. Define S = {s1...sn} as the set of treatments which are possibly implemented on unit ω. 
In this framework each treatment si105 is defined as a bundle of characteristics which are 
the components of vector Qs. If si (i=1) is a medical protocol, then the components of Qs 
might indicate the type of drug (Q1), the months of treatment with the drug (Q2), the 
quality of physicians (Q3), and so on.  
I mentioned above unit ω upon which the treatment is hypothetically implemented. 
Notice that ω does not appear in the causal function. It is instead modeled by means of 
the vector X which includes the determinants of Y that are observable. Units are thus 
                                                          
104 The choice of not modeling the causal relationship can well be motivated by empirical worries. This 
fact, however, does not undermine Heckman’s objection that in such a model questions of interest to 
policy makers such as P2 and P3 cannot be raised. 
105 i= {1...n}. 
  
characterized in terms of the causal factors of Y and the treatment they are exposed to. In 
other words, X's components fully identify the unit: units are equivalent if X's components 
are. Individual causal effects can thus be evaluated. Finally, vector U collects the 
determinants of Y that are unobservable, both regarding the treatment and the unit as 
well. This framework allows U to include different components as the treatment 
implemented varies (U is indexed to s).  
In this model causal effects can be defined by varying either a single component of 
one vector, or the vector as a whole, while keeping the remaining variables fixed. For 
instance, we might define the causal effects of Qs on Y as follows: 
 
g(qs, x, us) – g(qs', x, us) 
 
This framework is an “all causes” model which supposedly makes explicit the whole 
range of factors relevant to the outcome Y (2008: 28). Consider that the range of causal 
effects we define within a model depends on the factors we can hypothetically vary. In 
RH, the only causal effect definable is the difference in outcome consequent to the 
application of treatment t and c on unit ω. As I remarked above, interventions are treated 
as parameters rather than variables. This explains why Heckman asserts that in RH they 
remain black boxes to the investigator. Marshallian causal functions model instead 
interventions as packages of measures, in which each single components (or single aspects 
of the treatment) can vary. Furthermore, the features of the environment relevant to the 
outcome are also made explicit.  
In this way, it is possible to observe variation in the outcome as a result of changes in 
the context. By modeling the causes of effects, Marshallian causal functions multiply the 
range of counterfactuals open to exploration, and the causal effects that are definable 
therein. According to Heckman, this operation allows the range of questions that can be 
addressed to be much broader. In particular, this model would enable us to evaluate the 
impact that a given policy has on a new population, and thus address problem (P2). This 
is obtained by varying single components in x. We might further evaluate the impact of 
  
newly envisaged policies and thus address problem (P3), by varying either qs, qs, and x or 
the three vectors all together (or single components in them). 
 
4.5 HOW RELEVANT ARE MARSHALLIAN CAUSAL FUNCTIONS? 
As I shall argue, Heckman’s model for causal effects deals with the problem of external 
validity in such a way that it also renders the causal effects defined therein more relevant 
to the policy maker. It cannot be denied, however, that this gain comes at a huge cost. The 
model relies extensively on “some” theoretical background, which should allegedly 
provide the massive causal knowledge required.  
One of the basic assumptions for the model to work, in fact, is that it characterizes the 
whole array of causes of the outcome in question and the corresponding functional form. 
Heckman is confident that “some theory” would take care of this demand (2001: 12-3). 
He remains vague, though, as to which theory can adequately meet such an epistemic 
requirement.  
Furthermore, having such an ambitious range of causal effects correctly estimated is 
also very demanding in empirical terms as to the extent and accuracy of data collection, 
measurement, and analysis. These concerns only matter, however, for an overall 
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of Heckman’s approach with respect to 
the alternative models and strategies. Such a comprehensive assessment is not of interest 
here. Rather, the question at stake is whether Heckman’s proposal addresses more 
adequately policy makers’ questions than the strategies to which it reacts.  
Heckman’s strategy to improve the external validity of causal effects consists in 
modeling the causal structure for the outcome in question. It is widely acknowledged by 
philosophers of science that some knowledge of the causal structure is indeed required for 
formulating claims of external validity more reliably, even though there is disagreement as 
to the type of knowledge that one should use. For instance, some scholars maintain that 
knowledge of capacities licenses reliable inference (Cartwright 1989, 2009a). Capacities are 
causal powers endowed with potentiality and stability. That is, capacities produce a 
characteristic effect when impeding factors are not operating and they contribute to the 
  
overall outcome even when counteracted. Furthermore, their ability to do so persists 
across some range of contexts. In virtue of their stability across changes in the background 
conditions, it seems that knowledge of capacities can help external validity inference. Some 
scholars disagree, however. 
Daniel Steel among others maintains that capacities are not helpful to solve the most 
pressing problem of external validity (2008: 83-4): it is not at all clear how we are to obtain 
knowledge of capacities where we are more likely to need it. Issues of external validity 
typically arise in those circumstances where we have very limited knowledge of the 
contexts to which we are interested in extrapolating causal claims. Knowledge of capacities 
would be helpful in these cases, wasn’t it for the fact that it presupposes that we already 
have substantial knowledge of the target contexts; namely, that the power in question is 
stable across the relevant changes in the background conditions. In other words, using 
capacities to solve the problem of external validity seems to presuppose knowledge that 
we do not possess when issues of external validity arise (one is trapped in what Steel 
defines the extrapolator’s circle). Several scholars propose the use of mechanistic knowledge 
as an alternative (Guala 2005, 2010, Steel 2008, 2010). 
Disagreement aside, the intuition shared by these approaches is that understanding why 
a certain outcome obtains is a fairly reliable guide for predicting whether a similar outcome 
will also occur were circumstances to differ in some respects. Heckman’s approach shares 
this intuition. His proposal is motivated by the insight that policy makers address 
counterfactual questions that, as such, can only be answered properly in well-developed 
causal models.106 Counterfactuals are conditional statements that describe what would 
happen in hypothetical states of affairs. Heckman has in mind counterfactuals of interest 
to policy makers that describe the impact that given policies would have on outcomes of 
interest in given populations. In well-developed causal models counterfactual states 
(potential outcomes) and the related counterfactual effects (the difference between the 
outcomes) are precisely defined. Such models, in fact, render the whole causal structure 
                                                          
106 In this intuition he is not alone (see Reiss and Cartwright 2004, Reiss 2011). 
  
explicit and thus make possible to assess how the outcome would change were the relevant 
circumstances modified in some relevant respects.  
Both the scholars who propose RCT replication and those who defend the use of 
cross-country regression as strategies to improve the external validity and relevance of 
causal effects fail to take this point fully on board. Causal modeling is there either implicit, 
as in the case of RCT replication, or too coarse, as in the case of cross-country regressions. 
These accounts are based on the assumption that relevance is a by-product of external 
validity, and thus set the generality of the causal claim as their primary task. As argued 
above, however, external validity per se is not guarantee that the relevant questions are 
addressed. And, indeed, the upshot of these two accounts is that the range of 
counterfactual effects they define is highly constrained.  
RCTs are based on the Rubin-Holland model, which avoids explicit modeling and thus 
only defines counterfactual effects for potential outcomes in the alternative states of the 
cause it features. Any replication of RCTs that is not based on rendering the underlying 
model explicit cannot improve this situation just by extending the range of additional 
treatments in practice. Cross-country regressions are bound to treat the program as 
homogeneous across the countries and, to this end, they are likely to strip away significant 
details from the policy variable. Thus, provided that the regression equation counts indeed 
as a causal model (Deaton 2010), the potential outcomes defined therein do not involve 
tinkering with the program, the details of which remain black-boxed to the policy maker.    
Heckman’s approach, by way of modeling explicitly the causal structure, is superior to 
the strategies examined above. That is, it can be more easily used to address the questions 
of concern to policy makers. Its suppleness, in fact, permits to address both a broader range 
of counterfactual questions and more fine-grained counterfactual questions. Breadth has to 
do with the range of modifications that can be implemented within the model and, thus, 
with the variety of contexts it potentially encompasses. Breadth is maximized in 
Heckman’s model as the range of modifications spans the whole causal structure which is 
here fully deployed. Thus, a much broader range of potential outcomes can also be 
  
defined.107 Furthermore, fine-grainedness has to do with the possibility of exploring the 
effect of minute modifications in the causal structure. These are of interest to policy 
makers because they often aim at a surgical control of the outcome. Tinkering with the 
components of a treatment or policy, rather than the whole package, is a means to achieve 
it. Furthermore, their decisions often involve the nitty-gritty of program implementation. 
They ought to decide about the program details, such as its timing, duration, scale, and 
amount, and other qualitative aspects regarding the forms and contents of the 
implementation. It is therefore plausible that having a model that defines counterfactual 
effects for minute interventions is highly desirable for policy makers concerned with this 
type of decisions.  
How relevant is, though, Heckman’s model in fact? Reiss and Cartwright (Reiss and 
Cartwright 2004, Reiss 2008) argue not very much. According to them, the range of policy 
counterfactuals it assesses is still too limited for the purpose of policy making. Causal 
effects in Marshallian causal functions are, in fact, very “special” quantities: they measure 
the variation in outcome that follows variation in individual components of the causal 
structure while the other components are held fixed. The upshot is that causal effects can only be 
defined for those components that are variation-free; that is, can be modified 
independently from the others the relation with which should not be constrained by 
functional restrictions. Reiss and Cartwright aptly call counterfactual effects so-defined 
Galilean effects as they are “just the kind of effect we look for in a Galilean experiment” 
(Reiss 2008: 207). Their argument for lack of relevance stands on metaphysical grounds. 
It is simply not the case that systems in which control variables of interest can be modified, 
while letting the rest of the causal structure unaffected, are a common feature of our social 
world. Galilean systems, though epistemically convenient, are very special arrangements. 
In this sense, thus, the range of causal effects defined in Marshallian causal functions is 
still too constrained. Even though policy makers might be in principle interested in 
                                                          
107 The range of causal effects definable within the model is however constrained by further assumptions 
which I shall discuss below. 
  
producing Galilean effects, this might just not be an actual possibility in the systems in 
which they work.  
The relevance of Heckman’s approach can be further challenged. His proposal gets 
off the ground insofar as an additional, and fundamental, assumption is justified. That is, 
the counterfactual of interest to the policy maker is of the following type: 
(PH) What would be the impact on the outcome, were a policy 
implemented in a given way in a given environment? 
There are contexts of intervention, typically developing contexts, in which the 
counterfactual of prior concern to the policy maker is of the following type instead: 
(P*) How should a given environment be modified and/or a program 
implemented therein, were a given impact to be produced?  
I understand PH as a problem of prediction, and P* as a problem of planning. In 
contexts where the causal structure is defective, in a sense I will describe below, 
counterfactual questions such as P* trump, that is override, PH. Heckman’s model is 
designed to address problem PH, and is inadequate, as the approach to which it reacts 
also is, to confront problem P*. In the contexts where P* trumps PH, the relevance of 
this model to policy makers is therefore very limited. 
 
4.6 A SALIENT DISTINCTION: PREDICTING AND PLANNING 
Contexts such as the ones developing economists worry about are typically characterized 
by defective causal structures. For a program to work, a given set of background conditions 
needs to be in place. A program of children immunization in hospitals is effective only if 
the hospital is within reach for villagers and mothers have a means to get there. 
Educational programs raise the literacy rate in the community if classrooms are available 
and big enough to allow students to attend the class. Causal structures are defective when 
the set of conditions that need to be present for a given policy to produce the intended 
effect are either inadequate or plainly absent. In these contexts, the local circumstances 
demand that the policy maker be concerned with how to adapt the policy so as to render it 
  
effective, rather than whether a given policy is effective as such. Issues of adaptation thus 
arise, and counterfactual questions such as P* trump PH.  
This point is illustrated by the following case. Abhijit Banerjee tells the story of a 
project by the World Bank described in the Sourcebook on “Empowerment and Poverty 
Reduction”. The Gyandoot program in Madhya Pradesh, India, consisted in providing 
computer kiosks in rural areas. Banerjee ironically remarks that the World Bank enlisted 
the program among the most successful in combating poverty, while at the same time 
acknowledging that the project was “hit hard by lack of electricity and poor connectivity” 
(Banerjee 2007). From this patent failure Banerjee concludes that the World Bank should 
have considered firm evidence about the likely impact of the proposed action before 
having the program implemented. In particular, since RCTs are the simplest and best way 
of assessing the impact of a program, “one would not want to spend a lot of money on an 
intervention without doing at least one successful randomized trial if one is possible” 
(ibid.) 
If the World Bank had estimated the causal effect of the program in question before 
implementing it, as Banerjee indeed recommends, it would probably have predicted that 
the program was unlikely to produce the desired effect in the target context.  
This piece of evidence, however, is not what the World Bank needs in order to 
confront the kind of problem at hand. In the first place, evidence about the likely causal 
effect is not necessary, at least at this stage of program implementation. Had the World 
Bank first gathered evidence on the required background conditions, and checked their 
presence or adequacy in the target context, the “hard evidence” of the RCT would have 
become redundant. The regular and reliable provision of electricity is obviously one such 
condition. Upon realizing that the electrical system in place is defective, and the energy 
supply irregular and unreliable, the need to measure the likely impact of installing 
computer kiosks in the villages would just vanish.  
Moreover, knowledge of the background conditions, the ones required by the program 
and the actual, is not delivered by an RCT, or, for that matter, by any method for the 
measurement of causal effects, as they are not designed to provide it. This knowledge, 
  
however, is crucial in the case at hand. It testifies, in fact, that if the required conditions 
are not in place the program cannot just be implemented in the target context as it was in 
the context of origin. Adaptation is required. The policy maker has thus to make the 
program work by adjusting it to the local conditions.  
Adaptation is an issue for the policy maker whenever she considers whether to carry a 
given program over to a new context whose causal structure is dissimilar from the original 
context. Thus, it is a more general concern than that which is being discussed here.108 It is 
hardly the case in fact that two contexts are alike in such a way as to allow for the same 
policy to be implemented in exactly the same way in both cases without the need at least 
of some minor adjustments. Adaptation, however, is an even more challenging issue when 
the causal structure in the target context is defective, as it is often the case in the 
developing contexts of interest here.  
Development programs typically depend for their successful implementation on the 
presence of adequate infrastructures, the production and distribution of resources such as 
water and energy, production and distribution of food, and so on. More ambitious 
programs consist in the implementation of institutional changes. Successful privatization, 
for instance, depends according to many on a broad range of background circumstances 
that span from the adequate protection of property rights, to the rule of law, an 
independent judiciary, a democratic political system, and so on. It is hardly disputable that 
similar conditions are often insufficiently developed, or patently absent, in many 
developing contexts. Adaptation in these cases might consist in rendering the conditions 
adequate for the program to work; that is, setting the conditions “right”. However, it need 
not be.  
If the causal structure is defective in the sense described above, the policy maker actually 
faces a whole range of alternatives. She might in fact decide: 
1. To modify the background conditions so as to render the program 
effective; 
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2. To modify the program so as to adapt it to the actual background 
conditions; 
3. Some strategy between options 1 and 2.  
This situation is characterized by the fact that multiple courses of action are open to 
the policy maker. She has thus to devise the alternative strategies that enable her to fulfill 
the desired goal, and assess them comparatively before coming to the decision of which 
one to implement. The solution to this problem is far from obvious. One concern, among 
several, that arises at this stage is that interfering with the extant causal structure in order 
to set the conditions right might disrupt, or simply affect, local processes in unintended 
ways. In similar situations the policy maker confronts what is more accurately construed 
as a problem of planning rather than mere prediction.  
Planning consists in formulating strategies once the objectives have been defined and 
information about the context taken into account. Prediction instead translates 
information about the environment and the chosen strategy into statement about future 
results (Armstrong 1983). In a planning process what program to implement, how to 
implement it, which other modifications of the context to make are open to question, and 
genuinely devised along the process upon analysis of the actual situation. Whereas 
prediction is concerned with the outcome of given policies, planning consists in designing 
the intervention in such a way that the intended outcome would eventually follow.  
How do we approach planning then? Let’s first consider to what extent a model such 
as Heckman’s would help. Heckman defends the relevance of his model on the grounds 
that it aims at estimating the most ambitious counterfactuals policy makers face. These 
counterfactuals describe what would be the impact on outcomes of new policies, policies 
that have never been tried before, in new populations, populations that, it goes without 
saying, never underwent this policy before.  
The model is thus designed to answers questions such as PH above. Can it be used 
also to address problems like P*? It seems as if, by enabling to estimate the impact of novel 
programs, it could also design novel interventions, and not only assess their effects. In other 
  
words, the model seems equipped for planning policies. This is, however, not the case. 
Consider how the model works. 
 
Y(s) = g(Qs, X, Us) 
 
It displays the causal structure of the outcome by describing its determinants and the 
corresponding functional relations. These determinants comprise the policy specified as a 
vector of components (Qs) and the contextual factors relevant to the outcome (X). A 
“new” policy is characterized here by means of variations of the components of Qs. 
Similarly, a “new” population is defined by modifications of the components of vector X. 
The “new” policy and population look just like the “old” ones, except for the fact that the 
values of the relevant variables, or their components, are set at new levels, levels that have 
not been observed before.  
In this model the policy maker tinkers (theoretically) with the program and context, 
and observes the consequences of her tinkering on the outcome of interest. She 
manipulates a target context the causal structure of which is presupposed, whereas the 
impact of her ideal manipulation is actually inferred. This model, thus, is not adequate to 
address genuine planning. Planning is characterized by the policy being the epistemic output 
of the decisional process, and not its input.  
More specifically, planning consists in the inference from the actual causal structure and 
the intended outcome to the alternative strategies that help achieve the desired goal. In 
planning, knowledge of what variables one is going to manipulate is thus delivered and 
not assumed. The inferential process from actual causal structure and intended outcome to 
alternative strategies is based on a much broader set of considerations than the standard 
approaches to policy making considered in this paper are willing to concede. These 
considerations include: 
I. The background conditions necessary and sufficient for the 
alternative programs to work; 
  
II. The presence or absence of these sets of conditions in the target 
context;  
III. The causal structure in the target context relevant to the outcome of 
interest. 
Concerns about III are particularly prominent. The local context, with its causal field 
and causal laws, is the place where to start to plan the policy. It is also, therefore, the place 
where to start with the modeling process, the output of which should be the program to 
implement. The answer to whether the best strategy to undertake is option 1, 2, or 3 above, 
therefore, crucially depends upon the circumstances in place. Any consideration about the 
effectiveness of a given program needs thus to follow the analysis of the local circumstances 
and the conditions that ought to be present for the program to work. 
The upshot is that one should indeed worry about the causal effects of a given policy; 
which policy this is, however, becomes only apparent upon careful study of the target 
context. In what follows, I shall spend some words on the planning process in general and 
on the type of analysis of the target context that is relevant to it and why. In particular, I 
shall argue that case studies play a prominent role in this analysis and that, in so doing, 
they provide relevant evidence for the very early stages of the planning process.  
 
4.7 WHAT ELSE DO WE NEED FOR PLANNING? 
That planning rests on a much broader set of considerations than those enabled by the 
approaches examined in this chapter is easily proved by a sketchy, and admittedly 
approximate, description of the planning process. One can distinguish several phases 
within the process, each demanding distinct analysis and evidence (Armstrong 1983)109. 
The first consists in the specification of the objective. Setting the desired goal presupposes a 
diagnosis of the problem at hand, which requires background theory and empirical analysis 
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to define and explain the relevant problem. The analysis of the problem affects how the 
objective is formulated.  
The second phase consists in the generation of alternative strategies to achieve the desired 
goal. The analysis of the causal structure in the target context is central here. It ideally 
includes the alternative causal paths through which the outcome is affected (each 
corresponding to a potential strategy of intervention), and the background conditions 
required for each strategy to be effective (the INUS conditions).110 
The third phase consists in the selection of the strategy to be implemented. This decision 
depends on different strands of causal evidence and considerations of various character: 
whether the potential strategies can be actually exploited to fulfill the policy objective; the 
estimate of the causal effect each strategy is likely to produce; the comparison of the 
alternative strategies in other relevant respects (ethical, financial, practical, environmental, 
social), and so on.  
In what follows I will briefly discuss by way of an example how case studies can help 
in the first and second phase by providing relevant evidence for the specification of the 
policy objective and the formulation of alternative strategies of intervention. I will further 
suggest that pieces of causal evidence other than case studies are relevant in the third phase 
of strategy selection.  
In 1981, Amartya Sen published “Poverty and Famines”, an essay on the causes of 
starvation. He presents the entitlement approach as an alternative to the Food Availability 
Decline (FAD) theory which was dominant then. Whereas the FAD theory explains 
starvation as caused by a decline in the availability of food per head, Sen understands it as 
resulting from a person’s failure to be entitled to a bundle with enough food, which is 
determined in turn by legal, social, economic, and political factors of the relevant society 
and by the person’s position in it. Sen’s work can be understood as a defense of the 
empirical superiority of the entitlement approach over the FAD theory in terms of 
predictive accuracy and explanatory power. The FAD theory, in fact, leads to the 
                                                          
110 See sections 1.3.3.1 and 3.5.1. 
  
formulation of expectations about the occurrence of starvation that turn out to be 
incorrect in cases where the entitlement approach would deliver correct predictions 
instead. Moreover, even in the cases in which FAD’s predictions happened to be accurate 
the theory fails to account for the actual pattern of starvation: “who died, where, and why?” 
(1981: 120 – italic in the original)  
At the core of Sen’s approach lies the notion of maximum food entitlement:111 
For occupation group j, define maximum food entitlement as: 
 
(Fj) = qj pj/pf 
 
where qj is the amount of commodity each member of group j can sell or consume, pj 
is the price of commodity j, and pf is the price of food per unit (1981: 50). Entitlement 
failures are “direct” when one produces less food for own consumption; when one obtains 
less food through trade by exchanging one’s commodity for food one experiences a “trade 
entitlement failure” (1981: 51). Trade entitlement failure, in turn, can be caused by a 
decrease in qj due to an autonomous production decline (e.g. when livestock is destroyed 
by a draught) or to a fall in the demand for the good in question. Alternatively, it can be 
due to a decline in occupation j’s food exchange rate (pj/pf). Sen explains that groups can 
suffer both direct and trade entitlement failure when they produce a commodity that is 
both directly consumed and exchanged for some other food. In this perspective, people 
failure’s to command enough food as represented by a fall in Fj is the cause of starvation.112 
Sen’s theoretical introduction is followed by the analysis of four cases of starvation: 
the Great Bengal famine (1943), the Ethiopian famine (1972-1974), the famine in Sahel 
(1973),113 and that in Bangladesh (1974). The four case studies play a prominent role in his 
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falls in the entitlement set are determined by illegal transfers such as brigandage and looting. 
113 Sen distinguish three alternative definitions of “Sahel”. In what follows I adopt the political definition 
according to which Sahel refers to six countries in the Sahelian area, namely Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, 
Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Niger, and Chad. 
  
argumentative strategy. One purpose of introducing actual case studies of starvation is, in 
fact, proving the empirical superiority of the entitlement approach over the FAD theory. 
Upon the analysis of available data, for instance, Sen remarks that neither Bengal nor 
Ethiopia experienced a dramatic decline in food availability per capita in terms of either 
food production or calories consumption. The FAD theory would thus have failed as a 
predictor in these cases. It would have succeeded instead in the case of Sahel where a 
dramatic decrease in food availability was indeed experienced. However, the theory could 
not account for the specific pattern of starvation observed in this area which caused a 
sharp increase in the mortality rate of specific segments of the population.  
The case studies do not only provide evidence for the higher empirical adequacy of 
the entitlement approach over the FAD theory, however. Through the lenses of the 
entitlement approach, they identify local patterns in the actual causation of starvation that 
vary from case to case. The analysis of how entitlement relations shifted in the years of 
the famines brings to light specificities of each case that in the absence of a case-based 
analysis would have gone unnoticed. In Bengal, the starvation was driven by a sharp 
increase in the price of rice typical of an economy of war which was further fuelled by the 
following speculation and panic hoarding.114 In this context the segments of society that 
suffered the most where people in those occupations that, being not subsidized by the 
government, faced a dramatic deterioration in their terms of trade and a drastic fall in the 
demand for the goods they actually produced (e.g. agricultural laborers, fishermen, 
craftsmen, and other productive occupations). The massive starvation that occurred in 
Ethiopia in 1972-1974 was triggered by the severe drought in the Sahel belt in the 
preceding years. The sharpest decline in food entitlement was here experienced by pastoral 
nomads and agriculturists from the Eastern regions who underwent dramatic losses of 
their own crops and livestock and tried to find relief by migrating to the capital Addis 
Ababa.  
                                                          
114 In 1942 Japanese troops occupied Burma (now Myanmar) which was then part of the British Empire. 
Being part of the British Empire itself, Bengal was directly involved in the conflict.  
  
Shedding light on the specificities of actual causal patterns in each case is certainly 
interesting on its own. More importantly, it is a preliminary to actual planning.  
 
STAGE I: IDENTIFYING THE POLICY OBJECTIVE  
The first stage in planning consists in the specification of the objective: it depends on how 
the problem is analyzed with the help of background theory and empirical analysis, 
performed in Sen’s work by means of case studies. Sen frames the problem of starvation 
within the entitlement approach. As discussed above this framework proves empirically 
successful in the cases at hand; however, it is too abstract to help specifying adequately a 
policy objective. The entitlement approach to starvation as such would in fact suggest as 
a goal that of preventing a failure in the food entitlement of the relevant population. An 
adequate specification of this policy objective would require that one clarifies what the 
relevant segments of the population are and what induced the failure in their food 
entitlement. Case studies can help at this stage by re-situating the problem in the context at 
hand: in this way, they render possible the identification of a more concrete policy 
objective.115 The case study of the famine in Sahel can illustrate this fact.   
In Sahel starvation is typically engendered by occasional draughts and hits specific 
segments of the population, namely pastoral nomads and agriculturists that inhabit the 
northern regions within these countries. In the years of severe draught (1972-74), pastoral 
nomads and agriculturists in the dry region of Sahel had their crops and livestock either 
destructed or severely damaged. Both these segments of the population suffered direct 
and trade failure in their food entitlement due to a sharp drop in the amount of commodity 
produced and its price. In particular the exchange rates between animals and grain 
collapsed despite the severe loss in livestock.116 The sharp fall in their command over food 
                                                          
115 See section 1.3.3.1 for a discussion of why concrete causal knowledge might be relevant for policy 
making. 
116 This unusual combination of decline in the quantity and price of the same good, namely livestock, is 
explained by Sen in several ways. First, consumption in times of crisis tend to move away from animals 
that are “superior goods” towards grains which are cheaper source of nutrition; furthermore, animals are 
often saved as stock and in times of difficulty the owner might need to “dissave”. Finally grains constitute 
  
explains why precisely the nomadic pastoral population and agriculturists from this area 
in each country had the highest mortality rate, and were thus much more affected than 
other segments of the population by the draught.  
The case study, thus, identifies the context in which the Sahelian famine exploded, the 
factor that triggered it (the occasional draught), and the segments of population that 
experienced the most dramatic shift in food entitlement. On the basis of this evidence the 
policy objective is identified in reducing herders’ and agriculturists’ vulnerability to draught.  
 
STAGE II: FORMULATING STRATEGIES OF INTERVENTION 
Once the objective is specified, alternative strategies of intervention are formulated on the 
basis of the local causal patterns of starvation retrieved by means of the case-based analysis 
of the target context. This strategy consists in back-tracking from the outcome of interest 
(the policy objective) to causes through the analysis of the processes connecting the latter 
to the former (a sort of process-tracing from outcomes to causes). The following diagram 
represents the causal structure Sen reconstructs in the case of Sahel (1981: 126-129): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
a more adjustable (and thus desirable) stock than livestock and its products when the time pattern of 
consumption requires flexibility. 
  
Fig. 4.1 Starvation in Sahel 
 
 
 
In figure 4.1 red arrows stand for negative causal influence, green arrows stand for positive 
causal influence, and black arrows pointing into other arrows represent factors that disrupt 
existing mechanisms (the disruption is represented by the yellow flash). 
This type of analysis consists in the identification of multiple causal paths leading to 
the same outcome. The obvious benefit is that multiple courses of action are actually 
identified. Each path is a causal process that could be potentially exploited to modify the 
outcome. One can regard each process, in fact, as corresponding to an alternative strategy 
of intervention, and the causal variables that belong to it as potential levers that could be 
in principle manipulated to affect the outcome. But there is more to it. This type of analysis 
leads also to the identification of the processes that used to be operative and had been disrupted 
at a certain point in time.  
  
There is evidence that traditional insurance systems were in place against draught 
which consisted in the movements of herds across the Sahel region (i.e. across the actual 
borders). The system was disrupted by the political division of Sahel which limited the 
freedom of movements of pastoral nomads. Similarly, commercialization disrupted the 
symbiotic relationship between livestock and traditional crops that used to grant a stable 
production of food. Reactivating these processes might, or might not be, a viable strategy. 
However, it seems that the option should not be excluded a priori, but only after an 
accurate empirical analysis of the processes that used to be in place, and of the factors that 
led to their disruption.  
There are moral reasons that might justify a similar course of action, but they do not 
concern us here. There is also at least one practical reason of why this epistemic strategy 
might be recommendable. Having the background conditions in place is one of the factors 
that should matter in the criteria one uses when choosing among strategies of intervention. 
If the cause to manipulate belongs to processes that are local it might be the case that the 
required background conditions are already in place. If these processes were disrupted at 
some point in time, it is prima facie plausible that the background conditions might be 
easier to set right because they are part of local mechanisms that used to be at work in the 
target context. Implementing similar strategies would thus require less adaptation to local 
conditions than strategies conceived and imported from outside.  
Case studies thus help formulate alternative strategies by providing processual and 
contextual evidence.117 In particular, if they outline the complete causal mechanisms they 
can fulfill the two epistemic requirements of the second phase of planning. First, 
mechanisms are the alternative causal paths through which the outcome can be affected: 
each of them thus constitutes a potential strategy of intervention. Furthermore, the 
description of complete mechanisms individuates the background conditions that together 
produce the outcome. If the mechanisms are actually operating in the context the 
background conditions are necessarily in place and their identification is not strictly 
                                                          
117 I discuss the relevance of processual and contextual knowledge for policy making in section 1.3.3.1. 
  
speaking required for strategy implementation.118 If the mechanisms have been disrupted, 
and thorough investigation of the background conditions involved cannot be performed 
in the target context, one should turn to cases where similar mechanisms are actually in 
place. If these cases are epistemically accessible, they can be used to extrapolate knowledge 
of the missing background factors upon comparison with the target of interest.119 
 
STAGE III: POLICY SELECTION 
The analysis of the causal processes leading to the outcome of interest, the actual and the 
disrupted, is not sufficient on its own for the selection among the alternative strategies of 
intervention. Letting aside considerations that have to do with the side-effects of policies 
or with concerns of other nature (financial and ethical considerations for instance), for 
purposes of strategy selection knowledge of causal processes needs to be supplemented 
by other pieces of causal evidence. Two certainly seem prominent here. First, one needs 
evidence that the alternative strategies are invariant under (some range of) intervention. 
Invariance under intervention is also called stability or autonomy in the econometric 
discourse. The underlying idea is that the causal relationship one intends to exploit to 
reach the policy objective does not break when one intervenes on it by manipulating some 
of the factors in the relevant causal process. Second, one needs evidence of causal effects. 
The quantitative estimate of the impact that each strategy would have on the outcome in 
question is in fact relevant to choose among the possible strategies. 
  These two pieces of evidence, invariance under intervention and causal effects, are 
both underwritten by counterfactual claims. Single case studies, however, cannot support 
counterfactuals: to evaluate counterfactual claims one need to turn instead to causal 
models. Two methodological proposals are promising in this respect. Qualitative claims 
that certain causal relations are invariant under a range of interventions can be assessed 
within models such as those proposed by Reiss (Reiss 2011). The causal model Reiss 
describes is devised to evaluate token claims. In the light of the previous discussion it is 
                                                          
118 It might be, however, useful when exploring the side effects of the policy at hand.  
119 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of how making case studies comparable. 
  
reasonable to think of policy claims as token causal claims: strategies of interventions that 
are specified at a high level of concreteness because they are formulated on the basis of 
local causal processes and fit outcomes that also are.120 The strategies that prove to be 
invariant under intervention can then be compared in terms of the causal effect each of 
them is likely to produce by using models such as Heckman’s.121 
Heckman’s model for causal effects should thus be regarded as one epistemic input, 
among others, for planning. It is one of the premises in a complex inferential process that 
delivers as its epistemic output the strategy to implement in order to fulfill the policy 
objective. In contexts where planning comes to the forefront, the inference from intended 
outcome and actual causal structure to alternative strategies is prior to the inferences 
licensed by models for causal effects like Heckman’s. Only once the range of alternative 
strategies is specified, in fact, policy makers can engage with the actual selection of the 
strategy to implement. Causal effects become a relevant piece of evidence, one among 
many, at this stage of the decisional process. The selection from a range of alternatives, in 
fact, should also be based on the consideration of possible side-effects as well as financial, 
environmental, and social concerns. Furthermore, ethical considerations play a crucial role 
at this stage: what concerns, and whose concerns, give priority to in selecting the strategy 
to implement is matter that requires the policy maker to take a normative stance.  
Approaches that give central stage to causal effects in the analysis of policy making 
forgo a crucial dimension which amounts to formulating alternative strategies of 
intervention. This dimension of policy making should also be subject to methodological 
scrutiny.  It seems particularly important in contexts where policy making cannot, and 
should not, be reduced to carrying over strategies implemented elsewhere. Contexts where 
the necessary factors for the success of policies are lacking or defective make room for 
deep reformulation of policies and adaptation to local conditions. The epistemic starting 
                                                          
120 For a discussion of the notion of fitness of causal claims and the requirement that causes fit outcomes 
(and the other way around) see Woodward (2010). 
121 On intuitive ground, I would further suggest that Heckman’s model measure causal effects for causal 
relationships whose invariance under intervention is presupposed rather than inferred within the model. 
  
point for this inquiry then needs to be the inference from local causal conditions to 
possible alternative strategies.  
 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I defended the idea that problems of external validity and relevance are, 
indeed, tightly connected. Relevance, however, should not be regarded as a spill-over 
effect of external validity. Rather, it should be regarded as a distinct, and prior, concern. I 
suggest in fact that the concern for relevance should drive the search for evidence, and 
thus dictate whether and when concerns about external validity should also be raised. 
Giving relevance priority over external validity means raising first the question of what 
kind of problems the policy maker addresses, what evidence she might need to solve them, 
and how this evidence can be provided.  
Due to defective causal structures and need for adaptation, intervening in developing 
contexts is better understood as a problem of planning. Planning differs from prediction 
in that the policy to implement is treated as the epistemic output, rather than the input, of 
a complex inferential procedure in which the knowledge of the target context is upfront. 
I submit that case studies are relevant at the early stages of planning by helping the 
specification of the policy objectives and the formulation of alternative strategies of 
intervention. Causal effects, such as those Heckman’s model can measure, are a valuable 
input at the later stage of strategy selection. Even at this stage, however, they are but one 
relevant piece of evidence among others.  
Factual matters are by no means the only important concern when planning policies 
in developing contexts. Ethical concerns are at least equally prominent and, as such, they 
deserve a separate and thorough discussion.122 
  
                                                          
122 For a discussion of the complex relation between values, science, and policy making see Douglas 
(2005). 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
Studying the uses and the forms of case-based reasoning is a broad and intriguing endeavor 
for the philosophical speculation, and the narrow and partial discussion in the previous 
chapters can hardly do justice to it. Case-based reasoning in its multiple forms permeates 
our scientific, moral, and practical thinking; from this pervasiveness and its apparent 
simplicity much of its fascination as well as its challenges derive. The lack of formal 
sophistication and clear-cut results probably contributed to make it for a long time a 
forgotten method for the philosopher of science, although it never was for the social 
scientist. Even in the times in which case-based reasoning was subject to the harshest 
critiques and fell into discredit, social scientists could hardly ignore the simple fact that 
case studies continued to be a persistent feature of their practices. Thus, the case study 
never truly deserted the social scientist’s toolbox and her methodological discussions. 
This thesis is an attempt to bring case studies back to the fore of philosophical 
discussion. It does so in a moment of raising awareness among philosophers of science of 
the oblivion in which case studies fell for long time and of their importance. I addressed 
case-based reasoning from a very specific, and arguably narrow, angle. First, I confined 
my analysis to methodological issues, eschewing other fruitful perspectives such as the 
historical, the sociological, the epistemological, and the ethical, to name just a few. 
Furthermore, I restricted the disciplinary fields of investigation to some social sciences, to 
the exclusion of other fields where case-study reasoning arguably play a prominent role, 
for instance medicine, biology, psychology, psychiatry, and business studies. Moreover, I 
looked at case-based reasoning as an epistemic strategy for inquiring into social 
phenomena. In particular, I conceived of case study research as a machinery for 
establishing hypotheses, and of case studies as the output of its operation in which raw 
evidence, its analysis, and the ensuing conclusions intermingle.  
To some extent my work is a reaction to two challenges to which case study research 
has been repeatedly subjected. On the one hand, case studies have been typically regarded 
as providing limited justification to the scientific hypotheses. This idea can be rephrased 
in a more modern, and quite fashionable, vocabulary by saying that case studies are too 
  
soft a piece of evidence for scientific inquiry. Case study research has also been often 
dismissed for its lack of generalizing power. Understandably, this charge becomes 
particularly serious when the generation of generalizations is regarded as the main aim of 
science. Only to some extent, however, was my work directed at addressing these 
challenges: it had also a more constructive goal, which is exploring the potential and 
specificity of case studies. In the methodological framework I adopted this amounted to 
understand the ways in which case study research finds, validates, and generalize 
knowledge, what kind of knowledge this is, and to clarify thus what case studies can offer 
that the other methods cannot provide. 
This line of inquiry was also backed up by the conviction that the social scientific 
practice can be conducted in such a way as to be of use to the policy-maker, and that case 
studies possess features that render them interesting from this point of view. This ultimate 
preoccupation was, however, also influenced by the belief that the relationship between 
scientific practice and policy making is very complex. On the one hand, as other scholars 
previously acknowledged, scientific results are just one input into policy decision making, 
where a much broader set of considerations is at stake. On the other hand, there is no 
obvious and straightforward way for scientific epistemic practices to be of use to the policy 
makers. The spillover of scientific activity onto policies is various and, to some extent, 
unforeseeable. For what concerns my methodological investigation, I regarded the issues 
of internal validity, external validity, and relevance as crucial for a scientific practice that 
counts being of use to the policy makers among its objective.  
Historical narratives are the output of case study research when employed for causal 
investigation. The primary objective of my inquiry into historical narratives has been to 
define the conditions under which the results of a causal inquiry so conducted can be 
regarded as valid. I focused in particular on process-tracing as the most widespread and 
less understood technique of causal analysis in case studies. Whereas previous proposals 
have been made to assess the contribution of process-tracing as such, these conditions 
prove to be very narrow in terms of applicability. In particular they fail to apply to 
historical narratives that are not deductively derived. On an intuitive ground I argue that 
  
this is most often the case, and devise conditions for the circumstances in which historical 
narratives are the outcome of a markedly inductive inference. It remained to be ascertained 
whether the validity conditions that I propose are applicable across the board that is, can 
also operate in those contexts where process-tracing relies substantially on the use of 
theoretical, experimental, or statistical evidence. 
A reasonable demand to make on causal hypotheses thus obtained is that they be valid 
not only for the cases in which they have been established, but also in other cases yet 
unexplored, or studied only to a limited extent. This demand is reasonable because it is 
hard to deny that the scientific practice is to some extent a generalizing endeavor, and because 
scientific conclusions that fail to travel to other contexts can be hardly of use when less 
proximate purposes, like for instance policy making, come to the fore. In the philosophical 
debate external validity is much discussed and yet riddled with conceptual confusions. This 
is even truer of case study research. First of all, it is not indisputable that external validity, 
a concept coined in the experimental context, is the most suitable way to treat the problem 
of generalizability from case studies. Furthermore, the way the concept is used by a case 
study researcher is very much imbued of statistical talk and influences. This had the effect 
of leading the discussion on the external validity of case studies to what I regard as a dead 
end. Thus I confined my attention to the latter issue and to what I would describe as 
conceptual cleansing. The former question, however, is so far unanswered and calls for 
attention. 
When one considers the aims of scientific practice, and evaluates the methods and the 
results they deliver also for their capacity to fulfill those aims, validity is a necessary but 
insufficient concept. Relevance is an equally important concern. It measures the adequacy 
of the scientific results for the purposes we value and the problems we try to solve. It thus 
requires thorough discussion of which aims are a legitimate goal of scientific inquiry, and 
which ones are not, and draws to some extent on factual considerations to justify one’s 
point of view. Relevance, then, is what is also at stake in the growing debate on the use of 
randomized controlled experiments in development economics, whose aim is noble and 
hardly objectionable, that is erasing poverty from that part of the world that still suffers 
  
from it. I rejoin this debate because in the first place it offers the occasion to draw a neater 
distinction between external validity and relevance, which were conflated so far. While the 
two are connected, it is not only fruitful but also necessary to regard them as distinct 
concerns. Furthermore, it allows me to emphasize that the relevance of a given piece of 
evidence, namely causal effects in the debate in question, strongly depends on how one 
conceptualizes the type of problem policy makers actually face.   
I characterized the problems policy makers face in developing contexts as problems 
of planning, and outlined this notion within an admittedly sketchy framework. What 
emerges from that discussion, however streamlined and incomplete, is that multiple source 
of evidence are required when one confronts purposes as embedded in their concrete 
context of reference. I pointed out that case studies are relevant evidence for planning 
because they help to specify the policy objectives and to identify alternative strategies of 
intervention; I also suggested, however, that this is but one piece of evidence among the 
many the policy maker needs. Future methodological investigations might help clarify 
further what are the distinct pieces of evidence that serve those purpose, what methods 
can provide them, and how they can be integrated. Future avenues of research might then 
also be directed to understand more precisely what the role of case studies is among the 
various sources of evidence on which we can draw; and to elucidate further their specificity 
and the respects in which they differ from other evidence. Finally, one might investigate 
what sorts of complementarities can arise by the conjoined use of different methods. 
What I regard as the most challenging and seductive of the possible pursuits in this 
line of research is the attempt to gain deeper philosophical insight into the nuances and 
reaches of the case-based forms of reasoning. That is having a firmer grasp on what it 
means to reason in cases, and to reason with cases. When is something turned into a case, 
and what does it mean to look at something as a case? How does one reason from case to 
case, and when is this reasoning sound and fruitful? What does one carry with herself 
along the travel? This I regard as the most intriguing, and probably the most elusive, of all 
quests along this research path. Most probably, these are questions to which multiple 
answers can be given, and be all valid. If I had to pursue such an endeavor, however, I 
  
would do it equipped not only with the analytical lenses of the philosopher of science but 
with those of the historian and the sociologist as well.    
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SAMENVATTING 
 
  Ondanks modetrends in de academische wereld heeft case-based reasoning bewezen een 
blijvende vorm van analyse te zijn in de sociale wetenschappen, de geesteswetenschappen en het 
morele denken. Algemeen gesproken houdt case-based reasoning in dat de uiteindelijke bron van 
onze kentheoretische en morele intuïties gevonden kan worden in de tastbaarheid van specifieke 
gevallen. Hoewel ze een gemeenschappelijke oorsprong hebben, bestaan er verschillende tradities 
in het academische landschap die gebruik maken van case studies en case-based reasoning. Deze 
dissertatie richt zich primair op het gebruik van case studies in de sociale wetenschappen die als 
epistemisch doel hebben om causale hypotheses te formuleren, vast te stellen of te generaliseren. 
Een tweede doel is het onderzoeken van het nut en belang van causale bevindingen verkregen in 
en door middel van case studies voor beleidsvorming in de sociale praktijk.   
  De dissertatie bestaat uit 4 hoofdstukken. In hoofdstuk 1 beschrijf ik wat kan worden 
gezien als twee verschillende zienswijzen op case studies en de achterliggende 
wetenschapsfilosofie. De eerste benadering floreerde in de jaren zeventig en zag case studies als 
een bijzondere - en vaak minder overtuigende – vorm van experimenteel, statistisch of 
vergelijkend onderzoek. Aangezien deze benadering geneigd is case studies te evalueren met 
standaarden uit andere methodologische tradities, kan het gezien worden als een heteronoom 
paradigma. De tweede, alternatieve zienswijze  die in het afgelopen decennium werd ontwikkeld  
begint langzaam aan een vorm aan te nemen en is bij lange na niet volledig gearticuleerd. Deze 
benadering beoogt case studies los te koppelen van het idee dat ze slechts gebruikt moeten 
worden als andere methodes niet beschikbaar zijn. Case studies worden hierbij gezien als een 
autonoom epistemisch genre (Morgan 2012). 
  In hoofdstuk 2 bespreek ik de interne validiteit van case studies in de vorm van 
historische narratieven. Dergelijke case studies beogen causale hypotheses te formuleren en te 
onderbouwen door reeksen gebeurtenissen te beschrijven die tot een bepaald resultaat leiden. 
Doorgaans maken ze gebruik van het nalopen van processen (process-tracing) om tot causale 
gevolgtrekkingen te komen en wenden zich daarnaast tot vergelijkend onderzoek. Ondanks het 
belang van historische narratieven in de sociale wetenschappen is de rol van process-tracing in 
deze narratieven nog slecht begrepen. Feitelijk is het debat over process-tracing dat de afgelopen 
jaren flink is toegenomen in academische publicaties nog onduidelijk en onderontwikkeld. Meer 
specifiek zijn er nog geen gedeelde criteria om de epistemische waarde van academische bijdrage 
van process-tracing te beoordelen. Bovendien binden de voorwaarden die worden geopperd vaak 
de geldigheid van de bevindingen aan het gebruik van specifieke vormen van bewijs, en bieden 
dus geen nuttige inzichten als deze specifieke bewijzen er niet zijn. 
  Ik betoog dat de voorgestelde voorwaarden onnodig beperkend zijn en de werkelijke 
waarde die process-tracing te bieden heeft als het om causale gevolgtrekking gaat niet erkennen. 
Ik formuleer nieuwe voorwaarden om de prestaties van process-tracing te beoordelen wanneer de 
omstandigheden niet gunstig zijn en bestaande criteria niet van toepassing zijn. 
  In hoofdstuk 3 bespreek ik het generaliseerbaarheidsprobleem. Ik geef een overzicht van 
wat ik zie als de traditionele zienswijze op externe validiteit. Deze benadering is geworteld in een 
statistische visie op case study-onderzoek en ziet externe validiteit slechts als een probleem voor 
representativiteit. Hiermee wordt het debat over generaliseerbaarheid afgekapt, omdat externe 
validiteit simpelweg als een nadeel van case study-onderzoek wordt gezien. Tegelijkertijd wordt 
interne validiteit beschouwd als een relatieve kracht van case study-onderzoek. Op grond hiervan 
wordt in deze benadering case study-onderzoek geadviseerd als interne validiteit het belangrijkste 
onderzoeksdoel is, en worden andere methodes aangeraden als men in plaats daarvan 
generalisaties nastreeft. Dit is een ongelukkige zienswijze omdat case studies feitelijk vaak worden 
gedaan met het  impliciete of expliciete  doel om lessen te trekken met betrekking tot nog 
onbekende gevallen en contexten.  
  
geadviseerd als interne validiteit het belangrijkste onderzoeksdoel is, en worden andere methodes 
aangeraden als men in plaats daarvan generalisaties nastreeft. Dit is een ongelukkige zienswijze 
omdat case studies feitelijk vaak worden gedaan met het  impliciete of expliciete doel om lessen te 
trekken met betrekking tot nog onbekende gevallen en contexten. 
  Ik poog deze spanning op te lossen door de aannames te onderzoeken achter de traditionele 
zienswijze over externe validiteit van case study-onderzoek. Sommige van deze aannames zijn al 
besproken én betwist in het huidige debat. In hoofdstuk 3 bespreek ik die aannames die –naar mijn 
beste weten nog niet geëvalueerd zijn en verantwoordelijk lijken te zijn voor de impasse waarin 
sociale wetenschappers in kwestie zich bevinden. In het bijzonder beargumenteer ik dat het debat 
zich moet richten op de vraag hoe we case studies kunnen vergelijken in plaats van wat een 
prototypische case study is. Deze twee aspecten zijn weliswaar gerelateerd, maar moeten 
onderscheiden worden. De traditionele zienswijze doet dit niet en schept daardoor verwarring over 
wat externe validiteit is en hoe men dit probleem het beste het hoofd kan bieden. Ik verwacht dat 
het verbeteren van vergelijkbaarheid leidt tot nieuwe ruimte voor het verbeteren van de criteria voor 
externe validiteit van resultaten uit case study-onderzoek. 
  In hoofdstuk 4 bespreek ik kwesties met betrekking tot relevantie in de context van 
beleidsgerelateerd onderzoek. In het bijzonder richt ik mij op het debat rondom het gebruik en het 
nut van gerandomiseerd onderzoek met een controlegroep (Randomized Controlled Trials; RCT’s) 
om inzicht te krijgen sociaal-economische ontwikkeling. Deelnemers in het debat zijn het er over 
eens dat RCT’s te kampen hebben met problemen van externe validiteit en dat dit hun nut voor 
beleidstoepassingen beperkt. Ze verschillen echter van mening over de beste strategieën om dit 
probleem het hoofd te bieden. Ik analyseer drie alternatieven uit de economische literatuur: 
replicatie van RCT’s, voorgesteld door de voorstanders van RCT’s; regressie analyse op het niveau 
van landen, een benadering aangehangen door RCT-sceptici; en causale modellen, geopperd door 
James Heckman. Ik betoog dat deze strategieën - in beperkte, en verschillende, mate - succesvol 
zijn in het aanpakken van externe validiteit. 
  Voorstanders van de eerste twee strategieën erkennen onvoldoende dat er een belangrijk 
verschil is tussen relevantie en externe validiteit, en benaderen de eerste als een spillover van de 
tweede. Hun zienswijze is gericht op het verbeteren van de externe validiteit van causale verbanden 
met als aanname dat hiermee relevantie vanzelf volgt. Ik stel dat dit niet terecht is omdat relevantie 
en externe validiteit onderscheiden concepten zijn die apart van elkaar moeten worden beschouwd. 
Het voorstel van Heckman slaagt erin causale verbanden te ontwaren die, feitelijk, relevanter zijn 
voor de doelen van beleidsmakers. Ik betoog echter dat zijn model geen bevredigend antwoord 
vindt op de problemen die beleidsmakers tegenkomen in de ontwikkelingscontext. Heckmans model 
kan weliswaar omgaan met problemen die te maken hebben met voorspellingen, maar in de 
ontwikkelingscontext hebben beleidsmakers vooral te maken met planning en problemen die 
daarbij komen kijken. Planning is een complexe procedure waarbij een verscheidenheid aan 
relevante data gebruikt moet worden en diverse problemen komen kijken. Causale verbanden 
vormen slechts één epistemische input in deze procedure, terwijl case study-onderzoek tevens 
relevant is in andere cruciale fases. 
 
 
 
  
SUMMARY 
 
Despite fads and fashions in the academic culture, case-based reasoning has proved to be a persistent 
form of analysis in the social sciences, in the humanities, and even in moral thinking. Broadly understood, 
case-based reasoning locates the ultimate source of our epistemic and moral intuitions in the concreteness 
and idiosyncrasy of particulars. Even though they can be traced back to a common root, different 
traditions of reasoning with cases and of using case studies coexist in the academic landscape. This thesis 
focuses primarily on the use of case studies in the social sciences as an epistemic strategy to formulate, 
establish, and generalize causal hypotheses. A secondary goal is an investigation into the use of causal 
findings generated within and by means of case studies to inform policy making in the social realm.  
The thesis is organized in four chapters. In chapter 1 I characterize what can be regarded as two 
alternative views of case studies and the understanding of science in which they are embedded. The first 
approach flourished in the 70s and looked at case studies as a special, and typically weaker, form of the 
experimental, statistical, or comparative methods. Since this approach tends to evaluate case studies by 
criteria belonging to other methodological traditions it can be said to present a heteronomous paradigm. 
The second, alternative view, which developed in the last decades, is taking shape gradually and is still far 
from being fully articulated. This approach strives for an understanding of case studies liberated from 
the narrow mindset that caricatures case studies as the method of last resort. In particular, it sees case 
studies as an autonomous epistemic genre (Morgan 2012). 
In chapter 2 I address internal validity in historical narratives. Historical narratives are case studies 
that aim to formulate and substantiate causal hypotheses by articulating descriptions of the sequences of 
events leading to the outcome of interest. They typically make use of process-tracing to draw causal 
inference, and often rely on the additional use of the methods of comparison. Despite the important role 
of historical narratives in the social sciences, how process-tracing operates in the narratives is still poorly 
understood. The debate on process-tracing in fact, even though it is growing thanks to a number of 
recent contributions, is still muddy and under-developed. In particular, there are no shared criteria to 
assess its epistemic contribution; moreover, the conditions proposed so far tend to tie the validity of the 
findings to the use of specific kinds of evidence and are thus unhelpful when this specific evidence is not 
available.  
I argue that the proposed conditions are unduly restrictive and fail to acknowledge the actual 
contributions process-tracing can offer to valid causal inference. I formulate new conditions to assess 
process-tracing performance in cases in which the favorable evidential circumstances do not occur and 
existing criteria fail to apply.  
In chapter 3 I address the problem of generalizability. I provide an outline of what I define as the 
traditional view on external validity. This approach is conditioned by a statistical viewpoint on CSR and 
reduces external validity to issues of mere representativeness. In so doing it leads the debate on the 
generalizability of case-study results to a dead end as it quickly dismisses external validity as the downside 
of CSR. At the same time, it suggests that CSR is comparatively stronger in providing results internally 
valid. On this ground this approach recommends the use of case studies when internal validity is the main 
research goal of interest, while turning to other methods when one pursues generalizations instead. This 
outcome is unfortunate because, as a matter of fact, case studies are often performed with the explicit or 
implicit purpose of drawing lessons from the studied case to be carried over to new contexts yet 
unstudied. 
  
I attempt to solve this tension by examining the assumptions behind the traditional view on the 
external validity of CSR. Some of these assumptions have already been addressed, and actually disputed, 
in the current debate. In chapter 3 I focus instead on those assumptions that, to the best of my knowledge, 
have not been addressed yet and seem to be responsible for the dead end in which the discussion among 
social scientists seems to be trapped now. In particular, I suggest that the debate should focus on how 
make case studies comparable rather than how select the typical case. Typicality and comparability are 
concepts closely related but distinct. The traditional view conflates the two and thus run into confusion 
about what external validity is really about and how it can actually be confronted in a fruitful manner. I 
surmise that by enhancing the comparability of studies unnoticed room for improvement is made for 
formulating more reliable assessment of the external validity of results obtained in case studies.  
In chapter 4 I discuss issues of relevance when policy making purposes are at stake. In particular, I 
focus on the debate on the use and usefulness of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to find the key to 
economic and social development. The participants to this debate agree that RCTs are affected by limited 
external validity, and that this impinges on their usefulness for policy making. They diverge, however, on 
the strategies to overcome this problem. I analyze three alternatives that are found in the economic 
literature: replication of RCTs, which has been proposed by the promoters of RCTs; cross-country 
regressions, which have been typically endorsed by RCT-skeptics; and the causal models proposed by 
James Heckman. I argue that these strategies succeed in their attempt to a different, and limited, extent.  
Proponents of the first two strategies fail to take into adequate consideration the distinction between 
external validity and relevance, and treat the latter as a spill-over of the former. Their strategies, in fact, 
aim to improve the external validity of causal effects on the assumption that relevance will automatically 
follow. I argue that this is not the case because external validity and relevance are distinct concerns and 
should thus be confronted separately. The proposal by Heckman succeeds in delivering causal effects 
that are, as a matter of fact, more relevant to policy makers’ purposes. I argue, however, that his model 
cannot adequately address the type of problems policy makers are likely to confront in developing 
contexts. Whereas Heckman’s model is equipped to face problems of prediction, in developing contexts 
policy makers face problems of planning. Planning is a complex procedure that depends on various pieces 
of evidence and raises several concerns. Causal effects are but one epistemic input in this procedure; case-
study evidence is also relevant to the crucial phases of planning.  
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